







T. W. Gordon.



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THE
EXPERIENCED OFFICER

INSTRUCTIONS

FOR THE GENERAL OF DIVISION
FRANCIS WILKINSON

TO HIS SON,

AND TO ALL WHO WISH TO KNOW THE
THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE ART

OF WAR, AND THE DUTY OF A GENERAL OF DIVISION.
BY FRANCIS WILKINSON, ESQ. OF THE ART OF WAR.
AND THE DUTY OF A GENERAL OF DIVISION.
AND THE DUTY OF A GENERAL OF DIVISION.

THE SECOND EDITION, CORRECTED AND IMPROVED.
LONDON: 1795.

BY JAMES WILKINSON, ESQ.

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THE
EXPERIENCED OFFICER;
OR
INSTRUCTIONS
BY
THE GENERAL OF DIVISION,
FRANCIS WIMPFEN,
TO HIS SONS,
AND TO ALL YOUNG MEN INTENDED FOR
THE MILITARY PROFESSION:

Being a Series of Rules laid down by GENERAL WIMPFEN,
to enable Officers of every Rank, to carry on War, in all
its Branches and Descriptions, from the least important En-
terprises and Expeditions, to the decisive Battles, which
involve the Fate of Empires.

THE CORRECTED AND REVISED EDITION OF THE LATEST DATE,
ILLUSTRATED BY NOTES.

WITH AN INTRODUCTION,
By Lieutenant Colonel Macdonald,

Of the FIRST BATTALION of Cinque Port Volunteers; the
Translator of the French Tactics, F. R. S. &c.

LONDON:

PRINTED FOR T. EGERTON, MILITARY LIBRARY, WHITEHALL,

By C. Roworth, Bell Yard, Fleet Street.

1804.




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NOTICES TO THE READER.

THE letter, of which the following is a copy, was received from Colonel Clinton, Secretary to his Royal Highness the Duke of York; and is now, published by permission. It evinces what is so generally felt and acknowledged; the Commander in Chief's encouragement of, and attention to officers of every description, who attempt to improve the military system of tactics. So handsome and flattering a testimony of high approbation, the Translator has been induced to bring forward; and he trusts that his intention will not be misconstrued, and that this notice will not be deemed obtrusive.

“ Horse Guards, 29th October, 1803.

“ SIR,

“ I HAVE had the honour of receiving and of presenting to His Royal Highness the Duke of York, the copy which you sent to me for his Royal Highness, of your translation of the Tactics and Discipline of the French Army, and I am directed to return you his Royal Highness's

a

ness's best thanks for the communication of this interesting and useful work ; and to assure you of the high sense which his Royal Highness entertains of the zealous and laudable motives, which have induced you to devote so much time and labour to this work.—I take this opportunity, also of requesting you will accept my best thanks for the copy which you have been so obliging to send to me.

“ I have the honour to be, Sir,

your most obedient,

humble servant,

(Signed)

W. H. CLINTON.”

“ *Colonel Macdonald,*

&c. &c. &c.”

The following paper was sent to Mr. Egerton, of the Military Library ; who, from its apparent utility, and from a wish to promote the interest of those sensible suggestions, forwarded it to the Translator : the hints are accurate and judicious, and are made public, with a view of calling the attention of officers who are writing on the subject of tactics to these interesting animadversions. A paragraph relating to a small erratum in the French tactics, is omitted, as unnecessary to be inserted.

“ Having

“ Having very little leisure, I must make my observations as short as possible. Colonel Macdonald’s book of French tactics, has given me infinite satisfaction: and as he appears to me to be the only English writer on military subjects, who possesses the merit of understanding minute detail, without which they can never be explained; I, as a volunteer officer, searching for information, rejoice much that he has undertaken a commentary on General Dundas’s Rules and Regulations, which though admirable, are more calculated for soldiers already formed, than for volunteers, or young men entering into the army. A commentary, with plates, such as may be expected from Colonel Macdonald, will render our stock of military science, as far as relates to tactics, complete. As those who are learning a subject know best what they want, hints for the execution of such a work may be given by a volunteer officer; the necessity of which might never strike one of a different description.

1st. I should wish plates of a regiment, in, and during every change of position, particularizing the situation of every officer, serjeant, and corporal, in every situation of the regiment. This would, at once, do away a great many disputes; and also give the most accurate idea of all manœuvres. These plates ought to be independent of the general plates of the manœuvres.

“ 2dly. Guides, and what we call markers, ought to be so distinguished, as to shew, not merely, to what company they belong, but to what flank of the company.

“ 3dly. There ought to be a scale to each plate.

“ 4thly. There ought to be a complete chapter, with plates on markers, guides, directors, &c. shewing every way in which they are employed, and how. The whole ought to be detailed with the same minuteness as the manual exercise.

“ 5thly. The use of sharp shooters, and light infantry, with the method of grafting these on General Dundas's system, should be particularly attended to.

“ 6thly. There ought to be an appendix (with the plates, expressing the topography of the ground) of some brigade manœuvres for 1500, 2000, 2500, 3000, 4000, 6000, 8000, or 12,000 men; namely, such brigades as are commonly under the command of British generals. In this the duty of Staff Officers ought to be minutely detailed; not only in the text, but also in the plates. A scale ought to accompany all these plates: the instructions contained in this part of the work would be of great advantage, (and above every other, would spread military knowledge more than every other circumstance), as it would enable Generals, who have had few or
no

no opportunities of seeing the movements of large bodies, to manœuvre brigades; and would instruct volunteer officers to assist them as leaders of columns, &c. a thing much wanted in our army; as, at present, able generals are prevented from exercising troops, in the way they ought, from the want of Staff Officers.

“ There ought to be distant marks for guides, directors, &c. with several modes of expressing such, so as to shew their changes of position.

“ Of all these enumerations, the 4th, respecting markers, &c. is the most wanted, as well as the most important. This chapter cannot be too full and minute, giving every step they take, and the reasons of every step. The utmost pains ought to be bestowed in rendering the plates illustrating the subject, full and explicit.

“ The time that battalions take from one position to another, in manœuvres of the line, ought to be expressed in the plates, halfway between the positions, as well as the distance.”

The Translator of the French tactics, in his introduction to that work, threw out some hints of the above clear and intelligent description; and he will feel much gratified, if officers, who are desirous of promoting the object suggested,

gested, will leave at Mr. Egerton's library, addressed to him—remarks on any part or parts of General Dundas's excellent work;—cards of brigade reviews that have taken place, or of manœuvres and evolutions, combining the operations and movements of infantry, artillery, and cavalry;—the movements and formations of rifle corps, and light troops, as a covering and component part of a manœuvre; directions for conducting of reviews, if issued previously, in brigade orders; the use made of staff officers, during a review; the nature of the different firings;—the directions given relative to making the charge with bayonets; subsequent remarks made by generals; hints relative to improvements in drilling soldiers;—defects in accoutrements;—scientific or mathematical disquisitions on any part of the movement of small or large bodies, illustrated with rough sketches or calculations;—and reflections in general on military subjects.—Such a work as is suggested, the Translator would be glad to see executed by a *board of tactics*. It will require much reflection, study, and a considerable knowledge of the lower branches of mathematics. *In tenui labor, at tenuis non usus.*

Dover, 21st March, 1804.

INTRODUCTION BY THE TRANSLATOR.

THE professional character, knowledge, abilities, and experience of General Wimpffen, the very advantageous manner in which he has treated the general subject, and the compendious description of the composition, have fully established the repute of this work, on the Continent, and particularly in the estimation of the officers of the French army. They deem it an abstract and epitome of practical military duty, calculated for every situation, and conveying instruction and information of leading and great importance, in conducting the various departments of warfare. The volume has already run through several editions with increased interest; and is reckoned one of those practical treatises found applicable in the field, on every occasion, and in every emergency. While the duties of higher ranks are enumerated, and explained, those of officers commanding posts, detachments, escorts, guards, patrols, reconnoitring parties, and flank-

flanking chains, &c. &c. are laid down in a succinct, and satisfactory manner. The operations of light troops (*the Velites of the Romans*) and the precautions to be observed to ensure success, are particularly dwelt on, and every essential object intimately connected with their duty, is concisely adverted to, and methodically described. When the Translator was in France, prosecuting his enquiries into the state of tactics of that nation, he found this small work in great demand, and in general circulation. The translation of the French Tactics is already before the public. The reception it has experienced, the opinion entertained of it by officers of the highest rank, and the notices in periodical publications, are a proof of the importance attached to the subject at this momentous crisis. The expence attending the publication of foreign military works of magnitude and utility, deters many from translating them. *A Department of Translation*, attached to the high office of Commander in Chief of the Forces, would tend to disseminate military knowledge, and, ultimately, to improve the state of tactics, more especially the branch comprehending light movements. The expence of adequate salaries, compared with the resulting vast utility, would be a mere *bagatelle* in the general scale of military expenditure,

ture. Such productions ought, always, to be elucidated by notes, and references.

The art of war, during the last twelve years, has undergone a considerable change. Pitched battles, and regular engagements are, now, in a great measure, avoided, and a constant series of active and unremitting operations are directed against the flanks and rear of an enemy, to retard, or prevent his progress in front. Had the Austrians, in imitation of their active enemy, adopted counter light movements on the flanks of the French, when they injudiciously, and rashly, pushed forward towards Vienna, depending, solely, on fortune, Buonaparté's inconsiderate career would have terminated at *Campo Formio*, the fatal battle of Marengo (lost by detaching the centre, against every rule, in pursuit of the enemy), and the treaty of Luneville, which laid Europe at his feet, would never have been heard of; and the happiness and peace of civilized society would have been re-established on that *desideratum in politics, unequal, but generally balanced power*. On every principle of war, the army of Italy ought to have put a period to the enormous excesses and unheard of cruelties, which marked its destructive progress, by laying down its polluted arms to the Austrians, in the province of Carinthia. Carnot's sagacity suggested the treaty of Campo Formio, which humbled

bled the House of Austria, while it saved the French army from utter destruction. To light movements the French are indebted for much of their unmerited success, during the course of the revolutionary war; and they adopted them, more from necessity than choice. Their numberless wretched conscripts undisciplined, were marched, handcuffed, to their armies. They threw them out, in swarms, on the flanks of the Austrian columns, to act irregularly, till leisure and opportunity offered, of establishing their discipline. The success exceeded the expectation of the French. The Austrian columns, unaccustomed to this novel species of attack, when they looked for a regular battle, fell into confusion, and retreated before an undisciplined rabble. Such is the origin of the war of posts, which the republicans found it convenient to carry on, till tactical habits rendered their troops capable of acting in line. Nations adopt from each other what sad experience proves to be an obvious advantage in carrying on war. The action of rifle corps, and light troops, is now much depended on, and not unfrequently terminates the contest. All our battalion companies should be trained to the duty of light movements. The French will find that a system, which from being given into on an unusually extensive scale, proved formidable and too successful, will be practised
against

against them, with an activity, spirit, energy, and vigour, equally unexpected, and effectual. The tactics of light troops have now, necessarily, become an important branch of general discipline. Some useful small works have been published on this subject; but, as yet, no regular series of *Rules and Regulations for the Movements of Light Troops* have been published by authority. This is a *desideratum*, and it were to be wished, that Sir David Dundas would take the trouble of drawing up a set of *Rules* of this description, illustrated by a certain number of manœuvres for regular practice and reviews. These rules should detail and describe, *minutely*, the various duties of light troops in every possible situation of individual, and combined action, when accompanying heavy infantry, and when acting separately. Such a work, issued by authority, would render systematic and regularly general, light movements which are, at present, varied and diversified, according to the different modes of thinking of commanding officers. Demi-official compositions on this head are useful as far as they go; but they are not sufficiently tactical, copious, and methodical, nor elucidated by appropriate manœuvres and examples delineated in expressive plates. Such a work as is suggested to be so much wanted, would be of less difficult, than laborious composition; but, it must,

must, necessarily, be the production of an officer of rank, and have the stamp of authority. Sooner or later it must appear, and the earlier the better, *for it is wanted*, as an accompaniment to the Infantry Rules and Regulations. The very limited number of directions at present in use for regulating the movements of light infantry, would constitute a *section only*, in a work that must be extensive, to be adequate to the intended object. The Eighteen Manœuvres enable a reviewing general to form a proper estimate of the state of discipline of a battalion, but a series of evolutions of the line are wanted to exhibit the discipline of brigades, and divisions of the army, and to exclude the practice of erroneous combinations of general movements, not conformable to tactical accuracy. It is almost unnecessary again to observe, that these very requisite manœuvres must originate with a superior officer, and have the sanction of authority. It is the duty of every officer to throw out hints of this description; and intelligent military men will judge how far they may be just.

The Translator has illustrated the interesting work of General Wimpffen, by appropriate notes drawn from various sources of observation and enquiry, and compressed into a comprehensive form, bearing a reference and analogy to the subject of the text. There are no notes annexed
to

to the original work ; and the quality and nature of the composition obviously suggested their insertion. The rules of warfare condensed in this volume, will prove useful at all times, and are particularly applicable at the present crisis, when much will depend on the individual intelligence of officers who may conduct the operations of light corps.

The practicability of invasion is the topic which is prominently obtruded on the unfortunate inhabitants of France, whose prejudices and passions are attempted to be engaged, where their judgment and reason cannot concur. Between forty and fifty publications have appeared on the supposed abuses of the maritime code. The little Corsican, sensible that the subjugation of Britain can alone remove the barrier between him and universal empire, endeavours to inflame the passions, and stimulate the cupidity of his deluded millions, by the hopes of plunder, and the gratification of every illicit wish. Mr. Hauterive, that notorious sycophant, the perverter of truth, and sturdy author of unblushing falsehoods, though repeatedly held up to ridicule and merited contempt, by able writers who have clearly exposed his fallacy and weakness, still takes the lead of these sophistical scribblers, and continues to draw inadmissible conclusions from premises not granted, and to substitute

stitute declamation, and impudent assertion, for argument, and facts. The people are commanded to believe, and dare not avow a free opinion in a country where the liberty of the press is totally annihilated by a revolution that is but a register of the most atrocious crimes, and of the most unprincipled acts of oppression, cruelty, and injustice recorded in the history of any oppressor of the human race. It is not the jargon of liberty, but avarice that leads the French Revolution. Plunder and rapine follow its traces, and murder and ferocity are the nurses that fostered it, and will adhere to it to the latest hour of its existence. Committees of public safety, senates, directories, consulates, councils, ministers and generals, *all* have but *one* object, the conversion of power and conquest, obtained by bribery and deceit, into a right of general pillage and confiscation. No species of property, public or private, has escaped from French rapacity. Every nation, whether hostile or neuter, republican or monarchical, whose wealth they knew, or whose patience they tried, has experienced the same melancholy fate. The quantum of pillage exacted, in various shapes of oppression, during the Revolution, is reckoned greater than the national debt of Britain: even language has felt the debasing influence of the Revolution. The fulsome and adulatory harangues

rangues delivered during the consulate, are of an insipid, affected, and disgusting description. Purity of language has taken its flight, with purity of manners, and rectitude of moral conduct. It will scarcely be believed, that France is the country of the Bossuets, Massillons, Fenelons, not to mention the eminent writers produced by old France.

The chief consul, whom the pope calls his *beloved son in Christ*, and whose many amiable qualities, have so frequently been the theme of public animadversion, however much he may resemble Julius Cæsar, in inordinate ambition, and enmity to liberty, is certainly inferior to that subtle tyrant in classical composition, and grammatical accuracy. The would-be Emperor of the modern Gauls, is most woefully deficient in the humblest qualification of a writer, *common spelling*; but he is excused on this score, as a foreign adventurer. The French, in confidence, give a summary of his powers, by saying, *il n'a que l'audace*, meaning by that word assurance, and impetuous impudence. He makes up in cunning, what he wants in acquirement; and certainly possesses the art, in an eminent degree, of converting the talents of others to his immediate purposes. He has set, and got by heart speeches, adapted to the character and pursuits of those to be introduced to him, who depart
impressed

impressed with a wonderful opinion of his profound information and wisdom. Of his invincible intrepidity, and political sagacity, let the sands of Syria, and the mornes of St. Domingo bear testimony. Had he adopted the *wise code* offered by the enlightened and unfortunate *Toussaint*, St. Domingo, unaffailable by Britain, would have remained a valuable and secure colony to France; and though the reflection wounds the feelings of humanity, the world contemplates, with a mixt sensation of amazement and dread, the awful dispensation of 40,000 unfortunate wretches, meeting a merited fate, and sacrificed to the views of an unworthy upstart, who thought the subjugation of that fertile island, a sure means of stripping Britain of all her Transatlantic possessions. The shade of *Toussaint* has been amply revenged; and it remains for Great Britain to benefit by the disaster of the republicans, without committing the safety of the West Indian colonies. The carrying trade of St. Domingo should be, as much as possible, in British bottoms. This will improve commerce, effect every desirable object, and exclude the evident danger of direct and immediate intercourse. A few simple factories will be adequate to the establishment of a degree of communication, demanding extreme caution, and unremitting vigilance. An increase of European
force

force in *Jamaica*, is an indispensable measure. The invasion of Britain remains to confirm the political acumen of the mighty first, and in all likelihood, last Consul. His prudence will stand in the way of the increase of his fame, and will prevent his affording himself another opportunity of retiring, covered with the glory that enveloped him, mounted on a camel, in his celebrated retreat from *Acre* to *Jaffa*.* The massacre there is a subject almost threadbare: be it however, just observed, that many of our countrymen, who visited France, had the *fact related, and confirmed to them by Bertier's own narration*. The Translator, were any proofs wanting

* Dumourier, in the history of his own life, writes, that the Marquis de Rozier, and the brother of Marshal Broglie, had been twenty years employed in preparing surveys, drawing plans, and making an arrangement for an invasion threatened, with 50,000 men, to be landed at Portsmouth, Plymouth, and the Isle of Wight. A *coup de main* was, at the same time, to be made on *Guernsey* and *Jersey*. The Duke of *Parma* was to have embarked 30,000 men, to join 20,000 on board of the *invincible armada*. The metropolis, through the Thames, was to be the mortal blow that was to lay England at the feet of a merciless and furious bigot. Dover ought to be strongly fortified, and have its harbour enlarged; Harwich and Edinburgh should be strengthened; a strong fort should be constructed at Pevensey. Martello towers prevent a landing, and annoy covering shipping: all this is so obviously useful and wanting, as to require no discussion.

in addition to those already before the public, could mention the most respectable names. The Consul has given a new and unheard-of construction to language. He has asserted, that *England single-handed*, cannot, now, cope with *France*. If the direct proposition holds, the converse will equally; *that France alone is an overmatch for Britain*. But how stands the fact, and which of the two powers is *single-handed*? Buonaparté might be supposed born in a neighbouring country, when he decreed, that *France was alone*, with the resources of *Spain* and *Portugal*,—with the ships, money, and men of *Holland*, at her command,—with the plunder of *Hanover*, employed in recruiting her armies, and clothing her ragged troops—with all the means of *Italy* and *Switzerland*, actively brought forward,—with money raised by the swindling sale of *Louisiana*, and *with a force beyond the law* in *France*, and the *Netherlands*, to drive the miserable and unwilling inhabitants into this *single-handed* contest, undoubtedly on the part of *England*.——The little man endeavoured to draw all the northern powers into this *single-handed* contest, by attempting to establish the contrary proposition to the exploded principle, “*that free bottoms made free goods*. He artfully proposed, through a neutral power, to allow *Prussia* to protect *Hanover*, if *England* would

would respect the *Prussian flag*. The evident Machiavelian drift of this insidious proposal, was to involve us with the northern powers, to procure materials for his navy, to obtain constant intelligence, and to invade Scotland, under the Prussian flag, as a master-piece of political deceit, or *ruse de guerre*, on which to found a Corsican law of nations, on new principles, superseding those of Grotius, Puffendorf, Vattel, and other venerable writers.

Spain continued for a century, the rival and terror of England and France, and the tyrant over Europe, Asia, Africa, and America. Her fleet menaced the destruction of English liberty, while her army sent a French king prisoner to Madrid. After a gradual decline of her military renown, the treaty of the Pyrenees put a period to her greatness, and subjected her to France. The peace of Westphalia, concluded at Munster, organized the constitution of the German empire, which has subsisted for one hundred and fifty years, until lately, the intrigues of Buonaparté, more than victories, created in its place, a code of plunder, anarchy, and confusion. Germany is, thus situated, indirectly engaged in the single-handed contest, which the tame acquiescence of Prussia aids not a little. Let the degraded powers of Europe at-

nition, made fifty years ago, by the thinking
 and sagacious *Montesquieu*, "*Were one of the
 powers of Europe to make war as the Romans did,
 at the expence of those whom it vanquished, and
 draw its resources from war itself, it would at-
 tain the empire of the world.*" A war with Spain
 is ultimately unavoidable; the peace of Basle,
 and court favour, raised an obscure subaltern,
 in the Walloon Guards, to rank, title, and riches;
 and the Duke of A——, the Prince of Peace,
 and the creature of Buonaparté, will, *nolens, vo-
 lens*, grant treasures to France, which will main-
 tain republican armies, and which a war with
 Spain, would divert into English channels, more
 speedily than the circuitous operation of com-
 merce with Spain, that cannot much longer ex-
 ist. Nothing short of a treaty offensive and de-
 fensive between England, Russia, and Austria,
 can constitute an equilibrium of power, and save
 the liberties of Europe. Count Markoff justly
 remarked to a neutral ambassador, that an armed
 and vigorous mediation, was the only means
 of fixing the limits of the French territory; and
 of putting a necessary barrier to the ambition of
 her ruler.

The maritime powers, including Prussia and
 Germany, though sensible of the danger arising
 from the unbounded ambition, and suddenly ac-
 quired power of France, are meanly jealous of
 the

the commerce, wealth, prosperity, and naval power of Britain. They entertain but little apprehension that the republic of France, with a reduced, crippled, and inadequate navy, can make any serious impression on this kingdom, prepared at all points, with proprietors and property, operating as the agents and means of their own mutual security, in the shape of a volunteer force, unexampled in the annals of any country, and displaying the most magnificent and proudest monument that ever was raised to a nation's safety and glory. The insolent assertion, and audacious falsehood, uttered by an unprincipled despot, intoxicated by sudden elevation, from penury and wretchedness,* to rule thirty millions with a rod of iron, created the volunteer system, which has equally dismayed the ty-

* Buonaparté wrote in 1793 to Barras, from Toulon, that his heart beat with joy, and that his feet were deluged with blood, amidst the indiscriminate massacre of all ages and sexes. He signs his letter, according to the republican cant and affectation, *Brutus Bonaparte, Citizen sans Culotte*. Moreau and Pichegru indignantly refused to support the regicide convention, 4th of October, 1795. Barras found the ferocious Corsican, in misery, up three pair of stairs, and literally, *sans culotte*. He was clothed, put in command of the troops, and on that day, destroyed 8000 Parisians. Barras rewarded him with a wife, and the command of the *army of Italy*. Tallien related this passage in the great consul's life to many of our English travellers.

rant, and astonished Europe. The co-operation of these patriotic bands, with the most spirited, and finest regular army in the world, will teach the deluded republicans, probably too late for their safety, a lesson which they are little prepared to expect. The dictatorial conduct of France, in the north and south of Europe, her systematic interference in the affairs of Germany, her evident designs on the Ottoman empire, and the contempt with which her haughty ruler treats the sacred representatives of crowned heads, and their remonstrances for the general good, have at length convinced the powers of Europe, that the object of Buonaparté is the attainment of universal dominion; and that of England, the re-establishment of a general balance of strength, beneficial to general happiness, and productive of security to civilized society. The European nations, in the meantime, rejoice in seeing England and France mutually exhausting each other. If France fails, as she will, in her attempts on this country, she will, in despair, direct her arms against her continental neighbours, who foreseeing such an event, are arming and preparing to meet it.— This may terminate in a coalition formed on fixed and steady principles, to liberate the human race from menaced misery and wretchedness; and to reduce France to limits consistent with the

the

the general safety. It would be, unquestionably, the interest of England, fighting for her independence, and envied freedom, to end the contest without foreign or auxiliary aid; as otherwise, the great question of invasion would be left undecided. The same menaces would be repeated in all future cases of dispute, the same expences would be incurred, and the same inconvenience would be experienced in the adoption of the necessary expedients, to repel the threatened aggression. But to save the effusion of human blood, alliances and co-operation are eligible for the restoration of a safe and honourable peace, if it be possible to effect such with France, situated as she now is.

I have procured a late edition of one of the numerous Parisian publications on the facility of invasion. It is intitled “ *Notice Historique, ou Carte de Descentes faites dans les Isles Britanniques,*” and is written in the usual vain, boasting, gasconading, and confident style of French writers. These qualities in their authors, like the national volubility and loquacity, no revolution can alter, and nothing but their own favourite instrument, the Guillotine, can effectually remove; but here the cure would be worse than a disorder, which only excites ridicule or contempt. The work alluded to states, “ Nous venons aussi présenter à la Patrie, avec nos vœux

de justes motifs d'esperance. Le rapprochement des faits que nous avons recueillis avec une scrupuleuse exactitude justifiera la confiance que nous voulons inspirer à nos concitoyens. Il prouvera que sur quarante cinq descentes dirigées contre l'Angleterre, l'Ecosse, ou l'Irlande, depuis Guillaume le Conquerant, jusqu' à nos jours, quarante une ont réussi. Le sort de l'Angleterre a toujours dépendu d'une bataille. Nos phalanges Republicaines iront bientôt planter le Drapeau Tricolor sur la Tour de Londres, rendre la liberté aux mers, et la tranquillité à l'Europe, délivrer nos freres d'armes, et punir *en le détruisant* le plus Machiavélique des Gouvernemens." In these forty-one successful invasions, out of forty-five undertaken, piratical inroads and predatory incursions are pompously described and enumerated. The throwing on the shores of Wales, in 1797, two hundred miserable felons, is dwelt on as one of great importance, which this silly account says, shook public credit to its centre, and spread universal terror and alarm. The friendly landing of William in 1688, though invited over by the nation, is mentioned in this farrago of misrepresentation as another successful invasion ; and his march to London is exultingly detailed. Charles Edward Stuart's disembarkation from a small vessel in Moidart, in the Highlands of Scotland, is particularly ad-
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verted to as an invasion of a very formidable description. The failure of the invincible Armada is ascribed to the misconduct and want of skill of the Duke of Medina Sidonia. The intervention of Providence, and the bravery of the English, are found inconvenient to mention. The candid and liberal publication in question states, that William the Conqueror attacked Harold in his intrenchments. The fact is the reverse on record ; for Harold drew up his army in the form of a phalanx, hollow square, or oblong. William feigned flight, in order to draw the English from this advantageous order. The stratagem succeeded, and Harold's army, nearly victorious, rushed forward with impetuosity. This injudicious movement cost the monarch the battle, his life, and his kingdom. William landed 60,000 men at Pevensey, in Suffex, from 3000 vessels. Errors, in warlike operations, are generally irreparable and fatal. Harold's army had recently suffered in encounters with the Danes, and the fidelity of his Generals was more than doubtful. Thus situated, his plan was rash and inconsiderate, and should have been entirely defensive. A complete victory is necessary to render an invasion successful. The defender must avoid every chance that may lead to this event, and act with much caution and prudence, perpetually harassing and fatiguing the enemy,

by

by unremitting skirmishing on his flanks and rear. The invader must secure a strong hold for constituting a depôt in his rear. A line drawn from this point to the capital, is termed the line of his progressive movement and operations. Strong positions taken in front, active operations on the flanks of his march; strong detachments hanging on his rear; spirited attacks on his detachments, convoys, escorts, foraging parties, flanking, advanced and rear guards, and cutting off all communication with his depôts, form the leading features of a defensive plan, which always, if resolutely and judiciously conducted, terminates in the confusion and disgrace of the invaders. The roads are cut up and rendered completely impassable on the flanks of the enemy, in order to confine his slow progress *to one certain direction*, on which every article that cannot be removed must be burnt or destroyed, that they may not aid the enemy, or tend to sustain his army. The taking of a metropolis containing more wealth than all the capitals of Europe put together, would be a national calamity, the effects of which would be felt for a century. London, at any expense, ought to be secured against this bare possibility. The capture of a metropolis, in the middle of an armed nation, is an event highly improbable; and, if even accomplished, would be the very means of the utter destruction of the invader.

invader. The Austrians and Russians, amounting to 50,000, were glad, in the year 1760, to leave Berlin, after remaining in it eight-and-forty hours. An invading army, on whose line of operations strong detachments of light troops act morning, noon, and night, in perpetual succession of fresh battalions, will hardly dare to attack the centre of the main army, strongly posted and covered, on account of the certain danger of having his flanks turned during the action. The defending army will be enabled, on ground of its own choosing, to bring the enemy to action, fatigued and worn out by constant flank attacks and alarms, during a march of slow progress, and the probability is, that it will surrender at discretion, destitute of provisions and requisite supplies. A revolutionary spirit, bribery, and the blackest deceit, occasioned the uncommon and rapid successes of the French on the Continent, more than their arms. The allies, in the war for the Spanish succession, about one hundred years ago, after ten successful campaigns, advanced only *thirty miles* from the Austrian frontier, as far as Landrecy; and a slight defeat forced Prince Eugene to raise the siege of that place, and to abandon all his conquests, arising from many victories. Never was the fallibility of offensive war more forcibly exemplified than in the slow progress of the great Marlborough, who

who, after ten years of continued signal victories, found himself only *thirty miles* within the north frontier of France. Julius Cæsar, under a pretence that the Britons had assisted the Gauls, embarked with a fair wind, in the year 54, and in nine hours landed on the banks of the river Stour, near Sandwich, in Kent, a little to the north of Dover. The twenty-eight petty states, (subdivided into clans,) governed by kings and Druids, who were priests, prophets, and kings, were not calculated to act with either co-operation or concert, against a great and warlike nation accustomed to victories and triumphs, arising from discipline, constantly improved, during a period of seven hundred years. Naked savages, armed with bows and arrows, could not long withstand the efficacy of Roman tactics. Cæsar, however, did not, in the first invasion, penetrate many miles from the shore. In his second expedition, he reached only a few miles to the north of London. In landing, his troops were obstinately opposed before they encamped on Barham Downs. Here the Romans were attacked with intrepidity, and they deemed it eligible to embark in the night, and return to the Continent. Cæsar had eight hundred ships in the second expedition. The Romans were, afterwards, a century in reducing the south of Britain under their yoke. They depopulated the country, forcing the inhabitants

habitants to serve in their armies on the Continent.

If Darius, in conformity with the advice of a Rhodian General, had avoided the three great battles which lost him his empire, he might have destroyed the army of Alexander the Great by famine, and the unremitting attacks of detachments. Had the Roman Generals, *Scipio*, *Sempronius*, *Flaminius*, and *Terentius Varro*, acted on the defensive, the success and triumphs of *Hannibal* would not have been recorded in history. With the battles of Poitiers, Agincourt, and Cressy, the injudicious rashness of the kings of France lost their dominions. The cautious prudence of a *Fabius*, a *Montmorenci*, and a *Washington*, did not risk the safety of the state on the uncertain issue of a single battle. They availed themselves of the numberless advantages, which a nation, on its own ground, possesses over invaders, meeting with accumulated difficulties in proportion as they may dare to advance. The Romans disarmed the Britons, and thus destroyed their martial character. Forsaken by the Romans, they called in the hardy adventurers of the Baltic to defend them against the attacks of the Picts, Scots, and Irish. These are what the French dress up in inflated language, as successful invasions. Alfred, the founder of our monarchy, during his glorious life, fought fifty-six battles, by sea and land,
against

against invaders who had but slender cause to boast of success. When, by the want of skill, and misconduct of those to whom defence was committed, the country had been subjugated, the wretched inhabitants of all ranks, and of both sexes, were deprived of liberty, plundered of their property, ignominiously degraded, and sold as slaves. The youth were forced to serve in the armies of the conquerors. To the Norman conquest, and its consequences, may be traced the national animosity and destructive wars which have subsisted, at periods, between England and France, during seven hundred years. If we are to judge from the page of history, France will not derive much benefit from an attempt at invasion. Two invasions, undertaken from Persia, reduced and humbled her greatness. The fall of Athens, in a great measure, arose from her disastrous attempt to conquer Sicily. Spain lost her reputation, her fame, and her treasures, by the discomfiture of her invincible Armada. France only reduced her own strength by her former repeated invasions of Germany, Holland, and Italy. Louis the Fourteenth and Fifteenth added but little to their renown, by their projects against the British isles. A revolutionary spirit, founded on falsehood and false philosophy, has, recently, effected in Europe what half a million of soldiers could not achieve under Louis the Fourteenth.

Fourteenth. The decision and firmness of a late Minister, aided by the discerning good sense of the nation, vigorously resisted the baneful influence of this devouring atheistical spirit; and we have to see the nations degraded and oppressed by a Corsican despot, lamenting their fall, and tracing their unexampled miseries to the insidious efficacy of French political philosophy. The nominal Republic has, however, overshoot her mark, in attempting to unite under her tyranny, nations whose habits and prejudices are diametrically opposite to her own. After Buonaparté has been made use of as a scourge, and unworthy instrument for accomplishing the all-wise purposes of unerring Providence, we may live to see this incongruous, unwieldy, and incoherent mass of power fall to pieces by its own weight, when the balance of strength may again revert to its original level. Subsidizing is a measure preferable to sending armies to the continent. On the ocean, Britain can principally act with effect. The sea-ports, coasting trade, marine arsenals, and foreign colonies of France, are the primary objects of British warfare. Mr. Molyneux in his *Littoral War*, states, that out of sixty-eight European and foreign expeditions undertaken since the reign of *Elizabeth*, thirty succeeded. He says that the expeditions, on a large scale, were worse conducted than

than inferior ones. He writes, that two only out of fifteen expeditions, sent against the coast of France, where land forces were disembarked, were attended with success. He ascribes the failure to various causes; such as, crude plans, want of secrecy, quarrels between commanders, want of knowledge, improper seasons, bad guides, sickness, accidental circumstances, arising from winds, tides, and want of skill in pilots, and irregularity in debarkations. He recommends having boats regulated by signals, and constructed with folding parapets and draw-bridges, and of sufficient size to accommodate the troops, with necessary artillery and horses. He suggests having numerous gun-boats, to cover debarkations. Such expeditions aid allies, by creating useful diversions, and distracting and harassing the enemy. A fleet, in time of peace, can alone keep the enemy in check, and will exclude the necessity of a great standing army; it being taken for granted, that the volunteer force will remain embodied, *at all times*, regulated upon constitutional principles. In the dangerous change, in the political and military systems of Europe, we must look for the sanction of an unavoidable measure of defence. The magnitude of the standing army will, necessarily exceed that of any former period; but a volunteer institution, established on a permanent
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and eligible footing, and consisting principally of all who possess real property, will set due limits to a standing army, and maintain the independence of a great nation. Volunteers must have particular immunities and privileges, to insure respectability, permanency and stability, to an indispensable system. The state of Ireland forcibly arrests the attention of every well-wisher of his country. The population of this beautiful country has increased by two thirds, in less than one hundred years; and is, at this moment, little short of four millions and a half. This valuable part of the United Kingdom yields near a fourth part of the revenue of Britain, and furnishes a full third of the whole number of recruits, for our navy and army, with an adequate proportion of provision. The wealth and prosperity of this fertile land, have increased rapidly since the union. The translator was long stationed in Ireland, with the Royal Clan Alpin Regiment, commanded by an old, able, and experienced officer, who has again come forward in the service of his country. He conversed much with the best informed Protestants and Churchmen, on the affairs of Ireland; and on his return, suggested, publicly, and privately, from real conviction, as follows, in part:

“ I am firmly persuaded, from information, and a thorough consideration of the subject, that

adequate salaries or stipends, ought, without delay, to be granted to the Roman Catholic Priests. They are dependent on their flocks, whose passions and prejudices they find it necessary to humour. Render them independent, and their gratitude and interest will prompt them to promote the views of that government that treats them with unexpected liberality. The measure would be attended with incalculable advantages, in effecting a salutary and beneficial change in the dispositions of the lower order, misled by Priests and designing men." The admission of Catholics to the elective franchises, and to a participation in all political and civil rights, will be the only measure, that will give a firm and lasting efficacy to the Union; and attach to this country, three and a half millions of subjects, who, short of this grand measure, will never thoroughly feel themselves, cordially and gratefully attached to the real interests of the British empire. Were the Union rendered thus complete and perfect, France would no longer presumptuously reckon on the aid of six out of ten of the inhabitants. The interest of the Protestant religion would be strengthened by the liberality of this expected boon; or, at least, would suffer less than it does now, probably, from the animosity generally subsisting between opposite systems of religious persuasion, more especially

especially when political difference of opinion tends to add fuel to the flame. The times are past, never more to return, when the Catholic Religion was propagated by fire and sword. The inhabitants of these kingdoms, if not more moral in principle than at former periods, are at least more liberal and temperate in religious opinions. There is no fear now of being forced to become Roman Catholics, and a high zeal for our Protestant persuasion may be very consistent with granting Catholic emancipation. No danger could arise to church or state from Catholic members of parliament, whose discernment and good sense would induce them, as now, to support a constitution of unrivalled excellence. It has been urged, that the tenor of a part of the coronation oath militates against this position. The words are, “ *Will you to the utmost of your power maintain the laws of God, the true profession of the Gospel, and the Protestant reformed religion, established by law?* ” No sophistry of reasoning, and no forced construction put on this passage can, on any ground of sound argument, establish a persuasion that it is inconsistent with granting benefits, which it would be wise and sound policy to concede, and which will be attended with advantages to both nations beyond all calculation.

The restoration of a limited monarchy in France, reduced to something like her old limits, is certainly an object devoutly to be wished for. The present system of tyranny and oppression, under a fallacious mask of republican liberty, must, ultimately, revert to a modified monarchical government; but unfortunately for the human race, as Calonne has written, probably, through seas of blood. A quiet restoration, like that of Charles the Second, may, in all likelihood, be the result, particularly, if the fall of the tyrant should be sudden. It might be a wise measure on the part of the French princes, avowedly sanctioned by the British Government, to publish throughout Europe, a proclamation, or manifesto, addressed to the people of France, stating, in dignified language, past misfortunes, and candidly acknowledging their causes; proving forcibly, what requires no proof, the present abject and wretched condition of France; establishing by conclusive reasoning, that a limited monarchy is alone productive of general, and individual happiness, as evident from history; detailing the great outline of the nature of the constitution to be established; making it as nearly similar to that of Britain, as the difference between the genius, temper, and habits of the two nations will admit; describing the leading features of the civil and criminal laws to be

be adopted ; resolving on establishing the independence of judges, and the trial by jury in all cases of life and property ; declaring that there shall be a Habeas Corpus, a Bill of Rights, and Mutiny Act ; explaining what these principles of liberty mean ; granting pardon and indemnity, under certain just and judicious limitations, for past offences ; adverting discreetly, to the present possessors of the former national property and domains ; declaring and resolving to establish and support, in future, the independence of *Holland, Italy, and Switzerland* ; declaring Belgium a necessary and component part of France ; and above all, solemnly pledging a re-establishment of a balance of power to be specified, for securing the independence of European nations. Such a proclamation might accelerate an event which France herself, and all Europe look for with an anxiety proportioned to its magnitude and importance.

The designs of France on India, through the medium of Egypt, are no longer of a doubtful nature. Inferiority of naval power alone prevents the execution of this daring project. The conquest of the distracted Ottoman empire is now deemed the sure and direct road leading to the accomplishment of this object of consular ambition. The assembling of a vast army opposite to the Morea, and General St. Cyr's late suspicious visit to that country, indicate, clearly,

the unjust intentions of the foreign usurper, whose extravagant ambition knows no bounds. Russia, at an early period, regards the dismemberment of the Ottoman empire, and the annexation of it to her vast territories, as an infallible event. The opposite interests of Russia and France, joined to the jealousy of Austria, will disappoint the expectations of the French Republic, and save the Ottoman Empire from menaced annihilation. It is a fact known to few, that *Elphy Bey's* visit was *originally* intended to *Buonaparté*, and *not* to this country. At Malta he was induced to alter his intention. He was furnished when here, with regular remittances through *foreign countries*, and his asserted attachment to British interests bears a very questionable aspect. He has lately married the daughter of the *Sheike el Arab*, the chief of the leading and formidable tribe of *Bedouin Arabs*. This alliance has greatly strengthened his interest, and as he will soon wield the sceptre in Egypt, it will be highly eligible, under existing circumstances, to cultivate his friendship, and secure his attachment to Great Britain.

The reduced state of the French navy will, during this war, frustrate all direct designs, by sea, against India. The spirit of intrigue which eminently distinguishes the French diplomatic character, will be actively employed in fomenting
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disturbances in the east. Previous to the delivery of the King's message, two large frigates were sent to India, having on board forty Savans (*intriguing Civilians*) and three hundred officers, chiefly of the engineer, and artillery corps. The instructions sent out directed these officers to enter into the service of the country powers, and the civilians to propagate the laudable tenets of French philosophy, with a constant view to the destruction of the British power in India. The original inhabitants, the Hindoos, and their conquerors, the Mussulmen, constitute the bulk of the inhabitants of India. Between these a considerable enmity subsists, arising from a difference of religion, manners, prejudices, customs, and the effects of conquest. The Mussulman power is broke in India, yielding to British mild government, which has conciliated both descriptions, who contrast security to persons and property with the rapacity and despotism of their ancestors. They are thoroughly disciplined into excellent soldiers, who will follow wherever their European officers lead; and these have always led well, as the history of British India can testify. Many of our governors, sensible of the high discipline of the *Sepoys*, and dreading danger to the Asiatic possessions from this, turned against them, by whatever cause, have recommended having *always*, in India, a coun-

terpoise of European force, a measure now constantly attended to. L'Abbé Raynal has written, that when a native prince will spring up in India, who can afford to pay the sepoy better than the English, the natives will turn our own bayonets and discipline against us, and drive us to the shores of Asia. This is an unlikely event, and the opinion was given by a French writer. It is again recommended to occupy and fortify Acheen-Harbour, which with Bombay, Trincomalee, and Prince of Wales's Island, will command the seas of India. The King of Acheen has no objection to the measure. It strengthens his interest, and confirms his independence. At present, fast-sailing frigates and sloops of war are the naval force wanted in India. Without this, the trade will be cut up, and much injured. The west coast of Sumatra has on it many excellent harbours, which the Translator, who was nineteen years in the East India Company military service, surveyed by orders from Europe, and from the supreme government. The charts of these surveys are published. The country, however, does not yield provisions adequate to the wants of a fleet, independent of the difficulty of working back to the Bay of Bengal in the Sumatran north-west monsoon, being the season of naval operations to the east of Madras.

A war begun, on the part of France, in vanity

nity and presumption, will be conducted capriciously, and supported by oppression. An erroneous opinion of the resources of the Republic is industriously spread on the Continent, and too credulously believed by those who ought to be better informed in this country. The tendency of these fallacious assertions promotes the dangerous designs of the usurper, and generates a despondence in the cause of civil society. Every article of the most indispensable consumption is, in France and Holland, taxed in the extreme. Since the commencement of the Revolution, the French and Dutch have paid, exclusive of income, and indirect taxes, *forty-seven per cent. of capital*. Furniture and goods are rated by commissioners, and taxed at little short of half of an unjust valuation. The cries of the misery and wretchedness which pervade the metropolis and provinces, are kept under by the iron hand of oppression. This state of things cannot continue, and a revolution which will restore monarchy cannot be far distant. Steady and prosperous as may be the comparative state of our finances and resources, the subject demands the serious animadversion of men of abilities and talents adequate to so important an investigation. The national debt is of a magnitude which it may be eligible to diminish, and must be reduced

duced by an effort of finance, brought in aid of the flow, but sure operation of the sinking fund. The efficacy of one resource is obvious, and, it is hoped that the patriotism and justice of men of landed property will induce them to support a plan for the reduction of the funded debt, which, *be it recollected*, arose originally from securing and protecting landed property. The waste lands, and other lands of that description, over the united kingdom, amount to 8,000,000* of acres, which disposed of by lottery, at a valuation of twenty years purchase, on a supposition of four or five shillings of annual rent, would yield a sum of 40,000,000 sterling. Let 50 be supposed the lowest state to which the funds will fall during the war. The forty millions will pay off eighty millions of funded debt, and take off taxes amounting to the interest of that sum. Or, it may be more eligible to apply this efficacious resource, on the principle of the sinking fund. The benefits resulting from this plan are as evident as they are numerous. Near three

* This number is, probably, taken too high, and the rate of valuation too low. The result, with a less number of disposable acres, will remain nearly the same. It is hoped, however, that the Funds may not fall to 50, though a higher rate would reduce a little, the advantageous effect of the above suppositions.

millions

millions now, annually, expended and sent abroad, as bounties on importation of corn and provisions, would be saved: industry and agriculture, and ultimately, manufactures and commerce, would receive a new impulse and stimulus: the prices of the necessaries of life would fall: and population, which constitutes the strength of a country, would rapidly increase. The only objections in the way of this salutary proposal, will be found to lie in narrow and interested feelings, dead to every sense of public utility.

INVASION.

The Translator of these sheets, on the 15th instant, made one of a party which ran over in a small cutter, to reconnoitre the coast of France contiguous to *Boulogne*. The cutter made the coast about eight miles to the eastward of *Boulogne*, and ran, at night, along the coast up to the station of the blockading squadron. A new harbour, capable of containing 500 gun-boats, has been recently opened at *Ambleleuse*, and another is excavating at *Wimille*, two miles and a half from *Boulogne*. Buonaparté is perfectly aware of the magnitude of our preparations, and is forming the plan of invasion on an adequate scale. It is now *evident to demonstration*, that
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the *grand effort* will be made from what we may now term the three harbours of *Boulogne*. All the boats are known to be furnished with oars. The plan is to leave the French shore in one tide. This is to be effected by arranging the boats three or four deep, along the sand, when the force will be prepared, and ready to step into them. The leading object in view, is to avoid the squadron on the station, such force as may be in mid-channel, and the gun-boats and gun-brigs which may be on the coast between Dover, and to the westward of Pevensey. To effect this, the three or more lines of boats will start *in a dead calm*, and will be rowed over. Another essential object will be obtained from this procedure. The French will be less sea-sick, than if the flotilla sailed with a leading wind; and their troops will, according to their usual custom, be, thus, enabled to animate themselves for the contest, by means of copious doses of *eau de vie*. The French do not thoroughly understand the doctrine of the Channel directions and settings of the tides. From this circumstance, much confusion and irregularity will arise among the lines of the flotilla; nor will the whole fetch within ten miles of any intended point.

The nearest point of England, or some point between Dover and Pevensey, is, to a moral certainty, that which the flotilla will endeavour

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vour to reach. As it appears decided, that the maximum effort will be made from the *three Boulogne harbours*, the Admiralty, will, no doubt, not depend on the blockading squadron which may not be able to move. Gunboats, and gunbrigs, *with sweeps*, stationed off our coast, along the exposed line, will afford the ready and effectual opposition, *in a calm*.—Ships of war, in mid-channel, accompanied by gunboats and gunbrigs, will have, even in a calm, a great chance of intercepting the flotilla. There are expressions in the address of the army of *Boulogne* to Buonaparté, which clearly indicate the rowing plan, which many naval officers deem practicable. “*Vainement les flottes ennemies tenteront d’empêcher le passage. Vous l’avez calculé, et les moyens sont prêts. Ordonnez, et le succès prouvera à l’Europe entière, que tout est possible, quand votre génie conçoit, et que les François exécutent.*” The import of this gasconade is evidently, that *oars in a calm*, are the means to be made use of, in order to avoid the British fleet; and we are obliged to the army of *Boulogne* for the hint. The three harbours will contain 1600 carrying boats; each will carry 100 men. The force embarked will, thus, amount to 160,000. Let the navy, of all descriptions, be supposed to destroy 60,000; there will remain 100,000 for effecting a landing.—Buonaparté’s evident object,

ject, *now*, is to strike at the vitals of the empire, by a forced march to the capital; for which purpose, his troops will be ordered to carry five days biscuit and brandy. The Commander in Chief has made the most judicious arrangements, by the concentration of force, and by moveable reserves, for rendering abortive this desperate and daring project of an infuriated enemy. It is perfectly ascertained that 400 gunboats from the eastward, westward, and interior, are intended for the *three harbours of Boulogne*. The second harbour, on which numberless hands were perceived working, by torch light, is not yet ready. It never would have been begun, if not intended as a component part of the means of invasion. Combining these considerations, we may, on good grounds conclude, that the rowing plan will not be executed till the latter end of May. Between this and that period, the volunteer force ought to be alternately, a week on duty, and a week off, to perfect their discipline. The expence is not, for a moment to be thought of, when we reflect that our very *existence as a nation is at stake*.—This force ought to be more habituated than it is to the fatigues of discipline and duty. Apprehensions are entertained that the French flotilla will *carry* some of our vessels in a calm. Frequent opportunities occur without any attempt being made. The
fact

fact is, that though by power of numbers, a vessel might be captured, yet the loss would be so great, that the French troops would be less encouraged than disheartened by the result.

To the political sagacity, enlarged views, and ^{5th April.} decided conduct of the Governor General of India, the recent brilliant successes in that country, are, in the first instance, to be ascribed. The vast and comprehensive plans of Marquis Wellesley have been admirably executed by Generals, and distinguished officers, whose talents, enterprise, and spirit, have been fully equalled by the alacrity, energy, and courage of the gallant armies they commanded, and served in. A Mahratta war, and an accumulation of debt in India, augured unfavourably to the complicated interests of the East India Company. The glorious termination of the contest has effectually removed these gloomy and discouraging prospects, and it now only remains to regulate a permanent empire in the East, and to watch and counteract the insidious attempts of French diplomatic perfidy. The wisdom and discernment which selected Marquis Wellesley to fill one of the most important offices under the Crown, are amply justified by the events of his splendid administration.

From Sheerness to Portsmouth, the lofty cliffs and flats are, nearly, of equal extent. Between
Calais

Calais and *Boulogne*, there are constructed *under* high water mark, *Martello towers*, at certain distances. On our flat shores they would constitute a most efficacious and formidable species of defence, taking an enemy as he approached, enfilading his force, by his flanks, as he landed, and plunging a destructive fire on his rear, as he proceeded to be warmly received by the forces on the shore. These towers are in the form of the frustum of a cone, and from their circular shape, a shot has little or no effect at the point, or vertex of the angle of incidence and reflection. These serviceable towers might be commanded by redoubts on heights, which would flank them, and prevent their being escaladed. The expence of constructing them would be moderate; they would be durable, and are more eligible than lines which are liable to be stormed, and to which flying, or horse artillery are preferable. The principal service of these excellent Martello towers, would be derived from a destructive fire on a landing enemy: sooner or later they will be constructed; and it is consistent with sound policy and wisdom, to commence rearing them, *without delay*. Louis the Fourteenth, in the course of thirty years, rendered *Dunkirk* a celebrated seaport and fortification. Between the Thames and Portsmouth, we have not one good harbour; Dover might be rendered such, of almost


most any requisite size, and might be made impregnable at little expence, in proportion to the resulting utility; it is liable, at present to be taken in reverse. Returning to the consideration of *calms*, a flotilla furnished with a rowing apparatus, and lying in Dover harbour enlarged, will, *at all times*, disappoint the views of our perpetual and inveterate enemy: the harbour will not be liable to be choaked up by sand, deposited by the action of the tide, there being natural back water to keep it constantly clear.* The real value of *Dover* is incalculable, either in a commercial or military point of view. It is particularly an important barrier to the Medway and Thames, and constitutes the only real check we have on *Boulogne*, *Ambleteuse*, and *Cherbourg*.

It is, probably practicable, *in a dark night*, to bombard the gunboats in *Boulogne* harbour, which is above a mile in length. Let the letters A, B, C, and D, represent four bomb ketches

* *Dover* derived from *de à fore*, *stopt up before*, because the British King *Arviragus*, who finished the castle begun by *Cæsar*, stopt up the old and deep entrance of the harbour, and opened the present shallow one, to prevent the large third rates, (*triremes*) of those times, from entering. *Sea-beach*, *mud*, &c. are found five fathoms *under ground*, at high-water-mark. This proves that *Dover-harbour*, at the lowest spring tides, might, by reforming the original channel, be calculated for admitting 74 gun ships.

lying at anchor, without gunshot of Boulogne harbour, extending from E and F. Let a, and b, be boats anchored head and stern, in the prolongation of the lines drawn respectively, from the harbour, through the position of each ketch. Let d, and e, be boats or buoys, with lights on them, placed to indicate the line in which the ketches are to anchor. When the night becomes dark, the boats a, and b, and c, and d, will exhibit lights. The bomb-vessels will run in on their relative lines. As the tide sets along shore in the night, the ketch A will be carried laterally, in her progressive course, and will anchor when on the line a, b, B. The ketch B will anchor, on the same principle, when carried by the conjoint actions of the wind and tide, on the line a, b, C; and so on with respect to the other vessels, whatever may be the number of them. The enemy, from seeing the lights, will suspect the nature of the process, and commence a very uncertain fire, directed merely at the flashes of the bombardment. The batteries are near the harbour, and seven floating batteries are anchored close in, in front of the entrance. The distance between the harbour and position of the ketches, may be found pretty near the truth, by finding the number of seconds between the first shore-flash, and corresponding sound, and multiplying such seconds by 1142, the number of feet over which

which sound travels in a second: or, the distance may be found by knowing the distance between any two ketches; and this will be the base of a triangle. A light seen on shore will be the vertex of a triangle formed on this base; the two horizontal angles at the base may be found by a sextant; and, thus, the distance between either ketch, and the light on shore, will be readily found by immediate protraction, or calculation. The mortars will be laid by looking backwards over the highest and lowest point on the muzzle, in the line of the boats with lights, a, and b.



The distance between the ketches in their first stations A, B, C, and D, might be pretty accurately ascertained, by measuring with a deep sea line the distance between two boats b, and b. This would constitute a base from which the distance between the ketches, respectively, might be found. The ascertained distance between the ketches would form a base, by means of which the distance between the bomb-vessels,

and the gun-boats in the harbour, would be found. All these measures would be taken *deliberately*, in the day time, and each ketch would, afterwards, *allow* for the space she would, *at night*, run in, to bring her into her bombarding station. As the range would be under the greatest, the cutting of the fuze, and the quantity of powder might be adapted to the range, without calculating an angle, and time of flight, for the new range, or amplitude, lying between the bomb-vessels, and the harbour. It would be necessary to steady the lights a, and b, by means of four anchors, the anchor-ropes of which would be veered out, *equally*, in proportion to the rise of the tide. The ketch would be brought into the plain of the directing lights, by veering out, a little, on one cable, and hauling in on another, till the vertical plain passing through the highest point on the muzzle-reinforced-ring, and the breech ring, coincided with the lights; at which instant the word "*fire*," would be given. If the directing lights could not be distinctly seen from the position of the mortar, it must be laid by the bearings of the lights taken in degrees, with an Azimuth Compass. To bombard, *effectually*, twenty-four ketches would be requisite; and these would be arranged, chequer-form, on the above principle. The tide would admit of bombarding during three hours. A ketch will throw a shell every ten minutes, making

making 18 shells thrown by each, in three hours, or 432, by 24 ketches, in three hours. The plan ought to be carried into execution *in a calm*, nearly. The rolling, and pitching motions may, by altering the angle and direction, affect accuracy of result; but the *extent* and *great magnitude* of the *object aimed at*, may *fully* compensate for this. Captain Effington, of the Royal Navy, a very intelligent officer, suggested putting some combustible matter into the shells, in addition to the powder for explosion.

In order to deceive the enemy, and to divert the fire of his batteries from the lines of directing lights and ketches, a small fireship or two may be sent in towards the mouth of the harbour. A few cutters may be directed to anchor at some distance, on the right and left of the position of the bomb-ketches. Lights will be displayed on board of these cutters, and guns will be fired, occasionally, with the same view of distracting the attention of the Enemy, and of drawing off the fire of the batteries from the bombarding direction.

France will, *in future*, hold out perpetual threats of invading the south of Britain with flotillæ *in a calm*. Some effectual method must be found to counteract this; and none appears more practicable than bombardment *by night*. In the day-time, if attempted, the loss would

be out of all proportion to the effect. There must be also a counter-flotilla furnished with sweeps, and stationed in Dover harbour, *enlarged, deepened, and fortified*, at an expence of half a million *well appropriated*. “*Nil actum reputans, si quid superesset agendum*,” is a maxim which every man, public, or private, should feel the force of, and act upon, at this important crisis.

interieur N. B. A Translation of two very useful Works, noticed in the Preface of the French Tactics, is in contemplation. These Works will be printed in one Volume Octavo: they are intitled *Réglement concernant le Service intérieur, la Police, et la Discipline de L'Infanterie*—and—*Réglement provisoire sur le Service de l'Infanterie en Campagne*. We have no eligible Works, by Authority, of this Description. It is by making known Works in foreign Services, on such interesting Subjects, that Matter is afforded for compiling similar Works, adapted to the Genius and Character of the British Army. The systems of tactics of European nations are valuable in proportion to the facility with which they can be applied to practice, and to the degree of mathematical science which pervades the principles on which they are founded. Hence arises the utility

utility of making known foreign systems, of which many eligible parts might be advantageously ingrafted on the British, which however admirable, and useful, like all human inventions, is approximating to perfection never to be attained. By borrowing from our Enemy, we turn his own weapons against him. "*Fas est, ab Hoste doceri,*" is a maxim as sound, as it is sensible.

GENERAL WIMPFEN

TO HIS SONS.

THE leisure afforded by a disengagement from professional avocations, has made me desirous of communicating to you the knowledge I have acquired in the course of fourteen active campaigns, and in a great number of memorable battles of which I bear the marks. I have ascertained in the course of my own experience, that a young man commencing his military career as an officer, in the middle of an eventful and bloody war, must feel himself much embarrassed, if uninstructed, and left to the resources of his own mind. If my sons study this compendious work, and if they possess zeal and talents for the profession of arms, they will have over me the great advantage of obtaining information, and learning rules for conducting war, which are the result of my long experience. This will enable them, earlier than others who have not acquired the knowledge I am now to impart, to rise to superior rank in the army, as rapidly as their father, and to merit it still better. What I write for the particular information of my sons, is intended, at the same time, for the general benefit of the
army.

army. It is not my intention to cast any reflections on the acquirements of officers, in supposing them not more skilful in the art of war than I was at the opening of the campaign of 1757 ; since even previous to that period, I had made the campaigns of Bavaria, on the Rhine, and in Alsace, independent of serving in the victorious and instructive campaigns of Marshal Saxe, in Flanders.* Though I have not ceased, during six campaigns, to reflect on the means which produced our success, and to weigh them in my mind, yet having served only as a subaltern, I should, without further experience, have found myself at a loss and embarrassed in commanding a division of the army, in directing its march, in deploying it, in superintending its evolutions, and finally, in conducting it skilfully against an enemy. It was by serving in the advanced posts of the army, in the capacity of a superior officer, in the seven years war, under a great general, of whose orders and arrangements I was the organ and interpreter, that I learnt what I now venture,

* The style of language in which General Wimpffen has written his useful and comprehensive work, is of that plain, clear, and concise description, which ought always to characterize military narrations, and details of introduction. The turn of expression, and general manner of the original, have been imitated in the translation, as nearly, as the military idioms of the two languages would admit.

with confidence, to teach others. It is by following the traces* of this celebrated officer, by forming my judgment on all that was faulty or admirable in his military system and conduct, and from my own experience, that I shall attempt to lay down rules calculated to conduct every officer through the active scenes of warfare, from partial actions, and unimportant affairs of posts, to the great battles which decide the fate of empires.

From a conviction that the same situation of ground, or even such as may be nearly similar, never presents itself as the scene of action, twice in a century; and that every battle furnishes a distinct train of events and occurrences, I shall, therefore, not quote any of the very numerous instances and examples which have come under my own observation. I shall not animadvert to such faults as I have seen committed by our generals. I shall only remark that all these faults have arisen from causes which I will endeavour

* “ *D’après les errements* ” is the phrase in the original. The French have lately, in military details, used “ *errements* ” in the sense of *mistakes committed by officers in the field*. It is a substantive used only in the plural, and means, *the resuming of some suspended affair*. In the translation, we have given the expression the force of both meanings, which convey a very clear sense, as the passage runs.

to prevent a recurrence of, by the instructions laid down in this work.

As all may err in judgment, professional faults are not what reflect disgrace on an officer : but treachery, baseness, cowardice,* cruelty, immorality, intemperance, and ignorance, dishonour the character.

My sons ought, then, at an early period, to obtain that knowledge, and to cultivate those virtues necessary for the station they occupy ; and to have it strongly impressed on their minds, that the more elevated their military rank is, so much the more are they exposed to the critical observation of those who are placed under them, who readily perceive, and mark any failure in the conduct of their superiors. Every unworthy action being, thus, always noted, the wisest course they can pursue, to avoid censure and degradation, is to conduct themselves irreproachably, not only in war, but at all other times, in the general transactions of life. My sons will reflect, that though they may impose silence on many under their command, who may be influenced by a temporary dread of their power, that yet the time may arrive, when that power will termi-

* “ *Lâcheté*” means either *cowardice*, or *baseness*, therefore either sense may be meant ; but, probably, the latter, as an officer arrived at the rank of a general, can scarcely be supposed a coward.

nate, and when their actions will be exposed in the worst possible light in which malignity can place them. They must learn to know, that since weakness in the conduct of human affairs must necessarily produce war, it ought to be carried on with magnanimity. They must be contented after a victory, to have surpassed the vanquished in valour; and they must exceed them, also, in every species of heroism. Finally, they ought to recollect, that harsh, hard-hearted, wicked, dissipated, and ill-bred characters, are always detested by those whose conduct is marked by generosity and goodness; and even by those very persons who have appeared for a time, to participate in their vices.*

* If the just sense of honour, and rectitude of moral principle evinced in General Wimpffen's paternal admonition to his sons, had characterized some of the French generals, during the revolutionary war, cruelty, rapacity, and crimes unknown under the old régime, would not have brought indelible disgrace on the French nation, and added to the numerous catalogue of horrors unequalled in any revolution recorded in history.

and when their action will be exposed in the world before him in which mankind can place them. They will learn to know that true weakness is the cowardice of human affairs and necessarily produce what ought to be corrected with magnanimity. They must be content after a victory, to have surpassed the vanquished in valor; and they must exceed them also in every species of heroism. Finally, they ought to recollect that better, hard-hearted, wicked, dissipated, and ill-bred characters are always detected by those whose conduct is marked by generosity and goodness; and even by those very persons who have appeared for a time to participate in their vices.

* At the close of history, and reflection of moral principles, we are reminded in General W. Napier's personal addition to his work, that the French general, during the revolutionary war, always repays, and always repays under the flag, who have brought in the flag to the English nation, and added to the number of the army of honor, as recorded in the revolution recorded in history.

Dover, 15th April, 1804.

AUTHENTIC STATE

OF THE

Preparations of the Enemy.

THE translator has positive and direct information received from the blockading station off the three Boulogne harbours, and *deduced from the log-books* of the blockading squadron, that thirteen hundred and thirty gun boats, or carrying boats, have entered Boulogne since the commencement of the blockade;—that fifty have entered Ambleteuse harbour:—and that there are thirty at Wimille. It is perfectly understood that there were 300 boats at Boulogne, when the blockade was formed, 120 are reckoned to have been built in the three harbours, this gives the aggregate number, *at this moment*, at *eighteen hundred and thirty*. Allowing 330 for carrying ammunition, a field train, camp equipage, horses, or for hospital boats, we have 1500 for conveying troops. From the ascertained capacity of the captured gun boats, each will carry, with ease, 100 men; and therefore, the 1500 will carry 150,000. The grand attempt will not be made till there may be 2000 carrying boats, which will endeavour by *rowing in a dead calm*, to land 200,000 men, on two succeeding days. We repeat it, the object is the *Capital*, by forced marches, and

Dover

Dover by a coup de main, to form a convenient Dépôt, and receiving harbour. The boats are not capable of attempting any distant point; therefore, *the nearest point practicable* is that intended to land on. The boats on this coast, 40 feet by 10 nearly, manned by 15 men to manage the boat, and work a carronade, are not, *by any means*, adequate to oppose the French flotilla effectually. *Gun boats and gun brigs furnished with sweeps* are the *proper description*. *By exertion*, there is *still* time to take such up, and fit them out. When these statements are made, we hear of 400,000 volunteers. Three fourths of them would not have time to leave their homes, before the fate of the empire was decided. We wish not to create false alarms, or to produce despondency in the public mind. We state facts of a stubborn description. It is not by concealing the extent of the danger, but by exposing it fully, that timely measures are adopted, by land, and sea *particularly*, to avert its consequences. It is the duty of every well-wisher of his country to bring forward facts calculated to invigorate public exertion, on which alone we can depend at an eventful period, when Europe lies prostrate at the feet of France.

Our empire in India may become too extensive for our population to supply the wants of such unbounded conquests, to which sound policy requires limits to be put. The Moghul, and other empires on record, owed their final dissolution to aggrandizement, and an unwieldy extent of territory.

THE
EXPERIENCED OFFICER,

&c. &c. &c.

CHAPTER I.

Duties of Vedettes in the Day-time.

THE word *éclaireur* means a trooper or flanker; light-horsemen stationed in front, and on the flanks, are better calculated for this service than the heavy cavalry; and they are to march in such a manner as to keep in view the body of men from which they are detached. These troopers, thus detached, and reconnoitring independently, ascend heights, gallop through hamlets and villages, and search in thickets, hollow roads, and woods, in order to discover, hear, or gain intelligence of the enemy. These vedettes are detached two together, with orders to separate from each other one or two hundred

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paces,

paces, in order that if one should fall into an ambuscade, and should not return, the other may announce to the main body the presence of the enemy. The most intelligent and best mounted are to be selected (*pour éclairer**) for this

* The word *éclaireur* is derived from *éclairer*, to keep an eye on, to watch, to observe. They are termed in the text *flankers* and *guides*. We have translated the word *vedette*, which conveys the author's meaning. These *eclaireurs*, *vedettes*, or reconnoiterers, or sentinels on horseback, will ascend heights, to make discoveries, halting there till the main body comes up. They will, according to circumstances, enter villages, hamlets, or houses, and procure information. If they enter a village, it must be in separate files, in sight of each other. They must not, too confidently, ride up to the front of an object, if they can examine it from its rear. However cold or rainy the night may be, they must not put on their cloaks. At night, they keep nearer to the main body than during the day. *Vedettes* detached from the rear guard, may join each other when they ascend a height to discover as far as they can. Whenever a *vedette* retreats, he will go to *the left about*, and when he is again to advance, he will face to *the right about*, in order that the right arm may, in either case, be ready to act. Mounted *vedettes* are not, unnecessarily, to fatigue their horses. On plains, *vedettes* are not to move too far from the main body, so as to hazard being taken, or cut off. They avail themselves of all ground which shelters them against the enemy's cavalry, if they appear. *Vedettes* are carefully to avoid being made prisoners, if they are even forced to take a circuit, and join the following day. If they meet a column of the enemy, at night, they will all together

this duty, and they must be supported, in plains, by small detachments of cavalry ; and in intersected irregular ground, by infantry. These vedettes report to the officer of the body they belong to ; and should one of them disappear, those sent out to support them are to halt, and will not resume their march till such vedette re-appears. The other flankers on perceiving this, are also to halt, and must not continue their march till they observe that the supporting detachment proceeds. If a flanker who has disappeared does not soon appear again in sight of the supporting detachment, the officer commanding will send a man to ascertain his exact situation. The vedettes will receive orders not to enter a wood or village in which they learn that an enemy is situated. They are simply to approach and reconnoitre, by skirting it, endeavouring to discover the strength, occupation, and intentions of the enemy. The vedettes are a species of guides, who must never be lost sight of. They are likewise to be stationed in the rear, as well as on the flanks, in order to prevent an enemy in ambush, from attacking the rear after it has passed, as this attack might be advantageously made

together fire, change place, load, and fire again. This will induce the columns to form, and commence a fire, probably on parts of each other, and a complete confusion may ensue, attended with a discovery of the enemy's strength.

by the enemy, if not timely guarded against. When the vedettes meet with the enemy, and are perceived by them, they must immediately return to make their report to the officer of their detachment, and if in danger of being cut off or taken, they must fire before they surrender. Vedettes, and even patrols, ought carefully to avoid engaging with the enemy, taking prisoners, or plundering. Such conduct would be the means of making themselves discovered, of drawing on them the enemy, and of retarding the expected report. Their strict duty is to give an account of the exact position of the enemy, of their appearance when discovered, and of the probable force.

CHAPTER II.

Duties of Vedettes during the Night.

AS discovering an enemy by night is more difficult than during the day, I shall enlarge more on the precautions necessary to be taken.

The first, which is the most essential and difficult,

ficult, is, that the vedettes do not lose themselves and wander out of the way, or straggle. To prevent this, they are to be followed or accompanied by others, who are to remain at each hollow, or turn in the road, in order to indicate to the succeeding vedettes the path pursued by those preceding. Vedettes, or guides by night, ought to march very slow, halt frequently, listen attentively, strike, sometimes against a tree, whistle, or cough, according as may have been agreed on between them and those who follow, in order to establish a mutual understanding, and to communicate information. For example, if they whistle, that means that they hear nothing; if they strike against a tree, that they hear some noise, and have halted; and if they cough, that they by that signal require others to join them. These vedettes by night must attend to every minute circumstance, such as the sound of footsteps, and the barking of dogs; they are occasionally to dismount, lying down and applying the ear to the ground, because they will, in that position, be able, during the night-time, to hear distinctly, at a very considerable distance. If they perceive a light, one of the vedettes will dismount, and slip cautiously and softly towards the light on all-fours, if necessary, to avoid being discovered. If he does not see an enemy, he is to knock at the gate, and

converse with the landlord on the subject of his mission. If he procures interesting and important intelligence, he is to transmit it to the commanding officer, directing every patrol to communicate it to the next in succession. If more eligible, the information may be reduced to a written report, and forwarded.*

The nature of the country, and the degree of darkness, will indicate the proper distance between the patrols. I have already remarked, that these reconnoitring parties ought to consist of two troopers, in order to multiply their number as much as possible. They must be strictly enjoined not to fall asleep on horseback, which might be attended with very serious consequences; to observe the most profound silence; and to have no dogs along with them, nor any white horses, nor any horses in habits of neighing. They are not to strike a light with a flint and

* If the vedettes are reconnoitring in a country unknown to them, a guide is to be procured; and should his fidelity be suspected, he is to be tied and led, and threatened with instant death, if he should betray those he conducts. When a light is wanted to observe the hour, such light must be struck under cover of a cloak, and put out immediately. The vedettes are to understand the language of the country, and to speak it well; otherwise, they will create suspicion. Two intelligent vedettes reconnoitre in front of the rest, and two steady non-commissioned officers bring up the rear, and prevent the vedettes from straggling.

steel,

steel, nor to smoke. Dark-coloured clothes are preferable to white or red, as being less remarkable. It is obvious that these vedettes are intended to reconnoitre, and not to fight, or engage the enemy; and therefore they are to retire when the enemy marches, unless they are absolutely closely attacked. In this case they are to fire, and immediately afterwards to join the advanced guard, exerting themselves to the utmost, to give timely information to enable the main body to get under arms.

CHAPTER III.

On Advanced Guards, when near to an Enemy.

I MEAN guards in fixed stations. They must be placed in such manner that the sentinels may be posted on the heights, and the guards in the ravines, hollow roads, or low grounds, or behind hedges or houses, or under trees, at five or six hundred paces from the sentinels.

Two sentinels ought to be planted together, in order that one may remain on duty, while the other is conveying a report to the officer of the

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post.

post. They must be often visited during the day and night, questioned respecting what they may have observed and heard, and they must receive clear instructions how to conduct themselves.*

If there is in the neighbourhood a belfry, a steeple, or any lofty or highly-situated house from which an enemy can be discovered, a vedette is to be posted in such situation, with orders to give warning of an enemy's approach, by firing off his fusée, or musquet.

An officer commanding an advanced guard, is to report, by night and by day, what he observes, and a small telescope will prove a very useful article. He will also give an account of all that he hears. An enemy cannot approach in force, without his hearing at a distance the noise of tumbrils in motion, of artillery, the neighing of horses, and the cracking of whips. Fires are not to be depended on, as they may be kindled or extinguished with an intention of

* The commanding officer of a guard which is advanced, is frequently to visit his sentinels, to learn from them such observations as they have made, and to ascertain that the parole has been accurately given to them. Towards evening, he will explain to the officers, and non-commissioned officers, the manner in which they are to go their rounds and patrols. It is to be recommended to them to make themselves, in the day-time, well acquainted with the roads which they will frequent during the night.

deceiving.

deceiving. They need not be particularly attended to.

If there are bridges situated in front of the guard, the boards of them must be removed; and the fordable parts of rivers must be carefully watched, by patrols moving frequently along the banks.

If the bridges are constructed of stone, they must be stopped up, and barricaded with dismounted carts and carriages, with trees, or palisades.

Should it be deemed dangerous to have the guards planted throughout the night in very advanced situations, they may be permitted to retire five hundred paces, and even more, posting themselves eligibly in the remote part of a hollow, at the extremity of their prescribed limits. On the first alert or alarm, the fires must be extinguished, and when there is no water, they are to be covered with earth.

In retiring, they are sometimes to halt, to ascertain whether or not they may be pursued. If posts are established on the right and left, then the central posts or advanced guards must retire as much as possible at the same time with those on the flanks, and on the same front.

Should the enemy observe the establishing of the night-guards, those who post the guards must take a circuit, in order to deceive the enemy
with

with respect to the situation in which they are really to be fixed. Fires must be kindled, as much as possible in recesses and retired hollows, and materials for extinguishing them must be previously prepared.

The mode of proceeding, and of communication * established between patrols detached from the guard for purposes of reconnoitring, are to be similar to those prescribed for the conduct of vedettes. The patrols must inform the commanding officer of the post of all they observe, and he will order his party under arms on the appearance of the approach of an enemy. If any man should desert, the parole must be changed, and this is to be communicated to the detached piquets. The patrols ought not to go their rounds at certain stated periods; for the hours are to be daily changed, otherwise, the enemy would make discoveries, and carry the post.

If the night is dark and rainy, the sentinels

* *Consigne, parole, and mot d'ordre*, mean, nearly, the parole in our service. *Consigne*, above, means *instructions for a mutual communication of procured intelligence*. At night, vedettes quit heights, and place themselves at the foot of rising grounds, the tops of which serve them as an horizon. They thus discover more readily than from above. At night, vedettes are doubled, and placed so near each other, that no person can pass between them undiscovered.

and

and patroles must be continually in motion, from right to left, towards each other, in order to watch and examine the spaces separating them, so as to prevent any person from slipping through unperceived.

If the post consists of cavalry, and if it is exposed to an assault, the one half of the guard must always remain ready mounted.

If the watering place is distant, and if the enemy is very near, the horses are not to be conducted to the water, which is to be brought on carts, in vessels procured from the neighbouring houses.

While the half of the guard remains mounted, the other must water, and feed their horses.

A fourth part only of the cavalry of the post is to be sent, at a time, to water ; and during their absence all the rest remain mounted.

When sentinels can make all requisite discoveries, there will be no occasion for any patroles : but when the sentinels cannot see sufficiently far, patroles become indispensably necessary.

When a trumpeter carrying a flag of truce approaches a post, he sounds a call, or parley, on which a person is detached towards him, who will cause him to face outwards, and to halt till orders are received to conduct him to the commanding officer of the post, or to receive from him the letters or packets which he may have brought.

brought. A receipt is to be given to the trumpeter for these ; after which he must be directed to return whence he came. If, on the contrary, he is escorted to the camp, it is customary to blindfold him, and thus to conduct him to the commandant. Deferters are treated nearly in the same manner ; and they must not be permitted to sell their arms, horses, or appointments, without the sanction of the commanding officer.

When the officer in charge of a post sends his report to the commanding officer of the party he belongs to, he will direct the escort to bring back the *parole*. The sentinels must be relieved every hour, which is the surest means of rendering them alert and active.

The parole and the assembling, or rallying-word, are given out at night only.*

The small patrols will proceed four or five hundred paces in front of the sentinels : they will cautiously examine in every direction, listen-

* The great guards in front of an army retire to their night stations at sun-set ; but the advanced guard, which always remains in the neighbourhood of the enemy, is not to fall back to its night-post till night comes on ; and, thus, with a view of concealing from the enemy the position which it will occupy during the night. The night station for a guard is, four, five or six hundred paces in rear of its position by day. A rallying-word is one by which patrols are to know each other.

ing at each step, and if they hear the marching of troops in the neighbourhood, an escort is to be sent to communicate this circumstance to the officer commanding the post. If the noise increases, the patrols will fall back.

C H A P. IV.

Continuation of the preceding Subject.

AS it is on the vigilance and ability of an officer commanding an advanced guard, or post nearest to the enemy, that the safety of an army often depends, I shall endeavour, if possible, to lay down every instruction calculated to enable an officer, entrusted with so important a duty, to discharge it thoroughly.—He will divide his party into three troops, or subdivisions: the first will furnish the vedettes and small patrols; the second constituting the body of the guard, must continue mounted; and the third subdivision must rest and feed their horses, in order, afterwards, to relieve the sentinels and patrols, or small detached guards. Supposing, for instance, the guard or post consists of sixty mounted troopers, twenty will be occupied as sentinels and patrols; twenty will be always ready

ready to act according to exigency ; and the remaining twenty will repose themselves. This arrangement will take place whether the guard is more or less strong.

Care must be taken to establish a ready and easy communication between the small detached guards and the main guard, and to avoid having a defile between them. If the guards are intended to cover cantonments situated near the enemy, their duty becomes of the last importance. In this case, reconnoitring in front of the post demands the most extreme attention and vigilance.* The officer commanding must reconnoitre in person, at the head of one-third of his guard, and attended by a peasant on horseback. He will leave the other two-thirds concealed behind a village : but should he deem an attack probable, he must take along with him two-thirds of his guard. Sentinels placed on steeples ; vedettes on heights ; patrols of two troopers in every direction ; small intermediate detached posts ; all these are necessarily supposed. It must also be understood, that if the officer has

* Should one of the guard desert, during the night, the rallying word, or sign by which patrols and videttes distinguish each other, is to be immediately changed ; and this is to be communicated to all the small posts, in order that the enemy, pretending to be friends, may not derive any advantage from such circumstance.

infantry, he ought to place them in preference, in orchards, in vineyards, in hollow roads, in ravines or intersected grounds, and on the borders of villages. He is to destroy the bridges in front, and to repair such as may enable him to retreat. He is to form abbatis and barricades, and, day and night, to watch diligently every movement in his front, on his flanks, or in his rear. He must attend to the safety of his guard, as well as to that of the cantonments or camp which he is directed to cover. Towards midnight, he must redouble his vigilance. As morning approaches, he must have his guard under arms till day-light, and until the patrols he has detached to reconnoitre have returned, he must not permit any person to pass his post. If he sends an intelligent person towards the enemy to procure information, he is to choose such from among the inhabitants of the town or village. Their house will be a pledge of their fidelity, or their wives and children will serve as hostages.*

It is easier in winter, than in summer, to cover

* The flanks of an advance guard, or post, should be covered naturally, or artificially. The rear has a communication with the main body, to render a retreat, if necessary, practicable. Deserters are to be carefully distinguished from spies, and the train of questions to be put is previously prepared. Sentinels and vedettes are placed so near each other, as not to have occasion to turn their heads to right or left.

cantonments, because the roads are destroyed by the rains and snow, which render the access more difficult. This, however, must not be relied on, for it was owing to this imaginary security that the Prince of Hesse Philipsthal, commanding a corps of Prussians in Silesia, was surprized, defeated, and taken prisoner by the Imperial General Count de Wurmser, who, in the severest period of winter, crossed the defiles which were then deemed impenetrable. Finally, an officer commanding an advanced guard, or post, situated near the enemy, must be sensible that he ought to take no rest during the night, and as much only during the day as may be necessary to recruit his strength. He must be persuaded that he covers the army in such a manner, that, on the approach of the enemy, it may have time to form in close order, so as to receive him steadily, and without disorder. The officer must always recollect, that the critical hour is towards, or near day-light. On this account, it will be acting prudently to march off the relieving guard previous to that hour ; and the new guard will remain with the old till day fully appears, which will be a measure attended with two-fold security.

When it is perceived that the enemy is advancing, one of the two vedettes must proceed fifty paces in front, and fire, in order to warn the posts
to

to retire. The vedettes will fall back on the small detached guards, and these on the main guards. If the officer of the main guard ascertains that the march of the enemy is in force and supported, he will immediately send information of this circumstance to the general commanding, in order either to receive a reinforcement, or orders to retire.

As this guard is posted for purposes of observing, and not of fighting, and to prevent the main body from being surprized, it will retire *slowly*. If the officer of the guard sees it so closely attacked as to be in danger of being captured, he will order his guard to disperse various ways, to make the best of their way, quickly, along the beaten roads, and to join the main body by every possible effort. For supposing many might be taken prisoners, still some would escape to make a report to the general commanding; whereas, if the guard retired in a body, the whole might be taken, and the consequence would be, that the main army might be surprized and overpowered without having time to form in line.*

* When a guard finds it necessary to fall back, it retreats by indirect paths, and by round-about ways, to conceal from the enemy the direct road leading to the main body. The guard sometimes retires firing, and slowly, either when it expects to be sustained, or when it is eligible to afford time to the main body to prepare against a surprize.

I shall conclude this chapter by remarking, that the vedettes who have, at the close of night, fallen back, must return to their posts before day-break ; and they are, on their arrival there, to make discoveries, as far in front as possible.

CHAPTER V.

On Detachments sent out in Time of War to Reconnoitre.

AN officer detached for purposes of reconnoitring the country of the enemy, ought to be intelligent, active, and brave. The troopers who accompany him must be well mounted : he must carry with him a minute geographical or topographical map of the country, a parchment pocket-book to take sketches in, pencils, or crayons, provender, and bread and provisions to last several days. He is to procure information from the country people with respect to defiles, morasses, thickets and underwoods, rivers, bridges, fords, mills, elevated or rising grounds, and mountains which command the plains. Huntsmen and butchers, or dealers in cattle, are the people best calculated for affording this species of information.

The

The officer will always endeavour to gain or occupy tops of hills, and eminences covered with planting or woods, or heights furrounded by ravines, or intersected grounds, whence he may discover and observe the enemy, without being himself perceived. He will endeavour to arrive in such situations at night, without making a noise ; he will avoid the villages ; he will prevent any of his party from making fires, and from firing off their pieces ; he will, at the earliest dawn of day, place sentinels at the bottom, and on the declivity of hills and heights ; and these sentinels must be always concealed. The officer will cause men to mount up into trees, and he is to note down in his pocket or memorandum book all the remarks he makes, for the information of the commandant.*

If the officer perceives that he is discovered, he will, during the day, select some other situation in which he is to post himself, at the ap-

* If the reconnoitring party falls in with the chain of the enemy's vedettes, it must speedily retire into some covert ; and afterwards proceed on to fulfil the duty required. Sometimes the party may fall in with the columns of the enemy at night ; the party will fire on the column, and move off, and fire on another part of the column, with a view of causing the enemy to commence firing. When the party, however, is not discovered by the enemy, it must quickly retire, to communicate the intelligence of the movements of the enemy.

proach of night, in order that he and his party may not be cut off. He is not to mention to any man belonging to his detachment where he intends to pass the night, and he will shift his ground, as often as circumstances may render it necessary.

The object of this officer being not absolutely to fight, to collect booty, or to make prisoners, he is, therefore, to study to please the inhabitants, in order that he may not be betrayed; and he is to endeavour to procure accurate intelligence for his general.*

He must not permit his men to converse with the peasants. If in an enemy's country, he is to study, by speaking their language, to cause it to be believed that his party belongs to them. By this means he will learn all that is requisite, and will not be betrayed. If he is obliged to conceal his party during the day, he will station it in close thickets; he will direct his sentinels not to fire, on perceiving the enemy, but to give notice of his approach by whistling, striking or clapping hands, or by calling out in imitation of woodcutters, or countrymen working in forests.

* A barking of dogs heard at night, indicates rather an assemblage of country people, than an enemy. A person who speaks the language of the country will intermix, in disguise, with the people of the country, whom he will carelessly question.

Should the inhabitants of the country, whether men, women or children, come into the thickets where the party is posted, they must be carefully detained till it changes ground ; every possible attempt must be made to impose on the inhabitants with respect to the real design ; they must be well treated ; they must not be frightened or injured ; and it would be, besides, base and ungenerous in the strong to insult or abuse the weak. When the provisions are expended, a fresh supply is to be procured, but it must not be brought by the peasants. A part of the detachment will be sent to the villages for provisions, and in departing from such villages, the men on this duty must make deceiving circuits, in order carefully to conceal from the inhabitants the situation of the party.

The officer commanding the detachment must acquire a knowledge of the great roads and by-paths, and will inform himself whether or not carts and waggons can easily pass along them, by which he can judge if they are practicable for cannon ; he is to observe if the roads are crossed by brooks ; if the bridges are of wood or stone ; if there are ponds, morasses, dykes, ditches, or other defiles to pass ; and he will insert all such remarks in his pocket-book.

It will be easy to ascertain what passes in a camp, from the nature of the noise heard : if the

clashing of arms which strike against each other in marching is heard, if the noise of carriages is heard, or the crying of the drivers, and the cracking of whips, or the march of cannon and tumbrils, or the neighing of horses, and if these noises continue, but grow fainter and fainter, it will be a certain indication that troops are departing from the camp, or that the enemy is decamping. If the noise continues stationary, or if new fires are kindled, it is a sign that new troops have arrived. If the sound of the driving of piquets or pins is heard, it indicates that cavalry form a part of the troops arrived. When the fires appear to be extinguished gradually, it may be concluded that the enemy has quitted his ground. *

If, in reconnoitring at night, the enemy is met, the infantry must be drawn up on one side of the road, to prevent the men from firing on each other, instead of firing on the enemy.

If, on the return of day-light, the detachment or party is pursued, the infantry and cavalry are not to separate. By mutual support the strength

* It is frequently necessary, at night, to reconnoitre an enemy closely. Small patrols will, in this case, be pushed up close to the enemy, and while he is occupied in ascertaining their views, the reconnoitring main detachment, under cover of this circumstance, will quickly procure the necessary information, and move off undiscovered.

of the party is increased. The infantry is to retire very slowly, keeping up a continual fire retreating, and will keep the enemy at a distance by the fire of the most active and best flankers and riflemen. By this means skirmishers are driven back, as they will not readily approach cavalry sustained by infantry, particularly if the ground favours those acting on the defensive.

It can be ascertained at night, from the noise of the horses' feet, whether the troop is numerous or not. An uniform and extended noise indicates numbers. The sound of the marching of a small body is often interrupted.

The reconnoitring of infantry need not be made at a cautious distance, like that of cavalry. When the officer charged with this duty perceives that the enemy has marched, he is to halt to hide himself, and to cause the enemy to be observed by a man who slips from tree to tree, from hedge to hedge, lying down sometimes on the ground. If this man is discovered without being able to escape, he must give himself up as a pretended deserter. He will desert again when the first favourable opportunity presents itself, in order to communicate all the intelligence he may have acquired.*

CHAP.

* Sometimes a reconnoitring party on falling in with the enemy, cannot avoid engaging. It will attack in a spirited

CHAPTER VI

*To Reconnoitre an Army previous to an Engagement. **

THE reconnoitring of an army is not to be deemed effectually accomplished, unless the real position of it has been ascertained. A clear conception is to be formed of the morasses, woods,

manner, and the firing will serve to put all the neighbouring stationary posts on their guard. The party, fighting retiring, will endeavour to join some one of these posts. Both fall back, disputing the ground; and thus time will be afforded to guards to join the main body, and to the main body to receive the enemy.

The party is to be warned when it may, at night, be the intention boldly to pass through, on meeting the columns of the enemy. These columns, rather than commence an uncertain fire, will frequently open to the right and left, permitting the party to pass through. If a bridge is to be crossed, the contiguous ground must be previously well examined. Two vedettes are to be left at the bridge which the party crosses. On the appearance of an enemy, these vedettes will fire, as an indication to the party to return by another road.

* An officer sent to reconnoitre an army, must rely but little on the reports of others; and he is himself to examine, with extreme minuteness, the nature of the enemy's position. The information contained in his report is to be accurate and positive, and not vague and conjectural. From equivocal intelligence melancholy consequences might result.

moun-

mountains or villages sustaining the wings. The extent of the front, the number of the lines, the situation of the General's quarters, the stations of the artillery, of the tumbrils and waggons, of the ammunition, of the park of artillery, and of the magazines, must be distinctly made out. It must be discovered whether or not the camp is entrenched, and the situations of the advanced posts must be fully understood.

Such an essential reconnoitring must be made by the Commander in Chief in person, or entrusted to an experienced and brave superior officer, incapable of losing the steadiness, recollection and coolness, which such a duty demands. If devoid of these qualities, he will take a battalion for a column of ten thousand men, a guard for a battalion, a flock of cattle for enemy's troops ; carts, chariots and waggons, or heaps of dung, for batteries, which I have seen happen before and after the battle of Rossbach. In making essential discoveries, the cavalry advanced in front must be supported by infantry and some field-pieces ; the infantry must carefully examine ravines and intersected grounds ; and if the enemy is perceived, the infantry must cover itself in the best manner practicable, by hedges, ditches, and carts. If forced to march along a road, and that the whole cannot form on one side of it, such infantry must be drawn up in such manner

manner that its subdivisions may not face towards, and fire on each other. The infantry when retreating must be in close order, without the least distance, or any interval. It marches stepping short, moving hardly at the rate of a league in three hours : it will be thus impentable and invincible, and cavalry will make no impression on it. If, on the contrary, the infantry loses this compact order, moving in a waving and floating manner, the pursuing cavalry must be devoid of all courage and resolution, if it does not break, and cut up the infantry, by the impetuosity of the charge.

Infantry generally support the reconnoitring by cavalry ; they examine houses and barns where the enemy may be concealed ; they leave parties stationed near all the defiles through which it may be necessary to retire. Should the enemy attempt to occupy these defiles, during the period of reconnoitring, these parties must keep up a constant fire, though, probably directed at no particular object, as such firing will warn the main body in front to retreat in some other direction.

If it is indispensably necessary to gain a height, in order to discover from thence the march, position and strength of the army of the enemy, it becomes requisite to get possession of such situations by an attack at once decided, resolute and impetuous.

tuous. After making observations in conformity to instructions received, the party is to retire in collected, steady, and slow order. The worst mounted troopers are to be stationed at the entrance of a village, of a thicket, of a wood, or hollow road by which the party is to retire, in such manner as to deceive the enemy. I mean by this, to cause the enemy to believe that the party is more numerous than it really is : and this deception is carried on by shewing your men, sometimes on one side of the position, and sometimes on the other, as if they were not one and the same people or party.*

Some shots must be fired as if to caution a force in the rear : a trumpeter placed on a rising ground must, in order to mislead, sound a call, an assembly, or a charge. If these stratagems do not prevent a pursuit by a superior force, the party must be ordered to disperse in various di-

* In a case of such vast importance, as that of reconnoitring an army, every remark is to be noted down. The faults of the position of the enemy, the manner in which his wings are covered, heights unoccupied near the enemy, defiles unguarded, the number and quality of the enemy's troops, the degree of vigilance he maintains, the woods which are near him, are all objects of enquiry, by actual observation, or from information to be depended on. An experienced eye reconnoitres with accuracy, and old officers ought to have their opinions taken on the spot.

rections,

rections, and to re-assemble at an appointed rendezvous ; and thus the enemy will be escaped from, and his force will be divided. The best mounted will bring up the rear, and cover the retreat. If there is time, defiles must be stopped up with waggons of wood, or rendered difficult to pass, by causing the peasants to dig holes in the shape of wells. In reconnoitring, great patience is required in watching proper opportunities for discharging the duty effectually. Were the party to discover itself precipitately or injudiciously, a danger would arise of being captured by the enemy.

I am thus particular on the subject of reconnoitring an army, because it is of the last importance to ascertain, when an enemy is marching towards you, on what flank he is directing his attack. An officer charged with this duty may render a most signal service to the army, by discomfiting the flankers, patrols, and detachment by which an enemy covers his march. To effect this, the officer reconnoitring will form his party in close order, to penetrate and pass through the enemy by the weight, consistence, and shock arising from the momentum of such formation. If it is night, the enemy's columns open and make way on hearing the party coming up in a trot, because it cannot be well known against whom they have to act.

Having

Having attained his object, that is, having got to the height from which he is to reconnoitre, he will avail himself of the disorder and confusion into which he has thrown the enemy, in order, with the same address and boldness to continue his march.

If the officer charged with this duty, meets on his march with patrols sustained by detachments, and not by columns, it is evident that the enemy is directing his force against the flank, the reverse of the one he is reconnoitring.

The ultimate success of the greatest enterprises depends on the accuracy and intelligence of officers entrusted with such important duties.

CHAPTER VII.

*On Detachments intended to cover Foragers.**

AN officer commanding a detachment intended to cover a foraging party should be very
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* A General should chuse the situation of his camp, so as that the enemy can neither deprive him of his forage, nor disturb his foragers in collecting it. Foragers, unless well regulated, generally spread too much, destroying and trampling down more forage than they gather. Ambuscades are chiefly
to

intelligent, and should have a map of the country which he ought to reconnoitre. He is to be preceded by light cavalry for reconnoitring the march. The cavalry are to spread and extend far in front of the ground which is to be foraged. Rear guards are to be posted from which sentinels are to be detached and planted on the heights and in avenues. Those in charge of these guards are to be instructed where they are to repair to under certain described circumstances, and to whom they are to make their reports. This arrangement will take place when the foraging is carried on, and the guards are to be posted in a manner calculated to prevent a surprize. Patroles will be stationed in front, and on the flanks, at a distance.

It now remains to detail the mode of conducting the two different species of foraging termed green and dry foraging.

An officer from each regiment, battalion, or squadron, will march with the foragers, who are not to proceed from camp until the ground has been well examined.

The foragers must confine their operations to

to be guarded against by the escort covering a foraging party : the ground cannot be too well examined previously, and vedettes are to be detached far and wide, to ascertain the intentions or movements of the enemy.

certain

certain prescribed limits: if the country is level, the escort will be chiefly cavalry: if uneven and intersected, infantry. It has already been remarked that the covering parties must be posted beyond woods, hedges, and morasses, in order to guard against every possible attack.

A party intended for dry-foraging is to be conducted to its ground in the most regular manner, and must be provided with ropes for securing trusses of hay, and with sacks for receiving oats and grain.

The forage in the rear of the army must be reserved as a last resource, being preserved for the general's quarters, and for the artillery.

It must be well inculcated and understood, that the light troops intended for preventing a foraging, never attack the foragers till they are making up their trusses, and when their horses are feeding in the fields and meadows; and that those directed to carry off the horses, are provided with instruments for cutting the cords or straps with which they are tied, and with whips for the purpose of driving them before them.

Foragers are generally attacked by small parties, supported by more numerous ones. I have frequently seen the attack of a foraging party made use of as a means of bringing on a general action; and in such case, the object in view is of considerable importance. This stratagem is
generally

generally productive of advantage to those availing themselves of it, as all the chances are in favour of those who attack. The foragers are thrown into the utmost trouble and confusion, and betake themselves to flight in general, communicating their disorder to the corps they belong to, a circumstance that almost always secures the victory to an active and intrepid enemy, who pursues close, and follows up the first advantage.

I have already said the ground ought to be well reconnoitered, and that the chain of posts ought to be well and judiciously established before the foragers arrive; I am of opinion that they ought not to set out from the camp sooner than two hours after the escort*,

In open countries, the light troops supported by cavalry in close order, constitute the advanced guard; in covered and intersected countries, they are followed by infantry accompanied with field-pieces.

In forming the guarding chain of posts, the

* The more economically forage is managed, the longer can an army subsist in a country, without making fatiguing and useless movements, which particularly disable the cavalry and waggon horses. The forage on the wings of the army is assigned for the use of the wings, and care must be taken that the enemy does not carry it off, and that the conduct of the inhabitants of the country is watched in regard to this forage.

infantry is placed on the borders of villages, behind hedges and hollow roads: the sentinels of the cavalry are planted on heights and commanding situations, from which the view is extensive: they must be sustained by parties posted in vallies.

Hussars and mounted chasseurs remain in front of the chain of posts, in order to reconnoitre and prevent the approach of the enemy, should he attempt to interrupt the foragers when carrying on their work.

The guns are placed on heights, whence they command the entrance of defiles, which lead to the chain of posts.

If the foraging takes place in situations very contiguous to the enemy, the foragers ought, at all events, to carry their sabres along with them. In proportion as the forage is collected, they are to return to the camp; but the chain of posts is not to be withdrawn, until all the foragers have retired.

In the case of a party on the duty of dry-foraging, the infantry are entirely arranged round the village, and the cavalry in situations where it can readily act: One village at a time only is foraged; after which the whole party proceeds to the next, or to such as may be indicated.

In presence of an enemy, foraging on an extensive

tenfive scale must be avoided: when it is found difficult to establish a protecting and extensive chain of covering small posts, including a certain space and extent, it becomes preferable to forage repeatedly, within a limited and formidable chain of posts. In general, it is to be a rule not to forage at a great distance from the camp, without stationing intermediate bodies calculated to secure the retreat of the foragers.

The time and place of foraging must be carefully concealed, and the requisite arrangements are not to be made till the instant when the duty is to be executed; as otherwise a deserter might give information, and ruin the success of the enterprize.

The most eligible time for foraging is when the enemy is engaged in the same undertaking, as the risk is then less; nevertheless, this is not to be entirely relied on, as the enemy under a feint of foraging, might attack with the half of his army.

CHAPTER VIII.

*On Detachments sent out to levy Contributions.**

CONTRIBUTIONS are either in money, or in kind; and sometimes both are required. If what is demanded is not immediately furnished, the richest and leading people of the country are to be taken as hostages: if contributions are levied in situations contiguous to the enemy, the party must regulate its procedure, and insure its safety, by following the rules laid down in the preceding chapters. If the collecting of provisions is the object, the mode of proceeding becomes different; the officer will assemble the principal people, concealing his force from them, and causing it to appear larger than it really is; he is to listen to no objections that may be urged by the magistrates or head-people, for they always bring them forward, however moderate the demands made may be: As in such a case, circumstances do not admit of long deliberations,

* Contributions being raised in an enemy's country, the officer commanding the party is to procure intelligence at the same time that he collects, as speedily as possible, the money and articles required; for the inhabitants will endeavour to detain him by delays, to afford time to the enemy to surprise the party.

the officer must act with a decided degree of haughtiness, keeping some of them as hostages, and dismissing the others with threats of setting fire to the place, and putting the inhabitants to the sword, unless the articles required are delivered within a limited period.

When the provisions are furnished at a place pointed out, the officer will send them off under an escort covered by the main body of his party formed in close order.

He will cause a certificate to be delivered to him, in which is stated the quality and quantity of articles delivered; this certificate presented to the general will be a proof and report of having discharged the duty, as legally as the nature of such service will admit of. A decided regularity of procedure effects quick deliveries, rendered thus less burthensome to those who furnish the articles, and less troublesome to those demanding them.

In executing this duty, the same reconnoitering is to take place, the same precautions are to be used, and the same arrangements are to be made, as indicated in the preceding chapters. The officer will meet the chief people of the town, or village, attended by an escort: he will draw up in line the rest of his party at the edge of a wood, or in front of a long rising ground, in order to cause it to be believed, that a part only of his
troops

troops are to be seen, and that they are more numerous than in fact they are.

CHAPTER IX.

*On Encampments, and the most eligible Situation for Camps.**

GUARDS attended by non-commissioned officers belonging to the quarter-master's department, precede the army in cases of formation of an encampment. These guards are so stationed, that there may be between them and the camp, a sufficient quantity of wood, water, straw, and forage for twenty-four hours: There must be at the head of the camp a suffi-

* Encampments calculated to cover a town threatened with a siege, are formed under cover of the cannon of the place.—Encampments ought not to be liable to a surprize, nor to have their flanks turned, as they should be supported by a wood, a river, the sea, a lake, or a morass.

Light troops must continually harass an enemy in his camp, by attacking in rainy weather, by cutting off his convoys, forage, and provisions. The camp must, day and night, be kept in a constant state of alarm: this vigilance will be rewarded by the reducing of the camp to the last extremity, and probably ultimately, to a surrender at discretion.

cient space or extent of ground, for drawing up the army in line.

The ground for the park of artillery must be marked off in the centre, and if possible in an elevated situation: the bread and ovens are also to be placed there.

The camp ought to join defiles, morasses, rivers, rivulets, villages, or woods. The general's quarters are situated in the centre, between the two lines, or towards the rear. If possible, there must be a space of three hundred paces between the lines. In all cases of a military description, every precaution is to be used in procuring intelligence, making discoveries, and reconnoitering ground.

One of the first things to be attended to is, to establish easy and ready communications between the brigades, between them and the provisions in the rear; and also for the purpose of moving and forming, without falling into confusion.

Signals must be agreed on, on perceiving, or hearing which, each battalion, each troop, and each brigade, is to repair to its assigned ground, by a previously prescribed road, in order to avoid, with the utmost care, every degree of irregularity or disorder in forming.

The camp must be intrenched, when it is intended to attack a place which may have supplies or reinforcements thrown into it; or where it is
intended

intended to defend a difficult pass, or finally where it is necessary to strengthen disadvantageous ground by fortifications.

When a camp is intrenched, palisadoed ditches are to be widened and deepened; chevaux de frise must be placed at the barriers, the parapets must be thickened, and holes like wells, must be dug in the places most exposed, and liable to attack.

It is generally understood that the first line furnishes the defence of the front, and the second, of the rear of the camp.

A camp is deemed judiciously situated, when it has within it wood and water; when its flanks are well supported, and its rear well covered; and when by a small movement, the enemy is forced to make a considerable one.

It is eligible to entrench a camp, not only to prevent a surprize by the operations of light troops, but to prevent desertion.

If the rivers for watering the horses are not supplied with a sufficient quantity of water, embankments are to be made for damming up the water.

CHAPTER X.

*On Detachments intended to act offensively.**

THE conduct of an officer who is to act *on the offensive*, is quite different from that hitherto prescribed, the object of which is, to procure intelligence, to reconnoitre, to guard an army, to cover foragers and encampments, to watch the enemy, to prevent the corps from which a party is detached from being surprized, and to make a faithful and accurate report to the general of all that has been seen and observed.

An officer commanding a detachment which acts on the offensive (a superior officer generally discharges this duty) ought to divide into four equal parts the corps acting under him. A quarter of his force will constitute an advanced guard disposed in echelon arrangement, that is, vedettes precede, followed by patrols, supported by a piquet; then follows the main body of the detachment, composed at least of the one

* Camps, cantonments, and winter quarters, are generally turned or attacked in the rear, being strongly covered, fortified, or barricaded in front. The alarm-post must be previously ascertained, and is the situation that ought to be first seized on. When the troops find that occupied, they are apt to give up all as lost.

half of the whole. The reserve, being a fourth part of the force, brings up the rear. From this reserve flankers are sent out to guard the flanks ; and the principal attention must be directed towards these, to prevent being cut off, and to secure a retreat in case of necessity.

The instructions heretofore detailed respecting advanced guards and reconnoitring parties, when near an enemy, are equally applicable in this case ; that is to say, defiles through which the detachment is to retire must be guarded, and it must be strongly recommended to those occupying such defiles, in case of not being able to maintain their situation, and in case they cannot make a verbal report, that they are obliged to abandon the position, to fire as often as possible with their carbines and musquets, in order thus to give warning to the main body that the defile is forced, that they are engaged by the enemy, and that, therefore, the main body of the detachment ought to retire by some other road.

When these arrangements have been made, the detachment proceeds. If the enemy opposes its progress, skirmishing will commence by those more advanced, who must be sustained by the main body, if requisite, or by as many as it may be deemed necessary to detach from it.*

If

* When an attack is to be made on a post, a select chosen troop of horse will gallop up, seize on the sentinels and vedettes,

If it is a champaign country, cavalry are sufficient. If it is a woody country, full of defiles and intricate paths and passes, infantry are more proper. If it is a mixed country, partaking of both these descriptions, as is generally the case, both cavalry and infantry are required to act according to circumstances. The object in view frequently is, to draw on the enemy to engage in a general action.

If ground calculated for forming an ambuscade presents itself, it must be accordingly occupied. It must be such that it can be occupied without being perceived by the enemy; that the enemy may be attacked from various parts of it; and that the party occupying it may retreat, if necessary, from several entrances leading into it.

The officer acting offensively ought not to give ground, or fall back, though even the enemy should be stronger than his party, particularly if his horses are fresh, and have had more rest than those of the enemy; if his party

dettes, and thus prevent a communication of intelligence of the attack. As these attacks are made with superior numbers, the object is not to attend to loss so much, as to prevent information from being conveyed to the main body. The character of the officer commanding the post, and the discipline he observes, are to be well known, otherwise *coups de mains* of this description are very hazardous undertakings.

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are more skilful in managing and conducting them with address and courage superior to the enemy; if the horses of the enemy are loaded with camp articles and necessaries; if previous to arriving they have had long and bad roads to march over; if they are more expert in manœuvring, and in the sword exercise than the enemy; and if his horses are in better condition and more fit for action than those of the enemy.

If cavalry are well trained in manœuvring, they may attack a double number with a certainty of overcoming them, in the case I have been supposing of such evident advantages; because the officer can divide his party into five or six sub-divisions. He will cause these parties to skirmish and hang on the flanks and rear of the enemy; he will lead the enemy out of his intended road, or he will drive him into marshy ground, or into disadvantageous situations previously reconnoitred. By these means he will easily prove superior to the enemy, from whom he will have the glory of taking many prisoners. He must make it his business to kill more horses than men, as a dismounted horseman is useless, and must soon surrender at discretion.

If inferior to the enemy, he may compensate the defect by attacking in close order the most exposed or thrown up flank of the enemy. He can throw this flank into confusion before the
main

main body of the enemy's detachment can have time to turn to the attacked flank, in order to succour it.

The fire of the enemy's cavalry is to be disregarded. If he fires, at that instant he must be attacked with impetuosity, when he will be penetrated and cut up to a certainty.

The reserve mentioned, must support the body that attacks, and second it, either by a close attack in column, or according to the nature of the ground, by deploying with rapidity from the centre, in order to fall on the enemy's flanks.

If, after all these measures have been judiciously pursued, a party detached from the line in order to act offensively is forced to fall back, before it retires it ought to move with rapidity to the front, feign an intention of again attacking, make, or keep up a constant fire, cover itself with smoke, retreat at first slowly, and after putting a defile between itself and the enemy, retire quickly, and finally, disappear all at once.

In order to keep a pursuing enemy in check, no mode can be more effectual than to face towards him, after passing every defile. During this time, such horses as are fatigued move on, and the best horses halt, and thus recover breath. When the main body of the enemy approaches

proaches the defile, the retiring detachment moves off rapidly.

If it is eligible to establish small posts near bridges and defiles, those in charge of them must have directions to tie a bundle of straw at the top of a pole, and to set fire to it as an intimation that the enemy has arrived. By wetting the straw, the smoke it yields becomes more thick, and is therefore perceived at a greater distance.*

Men composing such detachments must not be permitted to carry money along with them: they can lodge their money in the regimental chest till their return. It often happens that a brave man neglects his duty, in order to avoid running a risk of losing his money.

When an officer acting on the defensive learns from his vedettes, and small advanced parties, that the enemy appears, he will order his detachment to halt, will conceal the major part of it, will take with him the remainder, composed of the best mounted men, will reconnoitre in person, and will examine the appearance of the enemy, paying little attention to his superiority of

* In a level country, it is hardly possible to surprise a post. It is to be carried by power of numbers. In a mountainous country, the vigilance of the out-posts may be eluded, and by taking circuits, the attacking force may come suddenly on the post to be carried.

numbers, but much to the precautions he uses, and to the good order or negligence apparent in his march. If the enemy has marched over much bad road, if he has passed through wet, heavy, and deep ground, if he has baggage in his train, if he has defiles to pass, and if he is, under these circumstances, three times more numerous than the detachment, he must be attacked with impetuosity, and will be certainly vanquished.*

If, on the contrary, the ground is not advantageous for an attack, his flanks must be hung on with some chosen troopers, concealing the greater number, and no enterprize is to be undertaken against the enemy till he is led into a situation offering certain advantages, previously ascertained. An advantage is principally gained over the enemy by attacking the rear, which has still to pass a defile through which the main body has moved.

At the commencement of an attack, no prisoners must be made, every exertion and atten-

* The detachment directed to attack a post, will set out at night, and calculate time and distance so as to arrive in a neighbouring wood or village before daylight, when the attack is to be made by following up some of the enemy's patrols returning to the post. These enterprizes, if not of great utility, increase confidence, animate courage, and afford experience to light troops, who are thus formed.

tion being directed to routing the enemy completely. When the victory is no longer doubtful, and when the enemy is completely defeated, the trumpets, or horns, will indicate that prisoners may be taken.

When an enemy is to be attacked in front, if small parties are sent round to his rear in order to fire on him in all directions, such a measure will disconcert him much, and force him to detach small parties to oppose those who attack the rear, which will afford a decided advantage in favour of the front attack.

Finally, the advantage of an attack with cavalry consists, 1st, in the goodness and vigour of the horses; 2dly, in the address and courage of those who conduct them; 3dly, in a ready facility of dividing into small bodies, and of reforming quickly, in close and deep order; 4thly, in being so disciplined as to form close column, or a regular and accurate line, on the principles of tactical precision; 5thly, and finally, in the connected and compact order, and impetuosity of the charge.

CHAPTER XI.

On a Detachment to cover, or attack a Convoy.

THE precautions to be taken for securing the safety of a convoy, or for attacking that of an enemy, depend on local circumstances. I shall therefore point out only such general rules as follow.

Cavalry must be thrown in front, in the rear, and on the flanks, to be sustained by squadrons in close column or close order, at as great a distance as possible from the flanking, advanced, and rear detachments. The infantry must remain in column, near the convoy, in order to repel attacks made on it in force. I have frequently witnessed very detrimental consequences result from scattering, or spreading out the infantry injudiciously, over too much extent of ground. In such cases, ambuscades are principally to be guarded against and dreaded. Previous therefore to advancing, woods, thickets, hollow roads, hamlets, villages, the backs of rising grounds, cannot be too well examined, or too diligently searched. The inimical ambuscades choose that as the moment of attack, when the convoy has fully entered a defile. Thus situated, an attack on the centre, in front, and in rear,

rear, is attended with almost certain success. In a close and covered country, infantry are made use of in ambush, as being easily concealed, and because they readily and speedily annoy the cavalry, and retire more easily to the main body of the ambuscade. When success attends the enterprize, it will be sufficient to convey away the horses, and to burn and break the carriages.

If a convoy is attacked in a plain, cavalry effect the object. The cavalry remain concealed at a distance from the road, in a wood, or behind a ravine, and make an attack in full charge. Small bodies of four or six men seize on the waggons, and the main body attacks and disperses the escort.

If a convoy is to be attacked, the party must march with every possible precaution, towards the route which the convoy will pursue the ensuing day.

All the intersected grounds, and every defile leading to such road or route, must be occupied. If the convoy has to pass over a bridge, it becomes of essential importance to break it down. The time requisite for repairing it, affords an opportunity for capturing the convoy.

If the ambuscade is discovered, still the prospect of getting possession of the convoy is not to be abandoned. The flanks of the escort

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must

must be hung on ; it must be fatigued and harassed by skirmishing ; it must be driven out of its intended route, and thrown into confusion ; the progress of its march must be prevented ; it must be attacked in such a manner that disorder and want of conduct may prevail ; and it must be forced to disperse, and act in so many detachments, that immediate advantage may be taken, by decided attacks, of want of union.

If you are discovered, the advantage of changing your situation still remains. On all occasions, sentinels are to be very alert and well concealed. The convoy is to be fully within a defile, or on disadvantageous ground, previous to a vigorous attack. The attacking body will retire with celerity, placing the booty and prisoners in front, and the part of the force to be depended on in the rear, in order to repel the enemy, in the event of his making an effort to retake the convoy.

The attack of a large convoy is one of the most important operations of a war. An officer charged with this duty must, in person, reconnoitre the march and arrangement of the convoy. He will endeavour to effect this without alarming the escort. The more considerable a convoy is, and the more extended is its order of march, so much the easier it becomes to attack

tack and throw it in disorder, to destroy it, or to seize a part of it, if not the whole.*

If the front, or leading part of the convoy can be readily supported, in that case, the rear must be attacked, and false attacks are to be made to prevent the front escort from succouring that in the rear. In every case of projected attack, there ought to be reserves for opposing every attempt calculated to render the result unsuccessful. The escort must be completely defeated before permission is given to plunder, or to carry off the horses attached to the convoy. If this is not effected, the enemy may rally, and deprive the successful party of the fruits of their victory. Dragoons are best adapted for these expeditions, on account of the facility with which they can combat, on foot, infantry retrenched behind waggons or chevaux de frise. A small detachment of horse artillery, accompanied with a howitzer, are sufficient for throwing a whole convoy, and its escort, into the utmost confusion and disorder.

* The reserves covering foragers may be deceived by various stratagems. A line of cavalry, one deep, may appear to be marching round the top of an eminence, as if on some point to be attacked. After getting behind the eminence, the line may return and continue this deceit of appearance of force, while the *real attack* suddenly takes place on some other point.

When there are few light dragoons which can be readily employed, or when there is a scarcity of them, foot soldiers must be mounted behind whatever cavalry may be intended for the attack of a convoy.

CHAPTER XII.

On the Attack of a Battalion formed in a hollow Square ; on the Attack of a Column, and on their Defence.

A BATTALION formed in hollow square is an order so weak and defective, that I cannot conceive how experienced officers can deem it capable of resisting even an inferior enemy. Determined cavalry will instantly penetrate, at the first attack or charge, to the centre of this hollow square, dispersing and cutting down the infantry unable to rally, and utterly incapable of farther defence. The case is far otherwise respecting a column closed up into a solid parallelogram, or oblong square (*un bataillon quarré long à centre plein*), which is the most impenetrable of all formations, being as it were a rampart of bayonets sustained

sustained by a continued and warm fire. * The two first ranks having fired, will kneel, and remain

* This disposition against an attack of cavalry is admirable, as it affords a continued fire, and presents a successive forest of bayonets to a meditated attack of cavalry. The oblong square can be directed to face to the attack, to enable the whole to act with the mutual support described. If an angle is liable to attack, the men would half face towards the diagonal, and kneel in that direction. If all the sides were attacked, the mode of defence in common solid square would be resorted to.

The common hollow square is merely calculated for purposes of parade, and from its weak texture, is inadequate to resist an attack of cavalry. Where a small body of infantry is in danger of being outflanked and turned, or taken in reverse, the hollow square is, probably, the most eligible position that can be assumed, if attacked by infantry only, because the whole front of the force can be brought to act. There is a species of hollow square formed, six deep, in the French service, which has sufficient strength and consistency to resist cavalry, and affords internal space to contain the sick, the baggage, &c.—See a description of this square in the French Tactics translated, lately, by Lieutenant-Colonel Macdonald.

A method of forming a hollow, or solid square, with a single battalion, is sufficiently obvious, as laid down in our Tactics; but a mode of throwing a whole line, on an emergency, into these shapes, remains yet to be pointed out by our Tacticians. In proportion to the intended internal area, close columns may march to the angles, and deploy into formation of sides of the square, so as to have the sides six deep. When a solid square is to be formed, columns of companies may form close columns of grand divisions. The column may double its front by facing the half of the general close column

main in this position, and every two succeeding ranks will act similarly, till the fire arrives at the two rear ranks, which alone are not to kneel, nor to fire till the cavalry charge. Such a charge would be an act of decided rashness that would be attended with their total destruction. This arrangement and solid disposition of infantry in oblong solid order, can only be overcome by means of artillery. When infantry is thus exposed to the enfilade of artillery, and cannot with safety deploy into line, it must necessarily surrender at discretion, or be totally destroyed, unless the attack is diverted by a body of men coming to its relief.

Another method of overcoming a column in solid or close order, will frequently succeed. The body of cavalry intending to attack, must use a feint; seeming to retire to avoid the fire of the solid square. The cavalry will even retire out of fight, in order to induce the infantry to make a movement towards some wood, or intersected ground, which may secure them against any farther attack. If this stratagem succeeds, the infantry will be cut up; for they cannot march without opening out, floating on the march, and presenting intervals. The cavalry will avail

to a flank, and by filing it clear of the standing part of the column. The part that has led out will front and march up, so as to double the breadth of the general close column.

them-

themselves of these circumstances, will charge, pierce the column before it reaches its ground, and by cutting off the front from the rear, will force the whole to lay down their arms. In a word, when a column presents openings, impossible to avoid when marching at the ordinary rate, it cannot resist the impetuous shock of cavalry charging furiously in close order, and on a straight front.

CHAPTER XIII.

*On the Attack of Lines and Retrenchments.**

UNLESS lines are situated on heights, or in rear of some large river, or unless the approach to them is rendered inaccessible, they constitute but a very imperfect species of defence. Certain

* Retrenchments and intrenchments mean generally the same thing, being parapets thrown up to defend a post. Retrenchments are applied in one particular sense, as in the instance of a bastion, in which a practicable breach has been made, and in the *terre plein*, or level ground of which, a retrenchment is formed by two parapets meeting in a re-entering angle, to repel the enemy, after the breach has been disputed, and stormed.

success attends an attack by even an inferior force, on account of the facility with which the attacking force can deceive that behind the lines, and of the superiority of force that can be brought to bear on the point attacked, and to be penetrated.

The enemy cannot quit his lines on a large front, and must therefore defile. Charged with the attack, I make all my movements with impunity. My movements are unconstrained; those of the enemy are confined: I possess more strength on the point to be penetrated, because concealing this point from him, he is obliged, under this uncertainty, to be prepared at all points, while I hold my force in close order, as it were in hand, ready to be directed to act as circumstances may render eligible. I defeat the enemy, ultimately, by means of the different fronts I present to him. In rear of these imposing fronts, in open day, I execute all eligible movements, without any hazard or inconvenience. After penetrating into his lines, by rapid wheels to right and left, I take the enemy in flank, and overpower him in every direction. The feints, or false attacks, hide from the enemy the real design; occasion, as remarked above, an extended division of his force, an embarrassment, and uncertain arrangement of it; and if my force

is

is judiciously and skilfully conducted, the defeat of the enemy becomes infallible.

Thus, the primary object of lines, which is to cover a tract of country, is seldom effected. Lines are only calculated to prevent light troops from raising or levying contributions, and to establish a communication between two places, such as rivers and mountains. When columns, however, arrive, lines are forced, unless situated on the top of a mountain, in rear of a large river, or unless the approach to them is rendered inaccessible.

To effect this object, lines must be so flanked, that every point liable to attack ought to be defended by four or five crossing fires.

Intrenchments and retrenchments are generally carried, because they are not properly flanked and supported; because their flanks can be turned; or because they are of such an extent, that the force assigned for their defence is weak throughout.

When lines are forced, pioneers are immediately employed to establish communications, in order that cavalry may pass through in pursuit of the routed enemy.

The infantry drawn up in line on the parapet, will fire by files independently, to prevent the enemy from reforming, and retaking the retrenchments.

In

In defending lines, it is of the utmost importance to have reserves so situated, as to be able to march with the utmost celerity to the point where the enemy uses the greatest efforts. The cavalry must be drawn up in one line, in the rear of this reserve. Its duty will be to engage and repel the enemy, should the infantry be forced to give way.

When an intrenchment is once forced, the defending force becomes so discouraged, that the storming force may pursue them with little danger of their rallying.

Lines, says Frederick the Great, afford but a bad defence; and they serve only to ruin the reputation of the troops assigned to defend them.*

It is different with respect to intrenched villages; and attacks on such, occasion serious losses. For instance, Marshal Saxe overthrew the combined armies of the Austrians, English, Hanoverians, and Hessians, at Fontenoy, Law-

* When an army must of necessity intrench itself, the space it occupies ought to be as limited as possible, consistently with the preservation of the health of the troops. Lines are, in general, carried from over-extent, and a want of troops to man such an extent sufficiently. The ditch should be sixteen feet wide, eight deep, and six wide at bottom. All commanding ground in the neighbourhood, must be included, occupied, or avoided in the first instance.

feld and Rocoux, where I have been, by shedding torrents of French blood.

Batteries furnished with grape and round, and supported by determined infantry, cannot be attained to, and consequently carried, but by sacrificing multitudes ; because the main force of the army of the enemy, being drawn up in line, behind these villages, the batteries cannot be turned, and must be necessarily attacked in front.

It is a great fault in troops defending intrenchments, to fall out in pursuit of a repulsed enemy : for the enemy may avail himself of this error to rally, and make himself master of the lines.

CHAPTER XIV.

*On passing Defiles : on the Passage of the Rhine :
on the Modes of Defending these Passages.*

DEFILES are formed by mountains, or by villages, by hamlets, by farms, by mills, by hollow roads, by morasses, by forests, or by rivulets.*

If

* An army reduced to the necessity of raising a siege, generally, if a defile presents itself on its line of retreat, takes care to

If several gorges, or outlets, are formed by, or between mountains, a column of infantry must pass through each of them ; and the summits of the mountains on either side of the defile, must be occupied by detachments which cover the columns marching below.

If the enemy occupies these gorges, or openings between the mountains, he must be attacked at all points before day-break. If the enemy is forced in any post, the part defeated cannot readily form a junction with the forces occupying the entrance of the other openings. The attacking force is the strongest in its whole occupied extent of front. Arriving with a considerable depth of formation, it penetrates with facility detachments of troops formed three deep only.

As gorges, or openings between mountains, where a continued defile is not formed, termi-

to place such defile between itself and the enemy, because he can be opposed in the defile (if he enters it) advantageously, on account of the small front which he must oppose to the retreating army which has already passed the defile. In passing through defiles, cities, towns, or villages, the officers cannot be too vigilant in preventing the soldiers from breaking off from the columns of march, and entering and remaining in houses, which will derange general regularity and order, as, independent of bad example, the men can seldom regain their original situations, till the army has quitted these places.

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nate in rising grounds in the rear, an effort must be made to secure them. This affords the most ready means of forcing the detachments occupying these gorges to abandon them, by taking them, or attacking them in flank and rear.

Morasses, which cannot be marched round, must be crossed. Passages across them must be formed with fascines, and redoubts must be constructed, at certain distances, in dry situations, in order to place in them infantry and field-pieces.

Defiles formed by forests and abbatis, are the most formidable. It requires time, and occasions much loss of men to carry them, if they cannot be taken in flank, or rear, by attacks in these directions.

A river abounding in fords, must, if possible, be passed during the night; and in order to distract the attention of the enemy, he must be alarmed and engaged at all points. This movement cannot be effected with too much dispatch, because it is essentially necessary to be drawn up in force on the other side, when the enemy discovers the intention, and arrives in column, to prevent or oppose it.

If the river has in it islands covered with wood, such must be occupied previously. It is to be observed, that if the edges of the river to be crossed have heights in front, the cavalry must
first

first pass. If, on the contrary, there are defiles, they are to be instantly occupied by infantry.

All enterprizes, for which the enemy is not prepared, embarrass and disconcert him exceedingly. Of this description are the passages of mountains which the enemy deems impracticable. These may be almost always traversed, and rivers can generally be passed before the enemy is aware of it.

When troops about to cross a river, perceive the opposite banks covered with woods, intersected grounds, or other obstacles calculated to prevent the enemy from immediate attack, or from marching up to oppose the passage, the enterprize may be executed with a considerable degree of security.

If I found it requisite to cross the Rhine, or some other large river, in the face of an enemy's army, I would commence my operations by erecting batteries on its banks, in every eligible situation, excepting where I actually intended to cross.*

I would

* Nothing is more difficult than to defend the passage of a river, where the attack is on an extensive front, or where the river is fordable, and so narrow, that one bank commands the other. If the river is narrow, the army to cross will choose a place where the river forms an angle, and where one bank is higher than the opposite. The fords must be rendered impracticable

*Passage of the Lake
by Gustavus Adolphus }*

I would provide, in perfect readiness, gabions, fascines, tools for throwing up works, rafts, flat-bottomed boats, and, in short, a sufficient quantity of all necessary materials for the completion of my object.

On the day, and at the hour fixed on, for passing the river, I would order the batteries to play; I would make a feint of a general attack on the whole extent of the front, with the exception of the very place where the passage was to be absolutely, at all hazards, effected; and there I would cause 500 light dragoons, well mounted, to cross over, under the command of an active, intelligent, courageous, and daring leader.

I would direct this commanding officer to form fifty patrols, consisting each of six men, to disperse these patrols to the right, left, and in front; and himself to take post in the centre with the remaining 200 dragoons. The officer would be farther directed to order these patrolling parties to keep within sight of each other, so as to maintain a communication, and to be able, in a quarter of an hour, to convey intelligence of their discoveries to their officer, over a space of two leagues. The information thus pro-

ticable by trees, or otherwise. The passage of the Rhine by Cæsar, of the Po by Prince Eugene, and of the Rhine by Prince Charles of Lorraine, shew in what manner large rivers are to be passed.

The Bourne by Lord Wellington ^{cured}

cured, would be transmitted across the river to the general of the army stationed, personally, at the point of intended passage.

If I was informed that no enemy was in sight, or that only vedettes appeared, I would instantly order 3000 infantry, provided with intrenching tools, to cross the river with the utmost dispatch. These, under the directions of skilful engineers, would immediately commence forming a *tête de pont*,* behind which I would post all my infantry, which would cross over in successive order, with their field pieces loaded with grape shot.

When this *tête de pont* is finished, the various working parties must be employed in forming an envelope† sufficiently capacious to contain, with ease, a division of the army formed in column. This envelope must have in it three openings, through which these columns can march and advance against the enemy, if deemed necessary.

* *Tête de Pont* is a small work branching from the edge of the river, on either side of the bridge, and covering the front of the bridge. It is an intrenchment, the various lines of which, generally, mutually flank each other, and is differently formed according to circumstances, by connected redans, bastions, demilunes, &c. &c.

† *Enveloppe* is here an extended work, thrown up for a specified purpose. It often consists of hornworks, redans, and demilunes, before curtains and lines of communication, placed to cover weak points of intrenchments. It is similar to a part of a line of circumvallation, in some respects.

During

During this period, the bridges are constructed, and the remainder of the army passes, using the precaution to march steadily and slowly till the bridge is crossed; to leave a considerable space between the subdivisions;* and when over, the troops must run some hundreds of paces in front, as otherwise, the disorder and pressure on the very bridges will be such, that many will be drowned.

It is a general rule to deceive the enemy, and to be beforehand with him, and by a forced march, to effect the passage, before he is aware of the design. The army must intrench itself after passing, in order to secure the safety of divisions which may not have as yet passed over.

I reckon it a very difficult operation to guard such extensive banks as those of the Rhine, because the attacking enemy, by making feints in several places, occasions such a subdivision of his opponent's force, that he becomes, unavoidably, the strongest, in the position selected for the actual passage.

It was in this manner, that in the month of June, 1744, Prince Charles of Lorraine, who commanded the Austrian army, crossed the

* *Section* is the word in the text; see *Translation of the French System of Tactics*, by the Translator of this Work. There it will appear that *section* means the half of a company, or a *subdivision*.

Rhine in the presence of 50,000 French, under the command of Coigny, and was the first to make himself master of the lines of Wiffenberg, which the French forced, on the following day, with their wonted bravery. It was in this action that I entered on my military career, above half a century ago.

The best means of preventing an enemy from passing a river, is to cut up, and render impracticable for a landing, every place calculated for favouring a crossing over. The army must be encamped along the line of shore on which the attempt will be probably made, in order thus to be able, readily, to repair to any point where opposition is requisite. A chain of patrols must be established to watch in every direction. Intermediate posts are to be stationed between the camp, and the banks of the river, for the more speedy communication of intelligence that the enemy is attempting the passage. Broad and commodious roads will be made, on which the army will march to attack the enemy, before he can be drawn up in line, after crossing. The movement towards him must be rapid. His advanced intrenchments, which must be very imperfect, and works, must be carried immediately with infantry. This will force him to repass the river, and a considerable number of men and horses, will unavoidably perish in the water.

CHAP-

CHAPTER XV.

On surprising a Town fortified with a Wall or with a Rampart, and on surprising an Army.

WHEN it is in contemplation to surprise a town or camp, reconnoitering cannot take place without a risk of laying open the design, and rendering the project abortive : a perfect knowledge of the ground must be acquired previously, by the detail of procedure laid down in former chapters of this work : guides must be ready, who will at once conduct the force precisely to the very place to be attacked : In executing the plan, diligence, celerity, and profound secrecy are indispensable. If the enemy is more vigilant during the night than during the day, he must be attacked in day-light ; otherwise before the dawn of day. In a flat country, such surprises can be effected only in one certain manner, which is to press forward the patrols and vedettes, with so much vivacity, as to arrive along with them at the camp or post, which is to be carried and surprised. On arriving, the attackers must fire into the windows, barracks and on tents, in order to increase the confusion into which the enemy is thrown : The commanding officer must be made a prisoner immediately, to

prevent his issuing orders ; the leading attack is to be made with the eighth part of the force composing the expedition : a double number will sustain the van ; the main body will then come up, and the reserve, being an eighth part of the whole, will bring up the rear.*

Before

* Surprises are of two descriptions, either when one army surprises another, or when a chosen body of troops is detached to carry a strong place by surprise. The detached party is to be of such strength, that the enemy, if he fathoms the design, may not detach a stronger force to cut it off. The most hardy, experienced, and faithful soldiers will be selected to form a detachment intended for a surprise. If it is an intrenched camp which is to be surprised, the barriers are to be shut the moment the detachment marches, to prevent a deserter from betraying the design. Small parties are placed in ambuscade, to seize on all who may be proceeding to the camp of the enemy. If deserters escape, pretended deserters are *immediately* to be sent out, who will give out that the design is of a contrary description to that reported by the real deserters. All parties of the enemy met on the road must be cut off, or taken, to prevent their return with information of the design. When the detachment is challenged by the sentinels of the advanced guard, the name of the prince or general commanding the enemy's army is to be given, in order to deceive ; and this post must be instantly carried, to prevent all intelligence from reaching the main body. The nature of the camp must be well known, and where are situated particular posts, as the park of artillery, the general's quarters, the magazines of powder, of provisions, and cavalry. The exact strength of the enemy must be known, and in what manner it is disposed of, in order to calculate and arrange the attack accordingly.

Every

Before the attack commences, the troops must be enjoined by orders, threatening the most severe punishment in case of disobedience, not to quit their ranks, or disperse. Defeats arise very frequently from imprudent misconduct of this nature.

The prisoners are to be kept in one place, that they may be guarded by as few men as possible.

Every possible precaution is to be used to prevent plundering without permission. After the surprise the detachment retires by a different road, if there is danger of being attacked; because being encumbered with booty, prisoners and baggage, the object is now to avoid any encounter with the enemy, after undergoing so much fatigue. When the retreat is through an intersected and woody country, the enemy, in dread of falling into ambuscades, will pursue cautiously, if at all; and thus, the detachment generally retires in safety, before the enemy recovers from his consternation. When an action with the enemy becomes unavoidable, the ground of the strongest nature, in proportion to the strength will be occupied; the prisoners will be disarmed and guarded, and the soldiers will be ordered to lay down their knapsacks, to be enabled to fight to more advantage. Parties may be left to dispute the passage of a bridge, or of a defile, while the main body of the detachment retreats.

Fortified places are hazardous to surprise, unless the garrison is weak, partly gained over, or that the works are imperfect, without a ditch, or having only a dry ditch of inconsiderable depth. These surprises ought to be at midnight, after the grand rounds have passed. Scaling the walls of a fortified town is now but seldom attempted, on account of the difficulty and slender prospect of success.

The prisoners must be sent off without delay. The escort must be composed of active light infantry-men, and the troopers who have the worst horses.

The leading and essential point in surprises, is to fall on the enemy the moment he perceives the design; and to come to close quarters with him in the village, or camp which he occupies, before he finds time, and becomes sufficiently collected to assemble and form. The main body is to be attacked without hesitation, with a determined resolution; and for this purpose, his alarm post is to be previously ascertained, in order to arrive there before him. I have already remarked, and it cannot be too often repeated, that the attack should be made in echelon, supported by a reserve, not only in order to augment the shock and pressure, where the exigency requires it; but also to induce the enemy to believe that a much greater force still is following in therear, and close at hand to complete the defeat.

If it is intended to surprise a town surrounded by intrenchments, dragoons are employed; and when there is a deficiency of these, foot soldiers are to be mounted behind them, in order to force the barriers and intrenchments at the same instant; to prevent the cavalry men, who are in the place from mounting their horses, to take their horses from the stables, and to cause the infantry

fantry men to mount them. If, in the event of a retreat, there may be a defile to pass, the infantry, if pressed by the enemy, may dismount and defend it.

When a place inclosed by a wall, or by a rampart, is to be taken by surprise, the gates must be blown open, or troops must be introduced through some subterraneous passage, or by means of a river, or the walls must be scaled at day-light. In all cases of such attacks, the forces of the enemy must be drawn away from the real point of attack; and the attention of the commanding officer must be diverted by false attacks, or feints. Horse artillery, or light artillery, and howitzers, are very serviceable on such occasions.

When the town is entered, every possible effort is to be used to prevent the foldiers from straggling about: they must be conducted directly into the body of the place, to be formed in line, and the generals and superior officers are to be secured. Fifty foldiers, disguised as peasants, with their arms concealed under their clothes and placed on carts, or in panniers, can destroy, or overpower a guard, and occupy a gate or bridge, till a body of cavalry, riding up at full speed, enters the town, followed by infantry marching in quick time. It is easily practicable to apply a petard to the gate, and to burst it open, if the town has no outworks.

The quarters or stations of cavalry are more easily surpris'd than those of infantry, unless the latter are attacked with a great superiority of fire and forces, before the dawn of day. If posts of infantry are carried, it generally arises from neglect of duty, or from want of requisite resolution, and collected coolness, in those who defend them. I shall in the next chapter, mention the precautions to be taken to avoid a surprise. These always reflect disgrace on any commanding officer, who experiences them; as it is very possible to guard against them. Surprises ought not to be attempted without possessing a thorough knowledge of all attached circumstances. The strength, the nature, the position, and the vigilance of the enemy must be ascertained; the arrangements he has made for his defence, the nature of his quarters, and the character and quality of his troops must be well understood. It must be particularly ascertained whether or not the enemy has troops near the post in readiness to support him, and in what time these can arrive for that purpose.

Plundering is to be strictly forbidden when a body of men march to surprise a post: a victory already obtained, is frequently lost by such a practice; besides, pillage is equally disgraceful to the foldier who is guilty of it, and to the officer who permits it.

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The manœuvre which succeeds best when the object in view is to surprise and attack advanced posts, is that of coming in on the rear of the enemy by a circuitous march, and of seizing on, and occupying by sudden movements, the avenues left open for a retreat; for the attacking force ought to expect to find the practicable situations leading direct to the posts of the enemy completely barricaded and secured.

As these attacks are made with a superior force, the success of the enterprise is, beforehand, deemed certain. The principal attention, therefore, consists in intercepting messengers, cutting off the retreat of the enemy, and in preventing him from communicating information, in time, to the troops covering the post.

In proportion as it becomes hazardous and difficult to surprise an enemy in a level and open country, it will be found an easy and safe attempt to attain to the enemy, situated in a mountainous and intersected country. The march preceding an attack, in the latter instance, must be always by night, and so ordered as to arrive on the flanks of the enemy before day-break. When the morning appears, the detachment is to be formed for the attack; that is to say, after the patrols of the enemy, from whom the party must be carefully concealed, shall have passed. If the notice of these patrols is escaped, success

success is certain; because on their return, and on their reporting that they have seen or heard nothing, the troopers unsaddle and feed their horses, and afterwards lie down to sleep, to recover from the fatigues of a night passed under arms.

CHAPTER XVI.

*On the Means of guarding against a Surprise, and on the Mode of effecting a Surprise with Success.**

IT is generally understood that the gates of an enclosed town ought not to be opened too early,

* Patroles are often negligent in bad weather, and though sentinels know that death is the consequence of being surprised unawares; yet, either from false security or indolence, a surprise very frequently succeeds in bad weather, during high winds and rain, during a fall of snow, or a mist, particularly if the storm drives in the direction of the post. Night favours such attacks, the importance and danger of which are magnified from alarm and apprehension. If a post can be approached undiscovered, and is then suddenly rushed on with a charge of the bayonet, such a *coup de main* seldom fails to succeed: but great must be the carelessness of the defenders, if they thus suffer themselves to be surprised. An enemy kept in constant alarm, is frequently attacked at noon-day, when lulled into false security.

and

and not at all during a thick fog or mist; that the drawbridges ought to be drawn up, and the gates and barriers shut, after the troops intended for going the rounds, and reconnoitering have passed out; that the guards and reserves remain under arms during this period; that no considerable party arriving, be permitted to enter, or establish any other reconnoitering parties, than the customary ones, as additional ones furnish no security against a surprise;—and, finally, that the garrison must rest on their arms, and send out rounds to a considerable distance, when the danger of a surprise is deemed imminent.

In unfortified towns, and open places, the troops will be stationed in the houses contiguous to the outlets leading to the situations liable to attack or alarm; they must be lodged by squads or by subdivisions (*sections*), and companies. The troops must be all night on the alert, dressed in their uniforms, ready for action, and provided with orderlies to communicate intelligence, (*avoir toujours une ordonnance*.*) The horses, taken out of

* *Ordonnance* has different meanings; it means an orderly detached to bring the *parole*, or orders, from head quarters; or who may be selected to be sent to the general, or commanding officer with *procured intelligence*.—It means an arrangement of troops made previous to going into action; it also means the *uniform* of a regiment: the word has likewise other civil meanings. The substantive is used with some degree

of the stables, ready for mounting, will be stationed, in bad weather, in barns, the doors of which will remain open. During the day time, the leaders of squads, and the non-commissioned officers will be shewn the alarm-post, and the shortest ways leading to it, in order that they may repair thither, with the utmost speed, in case of necessity. If these roads are rendered impracticable by waggons, by trees, or by heaps of dung, which may prevent the soldiers from passing speedily over them; these obstacles must be removed, and collected together. On the contrary, in situations through which it may not be necessary to fall out, retreat, or attack, these articles of impediment may be made use of advantageously, to cover the flanks. The supposed distance of the enemy ought to be no inducement to a commandant to neglect these precautions: the careless and negligent are always beat by the vigilant and prudent.

It must be always understood, that if a post is formed partly of cavalry, and partly of infantry, the latter placed behind hedges, ditches, rising grounds, or works calculated to prevent the effect of enfilading, (*epaulemens**) are to support the former.

gree of obscurity above; the translation conveys the idea the author attached to the expression, by giving the general, military, and enlarged sense of the word.

* *Epaulement* has various significations. In sieges, the word
is

former. The infantry are posted so judiciously, that the cavalry can retire through their position, without confusion, in the event of an attack by a very superior force. The sentinels, who, during the day, are detached to a considerable distance from posts of this description, are at the approach of night, planted nearer to the main body. Every possible attention is to be paid to the comfort, accommodation and convenience of men constituting an advanced detachment; because, principally they are thus enabled to sustain the uncommon fatigue to which their situation is liable; they besides consider their character and honour particularly interested and called on, to defend to the last, and at all hazards, a post, which they are taught to believe, to be of the most important consequence.

As to the eligibility of an alarm-post, it must be chosen with judgment, and is to be of sufficient extent, that the troops may have room to form

is applied to high parapets raised to protect cavalry, situated to sustain the workmen, or pioneers in the trenches, from a plunging or enfilading fire, from the works of the place. It means sometimes a parapet raised in front, and also a parapet forming a *shouldering*, or angle, to prevent an enfilade, and to cover cavalry. It is derived from *epaule*, a *shoulder*, from such works being in general of an angular form, or approximating to it. In the above passage, the word means either a regular work thrown up, or a natural eminence made use of as an *épaulement*.

without

without being embarrassed, or confined for want of necessary space. In an alarm post situated in a village, or behind a defile, the cavalry are stationed in the rear of the infantry. The edge of a wood, or that side nearest to the enemy, more especially if situated contiguous to an enemy's country, cannot be well defended but by infantry.

A village on the confines of an intersected, covered country, whatever may be the form or nature of the village, cannot be deemed in a sufficient state of security, when defended by cavalry alone. Independent of the fixed, or stated number of ordinary sentinels, parading or walking sentinels will be sent out; these will walk along the banks of rivulets, round about houses, among orchards and trees, among hollow grounds, ravines, and hollow roads. They are to fire, when they perceive any person approaching towards them.*

Small

* The grand guard is stationed in front of the post; vedettes are detached to occupy all the heights near the guard.

In front of the grand guard, a strong patrol, commanded by an officer, will be ready to proceed to reconnoitre, when the vedettes have made any discovery.

An ordinary guard is to be formed in the middle of the post or village; it consists of infantry and cavalry: vedettes are stationed all round, within sight of each other. A piquet, ready for acting, will be situated at the quarters of the commanding officer.

Small, as well as large posts of infantry should, at the moment the post is selected, be fortified and secured by abbatis, formed by the men belonging to the post. No entrances or openings are

officer. All covered situations near the post must be occupied; and a communication with these is to be established. The spare force, after these precautions have been taken, will be employed in clearing and forming a grand parade, which will serve as an alarm-post. The officers will have pointed out to them the situation of rallying and retreat, in case an overpowerful attack may force the whole party to relinquish the post. At night the main guard falls back to the piquet, and both, by turns, do duty till day-light, when the guard returns to its post. Vedettes are doubled, and the entrances and passages must be barricaded at night, when the vedettes are to range all round within a mile, at least, of the post, making regular reports on their return. At day light, the country all round the post is to be narrowly examined, to discover any ambuscade placed by the enemy during the night. No soldier must pass out without leave. The probable point to attack will be ascertained, and a plan will be laid for cutting off the enemy, should he attack.

On any alarm, the piquet and grand guard will prepare to sustain the attack, to enable the main body to fall in to receive the attack. The post is to be intrenched, if too weak by nature; women must not be permitted to approach the post, as the enemy frequently employs them to make discoveries. If the enemy is repulsed at night, follow him with caution, as his falling back may be a stratagem. False alarms the enemy will create, in order to harass the post; they must not be despised; a vigilance on the part of the vedettes will prevent them.

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to be left, but such as may be requisite for the sentinels to pass in and out when relieved.

Churches always furnish an excellent means of defence. They have burying grounds which either are, or are not surrounded by a wall which generally flanks, commands, and looks into, and along, the principal roads leading from the village. If there is no wall round the churchyard, a row of strong palisades must be well fixed, or driven into the ground, of a semicircular form, in front of the church door. A banquette of planks (*échafaudage*) must be formed near the wall, within the church. These steps of wood must be of sufficient height to enable the defenders to fire through the windows. A steeple, or belfry, may be also advantageously used as a means of defence: but these species of defence ought only to be had recourse to, in proportion as the troops occupying them may be situated in the neighbourhood of a force which can support them. Without this prospect and reliance, such posts are useless.

In all cases, the least exposed side of the village, where the troops can readily and with facility assemble and form for defence, is to be preferred for lodging the force in.

It has been already mentioned, that the rear of defiles constitutes the most eligible alarm-post for infantry, as the enemy must pass through these

these defiles, which, besides, can be defended with a comparatively speaking small number of men.

Two alarm-posts should be selected, one for day, and the other for a night alarm. During the day, this post ought to be situated in front of the village, in order to be able to support and secure the village, to assemble the out-posts falling back, to reconnoitre the enemy, and to adopt the measures to be pursued. It becomes necessary to have the day alarm-post in front, to be thus enabled to fall back to the rear, and to retire before a superior force.

The night alarm-post ought to be behind the village, or some other defile, across which the enemy must come to make an attack.

It may be often of the utmost utility to a general, to have soldiers carried off as prisoners from a post, which may, not unfrequently, appear to common observers of but little consequence.

To succeed in carrying a post, and taking away the prisoners, the high roads and villages are to be avoided. The surprising force must slip along hollows, low grounds, and vallies; they must pass from one ravine to another, and from one height to another; they must avail themselves of the nature of the ground, to be always, if possible, under cover; they will thus

be able to discover the smallest movement of those posted, and if marching, the direction pursued.

Sometimes, an officer quits his party for a short time, in order to gain intelligence (*pour prendre langue*) in the disguise of a labouring countryman, and to observe narrowly, and intimately, the march of the enemy's detachments. If he perceives a detachment equal in strength to that he himself commands, or weaker, he must succeed in making prisoners, by throwing himself with his party from his ambuscade, and by falling with impetuosity on the enemy.

Prisoners, immediately when captured, and before they have time to recollect themselves, and to be guarded in their conversation, generally tell the truth. Such moments of discomposure and flurry of spirits must be seized on, to discover what may be of the last importance to learn.

Infantry may likewise make prisoners* of cavalry,

* A love of money creates spies. They should, in few words, be examined separately. Although the reports of spies and prisoners should agree, they ought to be kept separate. No secret is to be communicated to them. If an expedition is undertaken on the strength of their information, they are to accompany the party to verify their report, at the hazard of their lives. Deserters, and sometimes prisoners who express a wish to abandon their own army, may be examined as follows.

1. How

valry, by flipping cautiously through coverts and brushwood ill guarded, and by gaining, without

1. How long have you served? In what regiment? What time have you been a foldier?

2. Your reasons for deserting? Whence, and when did you desert?

3. Has the regiment you left been long in its present quarters? What is its strength, and the character of its officers? Who commands the whole?

4. What is the strength of the garrison, or post? How many guards are there? What is the strength of each, and where is it situated? How many nights are the men off duty? What rounds are sent out at night? And is the duty vigilantly carried on in general?

5. Are piquets and extra guards sent out, and where are they posted, and at what hours do they mount, and when are they relieved? Are the roads and bridges good?

6. What additions are made to the guards at night? Where are their sentinels planted?

7. Have the regiments received recruits lately, and is any attack or expedition intended?

8. What is the strength in infantry, artillery, cavalry, and pioneers? Are they all well armed?

9. Where are the magazines, and what quantity of ammunition and stores may be in them?

10. What quantity of provisions and forage is in the place, and what are landlords obliged to furnish? What baggage has the force?

11. Are any works or retrenchments constructing by the engineers, and what are the names of the engineers, and their ranks and services?

without being perceived, the middle of woods, of thickets, hollow roads, or the rear of an enemy, in order to surprise him before daylight, when sleep overcomes those who warm themselves at fires. By marching then towards them, by charging them close, thus surprised, and by falling on those who are on foot, it generally happens, that those mounted, instead of defending themselves, ride off at full speed. This state of confusion enables the attacking infantry to seize on the horses of those surprised on foot, and to return with the utmost dispatch to the woods, or place of ambuscade, from which they set out.

The surprising of an army demands very different arrangements, and though I have written on this subject in the preceding chapter, I repeat it here, that when such an arduous enterprise is to be undertaken, it is essentially necessary to possess a knowledge, in detail, of the disposition of the army, and of the roads conducting to its position. The design of the meditated surprise

12. What guns have the regiments, and of what calibre are they ?

13. Are there any horse, or flying artillery ?

14. What are all the precautions used by the different regiments, and by the army in general, in marching, as to strength of front or advance guards, rear guards and flanking parties, and vedettes ? &c. &c. &c.

must

must be most cautiously concealed, by preventing deserters from betraying the intention.

Officers commanding columns must be furnished with written instructions adapted to all the probabilities arising out of the case. In short, every circumstance connected with the attack, must be foreseen, and provided against in these instructions.

The advanced posts, when driven in, must be accompanied on the same road at full speed, and in full charge, by the attacking party, which must throw the camp, and all in it, in disorder, cutting down all who attempt to form for resistance.

This advanced guard must be followed by three-fourths of the army, and the remaining fourth will be a reserve.

The attacking force must arrive in the enemy's camp at the dawn of day. The infantry, following the cavalry, must penetrate into the camp, in column. The troops will reserve their fire till daylight appears. The fire of the artillery will be directed against the wings, or flanks of the cavalry particularly, to induce the troopers to quit their horses, and to save themselves without them.

When the enemy is routed, the cavalry will receive orders to charge them furiously, and thus to prevent their rallying and reforming. Fi-

nally, the enemy must be vigorously pursued, the army must be dispersed, and either made prisoners of war, or destroyed. If the pursuit is warmly carried on, few will escape, provided the defiles through which the enemy must necessarily retreat, have been seized on, and occupied during the preceding night.

What has been detailed on this subject shews the necessity of securing the rear and flanks, which cannot be too well attended to.

It is in winter quarters, when injudiciously taken up, that the greatest risks of being surprised generally arise. The chain of cantonments must be therefore formed with judgment; that is to say, either in the rear of rivers, or covered by military positions and posts, well defended by art, and strong by nature, or situated under the cannon and works of some well fortified town. Rivers, when liable to be frozen over, afford but a slender, if any degree of security. The chain of defence from assault or surprise, and the arrangement of cantonments, must be strengthened and sustained, at regular distances, by corps of infantry or cavalry, stationed according to the nature of the ground, so as to be able, immediately, to succour any point attacked. Access to winter quarters must be rendered impracticable by fixing abbatis, and the troops must be exempted, as much as possible, from fatiguing and
unne-

unnecessary alarms. This period is intended for recruiting and recovering the army from the effects of former service, and to put it in a proper condition for opening the ensuing campaign, and taking the field earlier than the enemy.

CHAPTER XVII.

*Constitution, Service, and various Wants and Requisites of a large Army. On the Inconvenience resulting from symmetrical Divisions of an Army (Divisions symmetriques), or component Parts, consisting of similar and equal Numbers in each Division.**

ALTHOUGH the constituent parts of an army are such as military officers are well acquainted

* Platoon-firing has been remarked by Marshal Saxe, to be often the cause of shameful defeats. He recommends coming to the charge as soon as possible. Where hedges, ditches, hollows, rivers, brooks, &c. are between the armies, he admits that platoon-firing may be serviceable. Firing kneeling, excepting where the enemy is at a great distance, or retiring, is ascertained from experience, not to be eligible on many accounts. Troops once down, may, not *very readily*, be inclined to get up again, independent of the chance, amidst

quainted with, nevertheless, I will briefly mention them here, as they occur to me.

The

fire, noise, and movement, of not hearing a word of command. Three ranks cannot fire standing, with safety to the front rank. In action, independent file firing is the only safe species of firing that can be had recourse to; and here also the fire of the rear rank is never used in our service. The use of the rear rank is also lost in a charge, and the only real service derived from it, is that of supplying casualties in the front and centre ranks. This is undoubtedly an essential service, added to its giving solidity, strength, and consistency to the line. There are many parts of the French tactics which might be advantageously adopted, as great improvements: for instance, their mode of firing by independent files, called action-firing, employs the rear rank. The men of that rank load, and hand their firelocks to the men of the center rank, who fire off both their own pieces, and those of the rear rank, alternately, by a regular method which will be found minutely detailed in the French Tactics, lately translated by Lieutenant Colonel Macdonald. Here we have an obvious advantage derived from the rear rank; but still it remains, in a great degree, useless in the charge. It might be an improvement to lengthen the bayonets of the center and rear ranks, so as to range nearly as far in front as those of the centre rank. An inconvenience would arise of throwing thus the centre of gravity nearer to the muzzle than it now is: but accustoming the centre and rear ranks to throw the left hand further forward than the swell of the piece, in coming down to the charge, would obviate this objection, and render a charge of bayonets at once very weighty and decisive. Montecuculi, before bayonets were used, called the pike *the Queen of Arms* of the infantry. He says the pikes should be 15, 16, 17, or 18 feet

The leading character in a large army is the general commanding in chief. He commands,
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18 feet long, and that the iron or steel piece ought to be shaped like a carp's tongue. Folard proposes intermixing pikes with the bayonets of the infantry. These pikes he recommends to be 11 feet long, with a two-edged iron two feet long, independent of the length of the wooden part. Marshal Saxe mentions pikes 18 feet long, with the steel part 18 inches in addition, and in shape, three cornered. He proposes arming the third, and a fourth rank in this manner. The pikes of these ranks would range, in the charge, as far in front as the points of the bayonets of the front and centre ranks. The charge of the bayonet will, in future, fully more than heretofore, decide the fate of battle, and therefore every improvement which is calculated to give weight and efficacy to a charge, merits attention, and the nation which first introduces it will prove superior in action, independent of considerations of national character. All improvements of this description will, at all events, increase the means and ability of the infantry to resist cavalry. Military men will readily acknowledge the utility of the pike. Marshal Saxe says, that the general concurrence of men of reflection and experience is in favour of the pike; and that this weapon, in rear of bayonets, gives the fire the confidence arising from protection mutually felt. It is certainly a *desideratum* in war to unite missile and hand weapons still more effectually, than in the musquet and bayonet. A selection of arms, combined with eligible arrangement, will give tactics their acme of perfection. General Lloyd, whose thoughts on military subjects are in general accurate, says, that our present mode of drawing up troops three deep, is subject to great disadvantages. He deems a line too extensive and weak in this order, and incapable of advancing with tolerable

and causes to be executed all that the Sovereign himself would order to be done, were he personally present; and in the absence of the King, who is the head of the army, the general commanding carries into effect the plan which he is ordered to pursue, by higher authority.

lerable accuracy on uneven ground, over even an inconsiderable space. He says our present lines are calculated for fighting only at a distance; that it is too weak to sustain a shock; that the fire arms are too short, and that an enemy, unless kept off by fire, will penetrate, turn the flanks, and cut up these weak lines. To render a line highly capable of offence and defence, he adds a fourth rank armed with pikes, 11 or 12 feet long, two feet of which are to be of steel, two inches broad, to cut on each side, without a cross bar, that it may easily pass through hedges. He directs this fourth rank to be composed of the tallest and strongest men. This formation certainly will possess great strength, solidity, and compactness, and may be peculiarly adapted to the nature of close and intersected British ground. Troops drawn up three deep, would prove very inferior to this arrangement. Cavalry would hardly venture to charge where a row of pikes was presented, in addition to a file of musquets. A mischievous error is gaining ground in the public mind. It is frequently very confidently asserted, that our tactics are brought as near to perfection as possible. Let it be recollected for a moment, that our system is entirely borrowed either from the Prussian, in its principles, or from the French, in its arrangement of parts, and that the eminent judges of tactics in these military nations by no means deem their respective systems complete, and are constantly discussing their defects, and offering remedies for their improvement.

The

The *General of Division* commands his proper division, that is, a considerable portion of the army, according as the Commander in Chief thinks proper to tell off, or divide the whole army into a certain number of divisions.

The general of brigade commands a brigade which is composed of two half brigades, or two regiments; and each half brigade is composed, at the period at which I am writing, of three battalions, each battalion consisting of one thousand men. When the army is on a full establishment, a division of the army amounts to twelve thousand infantry alone.—The equality of these divisions is constantly deranged by necessities perpetually occurring of detaching parts of them to the right, left, front, or rear of the line; or of posting them at a distance in defiles, or other situations threatened with an attack. Besides, certain expeditions require cavalry entirely; and others, only infantry. As these various species of detachments disturb the regularity, or order of symmetrical, or even divisions, great inconvenience and much confusion often result from adhering, strictly, to precise equal divisions of an army.

In another Work I shall propose the system which I would substitute in lieu of symmetrical, or equal divisions, and now resume my subject.

The Chief of the Staff of the army discharges
the

the most important duties next to those of the Commander in Chief. He furnishes the General Officers, and other officers of rank, with written instructions for the discharge of their respective duties. He regulates the detail of movement of the army, and visits the out-posts and positions dependent on the camp. He issues all orders relative to foraging parties and forage, conformable to such orders as he has received from the Commander in Chief. The head of the Staff conducts the daily detail of the army; he issues his orders to the different divisions of the army; he directs the formation and march of detachments, and gives instructions to the officers appointed to command them. Finally, it is the Chief of the Staff who, conjointly with the Commissary General (formerly the Intendant) superintends the management of the hospitals, and the furnishing of provisions for the army. The head of the Staff has under his orders a certain number of Adjutants General; and each of them again has two assistants, or Deputy Adjutants General. In the province of these Adjutants General, and their assistants, lie the following duties of detail:—topographical information and delineations; the positions of camps and cantonments; the examination and inspection of military establishments; the conducting of columns; the general superintendence of the
execution

execution of particular services ; reports and returns to be made ; orders for the march and movements of corps ; the general and particular police of the army ; and, lastly, the correspondence in writing relative to all these objects.

The Adjutants General and their assistants cause bridges to be constructed, ditches to be widened, or filled up, hedges to be cut down, hollows to be filled, and the roads to be repaired, over which the columns of the army are to pass.

They procure early information relative to the places where water, wood, bread, and straw, can be provided for the army ; and they remain in the camp till all these services have been discharged.

It is always supposed that each Adjutant General has in his possession a map of the country, on the same scale with that of the Commander in Chief, in order that his arrangements may be exactly understood, and followed. Each Adjutant General must have a state (*tableau*) or description of the corps composing the army, their brigade and general rank, or place in the line, and the regimental and army rank of the officers. He must keep an accurate journal of all the orders which he receives, or causes to be executed.

When, in the months of February and March 1793, I commanded the army of Vosges, among
other

other Adjutants General, there were present Laubadere, Eickenmeyer and Scherb ; and among the Colonels, Aubert, Dubayet, and Kleber, all officers of distinction, who have since rendered themselves famous at the head of brigades, divisions, or armies.

It appears to me an essential consideration, that each Adjutant General should discharge the duties of a separate department. To one I would assign the foreign and secret correspondence ; to another, the movements and general correspondence, the reports, the making out the returns and states for the daily service ; to a third the choice of the positions of camps and cantonments, tracing the line of march, and constructing bridges ; to a fourth, the visiting of posts, camps, and cantonments, after their establishment ; to a fifth, the daily detail and assisting in the usual labours of the Chief of the Staff ; and, finally, to a sixth, the reconnoitring of places for supplying the army with provisions, wood, water, straw, and the superintending the distribution of all these articles.

Every day, an Adjutant General, and an Assistant Adjutant General, in tour of duty, will attend at the office of the Commander in Chief, in order to accompany him, on horseback, when he proceeds to reconnoitre, or to inspect posts.

They ought to be employed, not only according
ing

ing to their talents and abilities, but with reference also to their strength of constitution, to avoid requiring from the weak and infirm, the discharge of duties demanding a robust habit, and a strong frame.

In addition to these Adjutants General, and their assistant deputies, there must be intelligent secretaries and military clerks, and draughtsmen for drawing out the returns and states, for copying the maps and plans, and for copying and registering the details of such expeditions as may take place.

In the general offices of the army, three registers must be kept : 1st, That of Correspondence ; 2d, one relative to all Movements and Marches ; and 3d, one respecting all Orders issued.

The most difficult duty appears to me to be the reconnoitring and examination of posts, camps, cantonments, before or after their establishment. Every minute circumstance of ground must be carefully observed and remarked ; such as, 1st, roads ; 2d, rivers ; 3d, rivulets ; 4th, brooks or torrents ; 5th, ravines ; 6th, springs ; 7th, fountains ; 8th, bridges ; 9th, ferries ; 10th, fords ; 11th, meadows ; 12th, morasses ; 13th, pools, or ponds of water ; 14th, inundations ; 15th, lakes ; 16th, plains ; 17th, mountains ; 18th, heights ; 19th, defiles ; 20th, gorges or defiles without an outlet ; 21st, val-
lies

lies or dales ; 22d, forests ; 23d, woods ; 24th, heaths and thickets ; 25th, vineyards ; 26th, orchards or inclosures ; 27th, strong castles ; 28th, lines ; 29th, redoubts ; 30th, towns ; 31st, villages ; 32d, hamlets ; 33d, farms ; 34th, cottages ; 35th, mills ; 36th, ascents, declivities, or rocks. The extent, breadth and depth, and, in short, the dimensions, of these objects must be delineated.

The selections of positions and camps require, in the officer employed on this duty, an aptitude, or readiness of eye (*coup d'œil*) that can, at a glance, form a judgment of the country, so as to choose the essential points where the wings of the army are to be posted and covered ; where guards are to be placed ; and where batteries can be most advantageously erected.

The Adjutant General, whose province it is to distribute provisions and necessaries to the army, will take care that troops applying to him, unaccompanied by their commanding officer, are not to receive their supplies. In fortified and inclosed places, the infantry is furnished with these articles before the cavalry receive theirs ; but in camps and plains, the cavalry are first served.

In addition to the usual assistance given to these Adjutants, they derive much aid from the Engineers, Commissaries of War, and all employed

ployed in the department of provision for consumption.

Money, stores of bread, forage, butcher's meat, preserved vegetables, wood, water, wine and brandy, must be provided for an army in the field. Wine and spirits are articles of gratification and utility, rather than of necessity. The Spaniards drink but little wine, though that produced in their country is excellent. I never observed a Spaniard intoxicated, during a residence of twelve months among them.

I have served several campaigns without drinking wine, and I have never tasted brandy; nevertheless, few have sustained the inconveniences, hardships, and fatigues of war with less detriment than I have. I do not recollect having been indisposed, a single day, during twelve campaigns which I have made, previous to those of the French Revolution.

In carrying on war in plains, or in a level country, the number of cavalry should be equal to one-third part of the infantry. In intersected countries, one-tenth of the number of infantry, in cavalry, will be sufficient. I repeat it, that the number of light-horse cannot be too great, especially now, when enterprizes, which formerly, and even under the late Marshal Saxe, were deemed impossible to be carried into effect but by heavy armed cavalry, are entirely executed by

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light

light horse. Light cavalry make up in velocity what they want in weight, or momentum. They attack in close column (*en masse*), and in steady line (*en muraille*), in the same manner as cuirassiers.*

If dragoons† are wanted, a small number will be sufficient. They are mounted infantry occasionally, who are quickly conveyed to carry and occupy a post, and thus afford time to the real and proper infantry to come up: but as they are not well accustomed to fight on foot, they cannot, on any account, be compared to a solid body of well-disciplined infantry. It is only

* *Cuirassier*, a horseman armed with a cuirass (*cuirasse*), being an armour for the breast and back, used in the Prussian and Austrian services, but laid aside in the English service, since the Revolution. These cuirasses were made of hammered plates of metal, or chain work, and covered the body from the neck to the girdle. The Romans used them made of leather (*cuir*), and hence the word *cuirass*. They were, afterwards, made of brass. The coat of mail, in the middle ages, was put over the cuirass. The ancient armour which covered the thighs, was called *cuisse*, from *cuisse*, the *thigh*.

† *Dragoons* are calculated, and disciplined, to fight either on foot, or horseback; but infantry duty is seldom now required from them. The word is derived from *Draco*, which was a figure of a serpent on an ensign, or standard used by the Romans, who called the bearers of them, *Draconarii*. The first regiment of Dragoons was embodied in the year 1681, under the appellation of, *The Royal Regiment of Dragoons of North Britain*.

since

since they have been deprived of their heavy, unwieldy fufees, that their fervices, in compact line, have been found equal to thofe of good cavalry. The fhock and preffure of their charge prove now of equal efficacy as thofe of any other defcription of cavalry.

Great advantages may be derived from fpies. The beft and moft ufeful, are thofe who actually fit in the councils of the enemy, in the offices of minifters, or in the clofets of generals. It is well known that Prince Eugene of Savoy, who commanded the Auftrians, for a long period, paid a penfion to the poftmafter of Verfailles, who opened the letters and orders tranfmitted to the French Generals, and forwarded copies of them to Prince Eugene; and he thus received them, generally, fooner than thofe who commanded the French armies. It is likewise known, that Luxembourg bribed a fecretary of the King of England. The fecretary communicated the defired information. The King, however, having difcovered this treachery, turned it completely to his own advantage.

Spies muft be paid for their fervices profufely. He who risks his neck to ferve you, deferves an adequate recompence.*

When

* The late General Goddard, under whom I ferved, and who was the firft that marched an army, partly compofed of



When I was Commander in Chief at Mayence, in the months of February and March, 1793, I found the Abbés and Monks, whom I carried along with me, of the most essential use. Though very large sums were placed at my disposal, for secret service-money, as these men gave me information gratuitously, I did not draw one penny from the military chest, or treasury of the army.

As the greater number of spies * act a double part, that is, receive pay from their employers,
and

British, across the peninsula within the Ganges, was remarkable for the accuracy of the intelligence procured through the medium of spies. His mode of paying them was singular. He opened a drawer filled with pieces of gold and silver, previously mixed in certain proportions, according to the importance of the intelligence. He directed the spy to help himself. This mode actually saved money, while it gave him, in the estimation of the *honourable tribe* he had to deal with, a character of profuse liberality, which promoted the public interest.

* A traitor, as a spy, may be made an advantageous use of. He may be employed in such a manner as to cause the enemy to believe that the plan to be executed is diametrically the reverse of that really to be carried into effect. Spies must be known only to those who employ them, and not to each other. Their accounts must be taken in writing, for the purpose of being, afterwards, compared with the depositions of prisoners and country people. Letters in the possession of spies, must be drawn up in a character unknown to the enemy. Postmasters may be always made good use of in communicating the intelligence

and betray their secrets at the same time, confidence must never be placed in them ; and many, unknown to each other, must be employed for the same purpose. The conversation held with spies must be so conducted, that it may be a matter of indifference whether they afterwards talk of it, or not. Little ought to be said to them, while, at the same time, they must be induced to disclose their thoughts as much as possible, with a view of discovering their real sentiments, the real part they are acting, and how far they may be depended on.

The depositions, or accounts of prisoners, merit but little attention. These only observe what passes immediately around them, and reflect but little. Their stories only add to your doubts and uncertainties. The accounts given by deserters are little better. The reports of

ligence brought in by spies. Soldiers who have proved themselves trust-worthy and faithful, are the most eligible spies that can be employed in visiting the armies and quarters of the enemy. They are to be disguised in various respects. Great information is to be acquired from the inhabitants whom motives of curiosity induce to visit the army : but these are, frequently, spies employed by the enemy, and if they can be deceived, great advantages may result. Violence should never be had recourse to, in procuring information, as any thing but the truth comes out under the impression of fear. Present, and future rewards promised, if what is asserted proves accurate, will be infinitely more efficacious.

both, are generally very confused and contradictory. Prisoners of the Prussian nation are excepted, especially if they belong to the cavalry. From these I have received intelligence so clear, distinct, and connected, that I have had no hesitation to conclude it genuine.

The soldier knows what passes in his own regiment, and seldom any thing beyond this; and the instance of the French corporal serving under Turenne, is as remarkable, as it is uncommon. This celebrated general reproached the corporal on account of his laziness, and idleness, in not working on the intrenchments which were constructing round the camp. The corporal answered, "that it was literally throwing away time and labour, to fortify a situation that Turenne was too able and skilful a General to think worth occupying for even twenty-four hours." Turenne, who had really directed these works to be carried on, *merely* to deceive the enemy, on the following day, quitted his intrenched camp.

In an army properly constituted, the infantry, cavalry, and artillery, ought to be very exactly proportioned to each other; as also the descriptions of light troops. The troops of the line, and of reserve, should be ascertained, in number and description, according to the nature of the war which is intended, and according to the extent and importance of the services which will be

be required to be performed by these respective corps.

As it frequently happens that an officer, not an engineer by profession, is charged with the command of a fortified place, I shall terminate this Chapter, by briefly stating the measures he is to pursue previously, and necessarily, to be enabled, in case the place is invested, or besieged, to make a vigorous and long defence. If the activity, the valour, and intelligence of the Commanding Officer can sometimes supply the want of these means, as happened in the year 1792, during the long and glorious defence of Thionville, such examples are rare, and cannot justify a general who neglects to collect, and arrange, the materials that are calculated, and which he requires for facilitating a defence, and ensuring the most complete success.

For every hundred infantry, there ought to be in the garrison ten artillery-men, and ten troopers mounted, two hundred sets of spare arms, and six hundred flints. For every ten pieces of cannon, there ought to be two howitzers, and two mortars, five spare carriages, thirty cannisters, or quilted grape rounds fixed to cartridges, and four hundred cartridges for round shot.* Tal-
low,

* The expression, *trente gargouffes à mitraille, quatre cents de siège*, means either that number of rounds for each gun,

low, new wax, white and black rosin, pitch, fascines, gabions, pikets, matches, grenades, wind-mills, fire-engines, and magazines for containing stores of provisions, must all be provided.

The powder magazines must be so situated as not to be exposed to the fire of the enemy. There must be baking ovens, convenient and secure situations for the sick, medicines, linen, lint for wounds, and also heaps of earth to be ready to be carried where there may be occasion for it. There must be proper barracks for such of the troops as the casemates will not contain. The ramparts ought to be in good repair. The covert-way must be palisaded, and the glacis in good order. Spades, pick-axes, mattocks, hatchets, and hand-barrows, and carts, or tumbrils, must be in readiness.

As to provisions, for each man in garrison, the public stores are to contain two sacks of grain, or flour, a cord, or chump, or certain quantity of wood, sixty pounds of salted meat, or smoked flesh, a pot of brandy, the same of vinegar, twelve pounds of rice, twenty-four pounds of dried, or preserved vegetables, twelve pounds of

actually made up, or as many cartouches for carrying cartridges in, of both descriptions, for serving the guns. The meaning is certainly obscure, as *gargouffe* is a cartridge made of paper or parchment; and, therefore, it is translated, *cartridges with grape, or round, fixed to them.*

salted

salted butter, the same of candles, and a pint of lamp oil. For every horse there must be provided thirty-six quintals, or hundred weights of hay, eighteen quintals, or hundred weights of straw, and eighteen sacks of oats.

CHAPTER XVIII.

On the Assembling, and on the Marches of a great Army.

THE assembling of an army ought to be so combined and ordered, that all the battalions, and all the squadrons which compose it, may arrive on the same day, at the appointed place. If an army is intended to act offensively, its movements must be all calculated to mislead and deceive the enemy. If an army is to act on the defensive, it must be marched under the walls, or before the place, or town, which it is apprehended the enemy intends to attack.*

The

* The sentence runs in French, in the original, thus, “ *Si une armée doit agir offensivement, il faut diriger sa marche sous ou devant une place qu’on craint que l’ennemi n’attaque.* ”— Though there are no errata attached to this volume, it requires
but

The order of march has a reference to the order of battle, and the two should correspond as nearly as circumstances will admit. In marching on plains, and in a level country, the cavalry cover the infantry; and in an intersected, uneven country, the infantry cover the cavalry.—Both these species of force cover the artillery.*

Pioneers

but little knowledge of the art of war, to see that the adverb *offensivement*, ought to have been printed *defensivement*, which is scarcely a French word, to convey the meaning intended by the author; as an army that was to act *offensively*, would not *sit down under the walls of a place threatened with an attack*; but would, without hesitation, bring the enemy to action, or drive him out of the province, in order to relieve the place menaced with a siege.

* General Lloyd writes in his *Political and Military Rhapsody*, that in the manner our line is now formed, not a third of the army is engaged; and that, successively; so that numbers are of no use, and only serve to retard its motions, and to increase its expence. He proposes leaving an interval of one hundred and fifty yards between each battalion or regiment. In rear of these intervals, he places cavalry in two lines, at proper distances, each squadron separately, with intervals to manœuvre upon. He says that by this means you extend your line, bring the whole into action, render a general movement more independent and rapid, have cavalry ready to cut up the enemy if they break the line, and to follow up the enemy if beat; and that this method of arrangement is *general, and equally adapted to every species of country*, combining the action of infantry, cavalry, and heavy artillery. These suggestions evince a military genius, possessed in an eminent degree by general Lloyd. A line formed with intervals, would probably

Pioneers are to be always ready at the head of a division of the army, whatever may be the number of divisions. Portable bridges will be in readiness, to be used in passing morasses, and to be thrown over rivulets : patrols of cavalry are stationed on the flanks, to prevent the soldiers from straggling, and leaving the column.

When an army is marching at a distance from the enemy, each division is to be formed into a separate column, and each brigade even ; because the general march becomes, thus, less embarrassed, and more easily conducted, each division moving independently, though generally connected.

When on the contrary, an army marches nearly situated to an enemy, the whole must march in one general column, in order readily to form close column, in case of necessity. The march must be slow, or in ordinary time ; pivot distances must be accurately maintained. The heavy baggage is to be left in a secure situation, and the light baggage must be left at a sufficient distance in the rear, in order that it may not impede the operations of the army.

In all marches, cavalry precede, in order to
bably, hardly march well in line, without constantly throwing up, and exposing the flanks of battalions. The position of the cavalry might be eligible, and in lieu of dangerous intervals, companies wheeled backward, would open spaces for cavalry to pass through.

reconnoitre.

reconnoitre. If the march is on a plain, other cavalry will sustain those out on discovery. In a close or intersected country, infantry must support cavalry detached to reconnoitre.

Forced marches, especially by night are, as much as possible, to be avoided; they fatigue in the extreme, the officers and soldiers, and occasion the capture of the van, and of those reconnoitring.

When a body of men, of any description, have to pass a defile, it must necessarily halt to be in compact order, previous to passing. The battalions and squadrons are to form in close order, or in close order of columns, in double line of general columns, if the breadth of the defile admits of such formation. The pioneers precede the column, followed close by the artillery.

As to marches, there are ten distinct species of them, each of which requires its respective disposition, or arrangement of formation. These are, 1st, the march towards an enemy, in order to bring him to action; 2d, the march calculated to avoid an engagement; 3d, the march in order to change the position of a camp, for a more convenient situation; 4th, the march intended to cut off the provisions and supplies of the enemy, and to deprive him of any particular local advantages; 5th, the march for the purpose of drawing the enemy into another country; 6th, the march

march for the purpose of preventing the enemy from entering a certain country; 7th, the march in order to pass a river or defile before an enemy, and sometimes in the face of an enemy; 8th, the march to prevent an enemy from passing a river or defile; 9th, the march in order to cover a fortified place, which the enemy forms a design of laying siege to; 10th, and finally, the march for the purpose of investing a place.

The order of march previous to the attack of an enemy, can only be ascertained by accurate reconnoitring. In a former chapter, I have fully laid down the method of reconnoitring in the most perfect manner. By a quick aptitude, or judging by the eye, termed *coup-d'œil*, it will be obvious on which side the enemy can be attacked to the greatest advantage. By *coup-d'œil*, or quickness of judging by the eye, a general readily ascertains distances. An officer who is fond of his profession, will acquire this *coup-d'œil*, or readiness of measuring distances by the eye, and of judging of a country, either while engaged in the chase, or by military practice compared with actual measurement, or, by military manœuvres in time of peace. Attachment to the military profession, and an ambition to excel, will contribute chiefly to the acquisition of this useful quality.

To avoid a battle, on a march where the enemy

my follows close, and presses, the general rules are, to march in close columns; to march very slow, though not above a league in four hours; to preserve distances of columns;* to retire if necessary, by echellons, that is, by presenting formidable fronts to the enemy; to employ the pioneers constantly in forming, and throwing obstacles to impede the progress of the march of the enemy; such as abbatis, breaking down bridges, and digging pits, which will hinder the enemy from following: and after having placed these obstacles between you and the enemy, to form the line, to give an advantageous commanding situation to your batteries behind the defiles you have passed; and to deceive the enemy so far as to make him believe that you offer him battle, while your real object is to avoid it.

An army retreating in the face of an enemy,

* *Ne jamais perdre ses distances*, is an expression by which the author would be supposed to mean the preservation of wheeling distances; but though this is the meaning of the expression, yet as the army, in a previous expression (*colonnes serrées*) is directed to march in *close column*, the maintenance of distances of columns is the sense that must be translated. As the author, however, has made use of an expression, *ne jamais perdre ses distances*, which in tactical accuracy, is *only* applicable to the open column, and means preserving wheeling distances previous to formation of line, it is probable that he was not aware of having recommended a march in close column, as best adapted to the situation described.

cannot

cannot march above three or four leagues a day, without opening out, losing wheeling distances, (*sans perdre ses distances*) and running a risk of being beat.

The general, who at the commencement of a campaign, first assembles his forces, and marches forward, fully prepared, will acquire a great advantage over his enemy not yet assembled.

Previous to assembling an army, the troops will countermarch in various ways, in order to alarm the enemy, and to conceal from him the real situation where the whole are to unite in force, and to penetrate into the enemy's country.* A force is frequently repelled by another force,

* It is necessary to draw the line of distinction between two words, the meanings of which are very frequently confounded. These are *strategy* and *tactics*; the former being peculiarly applicable to the operations of light troops, and the latter to those of heavy infantry and cavalry. All military movements at a great or considerable distance from the enemy, and beyond the range of the enemy's guns, may be termed *strategy*, or the science of stratagem. All military movements made near to an enemy, by regular rules, founded on the doctrine of lines, combined with common curves, may be denominated *tactics*. If these definitions are not founded in just etymology, they are, at least, applicable to general practice. *Strategy* may be peculiarly the science of a Commander in Chief, and the French express it, aptly, by their term of *Ruse de guerre*. *Strategy* comprehends the whole science of marching with a view to defensive

force, which is got the better of by a stratagem, in preference to risking an hazardous action.

When

defensive, or offensive operations: and also the knowledge, the result of experience, which enables a commander to select judiciously, situations for encampments, posts, and lines to be intrenched. *Tactics* include all deliberate formations previous to action, and all those rapid changes of front, and alteration of arrangement in action, which are calculated to take the flank of an enemy, and to decide the fortune of the day; or to retreat, with a degree of judgment, even superior to that which directs movements productive of the most brilliant success. *Attack* and *defence* embracing a considerable extent of country, and combining the united operations of *strategy* and *tactics*, may be termed *grand tactics*; or *war*, whose leading axioms are, as follow, principally:

Magazines, and fortresses to secure them.

Every operation must be supported by a base of fortresses or posts situated in the rear.

The progress of an enemy is retarded, and rendered ultimately abortive, by taking positions on his flanks, more than by opposition in front.

Offensive operations will be opposed by counter attacks on the enemy's flanks and rear.

The enemy's means of subsistence must be made a primary object of operations.

Offensive movements are directed on fixed points, to which all the different attacks tend; and retrograde movements are eccentric, in order to divide the force of the enemy, with a view of resuming the offensive.

Engagements are avoided, by keeping the enemy at a distance. After the loss of a battle, offensive operations are to be resumed.

Every

When the army assembles, an encampment is to be selected, which may, apparently, threaten several of the enemy's posts at once. If the enemy occupies them all, his strength will become weakened. Custine committed this fault, when he wished, and attempted to occupy at the same time, the posts of Bengen, of Crewzenach, those of Openheim, and of Worms; and to leave General Meunier opposite to Mannheim. It was impossible for him to deceive the King of Prussia, and to divert him from the project he formed of passing across Hunfruck towards Mayence.

Every position is liable to be turned *in some sense*.

The enemy is to be diverted in front, while the *real design* is meditated against the flanks, or rear.

Nothing but an extraordinary strength of position can justify waiting for an attack.

Outflanking and enveloping the enemy, with a view of turning his flanks, must be an essential object to be kept *constantly* in view.

The irregular and independent fire of detached corps, harasses the enemy, and facilitates the impression to be made by the charge of troops drawn up in compact order.

Cavalry posted in a second line, in independent squadrons, are requisite to support infantry.

Battles are to be avoided, and the enemy must be alarmed, and reduced by constant skirmishing, and manœuvres day and night, *to wear him out*.

The *reverse* of *all* these maxims is to be studiously avoided.

Every officer knows that an army does not march without reconnoitring the country; without having an accurate map of it; without clearing the roads, and opening communications, and without intelligent guides, capable of conducting each column, each division, and each brigade, by the shortest and most practicable roads, to the ground which they are intended to occupy. The army, in proportion to its strength, is always preceded by an advance-guard. This guard is generally a fifth part of the whole; the nature of the country decides whether this guard is to be composed of more infantry than cavalry, or the reverse.

All the various descriptions constituting the encampment, follow this advanced guard, which must occupy the defiles, the villages, the heights, and the banks of the rivers, in front of the situation destined for the encampment: The advance-guard remains in these posts, till the grand guards are formed and mounted; after which they enter the camp.

If there are four roads, the army will march in four columns; the cavalry on the flanks, and the infantry in the centre. The light baggage follows the columns, and the heavy will be in the rear of the army.

Besides, attention must be paid in making proper
use

use of reconnoiterers (*éclaireurs*), of guards, and other precautions which I have already fully treated of. The march must be always in ordinary time, and in compact order, maintaining wheeling distances, so as to be able, when requisite, to wheel up into line, without previous warnings, and measures of dressing distances, and covering in column.

In defiles, the march must be very slow; when the subdivisions clear the defile, they must run forward one hundred paces, to enable those following to quit the defile: they, then halt, in order to reform, and continue the march at a slow rate.

In passing a defile, the van is composed of infantry, and the cavalry follow; in plains the cavalry take the lead.

A march parallel to that of the enemy is the most hazardous, and requires the greatest precautions. It is necessary, in this case, to be every moment in perfect readiness, to present a front to the enemy, and to wheel up into line.

The marches which are intended to bring the enemy to action, must be conducted with many precautions.

The general must be perpetually on his guard: he must possess a perfect knowledge of a variety of positions in front, adapted to which he must

have, ready calculated, various modes of forming, according to circumstances.

CHAPTER XIX.

*On Defensive and on Offensive War.**

AN army is intended to carry on either a defensive, or offensive war. Each description requires

* There are five species of warfare, viz. *Offensive war*,—*defensive war*,—*la petite guerre*, or war carried on by light armed troops, and detachments,—*guerre de montagne*, or war conducted in mountainous countries,—*guerre à l'œil*, or the species of warfare which includes reconnoitring and procuring intelligence, by taking prisoners, and assuming various disguises to obtain information. This last description of warfare, the French, sometimes term, *envoyer des détachemens à la guerre pour prendre langue*. These five species of war branch out into a variety of modifications, conveying the same general idea. The science of conducting *la petite guerre*, which means attacking and carrying guards, and advanced posts, seizing on convoys, attacking foraging parties, engaging and dispersing detachments, &c. is one of the most important, which a general can possess. Nothing contributes more to weaken and destroy an army, than a continual loss of men and provisions. This description of war, conducted judiciously, frequently draws the enemy into unfavourable situations; where even by

quires preparations, arrangements, and dispositions of a different nature.

If the war is to be of the former kind, the enemy must be deprived of every resource that may enable him to subsist; and, therefore, grain, flour, forage, salted provisions, and cattle, must be secured in the towns, which are liable to sustain a siege. The troops which remain in the field in tents, will occupy positions in the rear of rivers and defiles; and these stations are to be strengthened, and rendered, if possible, imprac-

an inferior army, a general action may be risked, with every probability of success. The talents of *Prince Eugene*, and of *Turenne*, were eminently displayed in deriving the most decided advantages from this active war of detachments. The troops calculated for it, must be hardy, enterprising and bold. The attacks are generally made in dark and rainy weather; during thick fogs, during showers of hail and snow, and in the middle of a storm. Winter is a favourable period for such attacks. In defensive war, the whole army is never to be exposed to the chance of a defeat. The enemy's flanks and rear must be perpetually hung on; he must be confined to one line of operations, by cutting up the roads, destroying the bridges, and throwing up works at passes, far and wide on his flanks. He must be fired on with cannon, howitzers, and fire-arms, perpetually, by fresh troops. All provisions, forage, cattle, carts, horses, grain, hay, straw, and spirits, must be removed from his line of operations. The communications with his depots in his rear, must be cut off. The sure consequence will be, that he will either lay down his arms, or be beat with facility, by a strong detachment of the main army.

ticable. Detachments of considerable strength fall out from the fortified places to attack escorts, to seize on convoys, to retard their arrival at their destinations, or, at least, to cut off a part of them. Reinforcements must be thrown into such places as the enemy intends to lay siege to. This will encourage the garrison, and people, or inhabitants of the town. Every measure must be had recourse to, which may be calculated to gain time, or to occasion a loss of time to the enemy.

Frederick the Great constantly held it as a maxim, that the party which gained time by practising finesse, ultimately succeeded completely (*qui gagne du temps, gagne tout.*) By this means, a skilful general animates and encourages his troops, always liable to be disheartened by a defensive war, which naturally depresses the spirits. If the garrison does not feel a confidence in the general commanding, no time must be lost in appointing a successor of experience and professional repute.

Many circumstances tend to afford a general obliged to carry on a defensive war, strong hopes of being able to convert it into a war of an opposite description. A variety of causes may operate to produce this effect. The enemy carrying on offensive war, is often reduced to the necessity of expending his provisions fruitlessly, and

and without any fixed object of immediate utility: he is obligated to undertake sieges of uncertain issue. If he takes such fortified places as he attacks, he must repair them, and place in them strong garrisons, which will weaken him considerably. On these accounts, though the offensive enemy may have been, originally, very superior, still those acting on the defensive, may prove the stronger of the two at any eligible point, where an attack may be deemed advantageous, or decisive. It was, thus, that Frederick the Great, on the glorious days of the 5th of November and 5th of December, 1757, proved superior to the wings of the combined armies, which he attacked, though they were four times more numerous. From a perfect knowledge of the particular nature and description of the country which is the scene of warfare, and from a reliance on the activity and discipline of troops, the enemy may be forced to advance towards them in the form of an arc of a circle, and this arc may be attacked, at its flanks, before these can possibly be reinforced from the centre.*

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* General Loyd, on very just principles, objects to the present mode of making war. He says our armies, however numerous, are formed into two, or three lines. Between these lines, and the enemy, light troops, often amounting to twenty thousand men, form a chain of observation, to prevent

In defensive war, which, properly speaking, is a war of mere retreating, there is generally no baggage.

the enemy from attacking unexpectedly. Frequently, they are sent out on detachments, to cover, or cut off, convoys, while the main army is acting on a certain line of operation. These light troops are considered as mere scouts, which seldom take a part in a battle. When you advance, or when the enemy advances, these light troops close to the right and left, and are no more heard of till the action terminates. Why they do not form on the enemy's flanks, and create a diversion there, has been often a matter of surprise to judicious military characters. Small bodies of light troops stationed behind hedges, near the high roads, and behind clumps of trees, or in woods, would observe and harass the enemy, annoy his columns, and aid a decisive attack by the main army, more effectually than ten or fifteen thousand men acting in a straggling chain of observation. A regular chain is easily observed by the enemy who manœuvres even under cover of it, whereas a broken chain of detached parties unites, or disperses, in an instant, is, as it were, invisible, and gives immediate information of the minutest movement made by the enemy. The present mode of drawing up armies renders their motion slow. The enemy can calculate his march so as to outflank an opponent who marches on a line perpendicular to his enemy's front. A man, or a body of men can only defend effectually in front; therefore, any formation having for object the flanks and rear, must, generally, succeed; particularly, if columns are attacked before they deploy into line. Redoubts arranged chequer-form, in front of a line, will force the enemy to advance in columns, and afford a facility for an advantageous attack on his flanks. A certain position is too often assumed: all arrangements and calculations are made for fighting

baggage. Previous to retreating, the defiles must be occupied and enlarged, so as that the columns,

ing a battle there, though, in the mean time, the counter-movements of the enemy expose want of professional talents, and shew defects that demand a more able and judicious formation on new ground that promises a moral certainty of success. But the plan of the battle has been laid down, and orders have been issued to decide the day in the first position, though probably against every principle of grand tactics. General Loyd recommends forming a line on a portion of a circle, or rather in three divisions, each being the cord of an arc of a circle, the centre of which is situated in rear of the enemy. Three parts of the army, divided into five parts, he places in the centre, and each of the other two fifths he places, with an interval, on the right and left of the centre three fifth parts. The angle formed by the divisions on the flanks, with that in the centre, will depend on the nature of the ground. If you advance, obliquely, on the enemy's flanks, your own thrown up flanks envelope him, and cut off a wing. These flanks must have a secure retreat, as otherwise, they may be in danger of being cut off. Under this formation, if the enemy advances, all his movements are discovered, and he is in continual danger of being turned. The formation is applicable to every description of ground. The movements of the whole army are independent and quick. The enemy will hardly attack the centre. If he attacks one of the advanced flanks, it may fall back supported by the centre division, while the other advanced flank will attack the flank of the enemy opposite to it, which will be, probably, thus turned and taken in the rear. This method is peculiarly calculated for a defensive war. General Lloyd's method supposes that the enemy will advance in a line parallel to the cord of the arc of a great circle,

columns, on their arrival, may be able to pass with ease. After they have passed the defiles, the advance guard which, generally, consists of a fifth part of the whole, will remain posted near the defile, will front towards the enemy, and cover the retreat, by a fire of artillery and musquetry. The advance guard, the moment it arrives at the defiles, must, immediately, busily occupy itself in rendering it impossible for the enemy to penetrate through them. For this purpose, they will form barricades and abbatis, and they will dig pits, and break down the dikes, so as to make it utterly impracticable for the cavalry to pass through.

In conducting offensive war, the series of operations is altogether different. After the plan of the war is digested, and thoroughly arranged, the town, city, post, or camp which gives a clear and free entry into the enemy's country, and which opens and secures the road to the capital, must be attacked. After the strong-

circle, including the formation he lays down. It is very probable, that the enemy will not advance to the attack on a straight front, and that he will assume a parallel formation, with precautions to avoid being outflanked. By this means, General Loyd's centre division, on account of the intervals between it and the flank divisions, would run a hazard of being turned and cut off, unless supported by strong reserves, with the intervals occupied by horse artillery, and cavalry immediately in the rear.

hold

hold has been taken, grounds and commanding positions will be seized on, and occupied. Depots will be formed in these situations, to enable the army to carry on the war with vigour and activity.

If the country is covered with strong positions, posts, and fortified towns, the army must be stronger in infantry than in cavalry. If, on the contrary, the face of the country is of an open appearance, the cavalry ought to be the more numerous. When the army advances, escorts for convoys only are left on the roads. The banks of rivers are to be occupied in such manner that the enemy can derive no advantage from them, should even the nature of the war change.

When the operations are of an offensive description, no detachments ought to be sent out, and the whole of the force should remain united; otherwise the army will be beat in detail. In a defensive war, the operations are totally different. It is absolutely necessary to detach troops to prevent the enemy from remaining and resting in security. Enterprises must be, unremittingly, planned and executed, in order to change, if possible, the defensive, into an offensive war.

In defensive war, reports must be industriously circulated that the force is greater than it really is.

is. In offensive war, on the contrary, and especially when it is intended to engage the enemy, it must be given out that the army is diminished, and a feint is made of avoiding the enemy, when the object is to bring him, if possible, to action.

When acting on the defensive, feints must be made of undertaking, and attempting the most daring enterprises ; this will, not unfrequently, induce the enemy, instead of attacking, to assume the defensive.

It is essential, in defensive war, to select eligible positions, and not to abandon them but in a case of the most urgent necessity, and also to have defiles between the two hostile armies. In retreating, the enemy must be intimidated from attacking, by assuming an imposing and formidable appearance. By this means, the army will arrive on its ground without being harassed, and without sustaining much loss.

When a progress is made into an enemy's country, the inhabitants of the conquered country must be treated with moderation and mildness, that they may not complain of the want of discipline of the army ; and the contributions and requisitions demanded from them ought to be as moderate as may be, consistent with the absolute wants of the army. In carrying on offensive war, time must not be given to the enemy
to

to recover from his losses, or to be reinforced ; the first blow must be followed up, by attack after attack, to force him to sue for peace, which is not to be granted till he has defrayed the expences of the war. There is danger, however, in requiring too much ; and such terms as may be received without ruin and disgrace to the enemy, ought to be granted, otherwise, the jealousy of the other powers may be excited, and they may force the conqueror to lose the fruit of his victories, and to retire within the limits of his own country.

CHAPTER XX.

*Of the great Battles which, alone, decide the Fate of Empires.**

AS one single battle fought by the two leading armies often decides the destiny of an empire,

* Among other orders, the following were issued by the King of Prussia. Their application is general, and not confined to any particular country, or army.

“ The first line, three deep, shall take care to stand in close order with their ranks equal and straight. The general officers,

pire, the result involving such an object ought not to be hazarded but with a great superiority of

ficers, and officers in general, shall exhort the soldiers to do their duty, and shall make the business of the day appear to them as easy as possible. The non-commissioned officers in the rear, must keep a watchful eye over the men, and beware of throwing the soldiers into confusion by useless words. If a soldier endeavours to run away, the officer or non-commissioned officer, in the rear, shall kill him on the spot, under pain of being broke with infamy. The worst soldiers, and sick, shall be left with the baggage. The field pieces shall be advanced eighty paces before the first line. The grenadiers shall be posted behind the first line, on the right, left, and centre. If the cavalry are repulsed without doing their duty, as at Molwitz, they shall be fired on by the grenadiers, even to exterminating them entirely. The majors and adjutants shall be continually riding along the front of their battalions, to prevent their falling into confusion. The corps de reserve shall be posted, in certain proportions of cavalry and infantry, behind the right and left of the first line, and twenty paces in in its rear.

“ A part of the dragoons shall be posted behind the centre of the first line, and the remainder shall sustain the right wing of the cavalry. The hussars shall sustain the left wing, shall observe the enemy's movements, and act accordingly. If the battle is disputed, and many are killed, a regiment from the right, and another from the left will, as the general may direct, fill up the intervals made, and the second line will advance towards the first. The second line is to be posted 300 paces behind the first, with shouldered arms, and the officers will not permit any man to quit his rank, under pain of being broke. Previous to an action, the officers commanding

of numbers, and a superior description of troops in the highest possible discipline. In no case should

manding platoons shall, very carefully, inspect the arms, &c. of their men, and if any thing is wanting, it must be instantly supplied. The soldiers shall be directed to aim well, and level low. On a signal of three cannon-shot from the centre, the artillery will commence firing, in order to throw the enemy into confusion, and will cease firing on receiving a verbal order to that purpose. The captains and lieutenants of artillery will point their own guns. After the cannonade, the signal for the attack will be given by three cannon-shot.

“ When the army, in close order, shall come within six hundred paces of the enemy, then, in order to familiarize the soldiers with the fire, and to blind them with regard to the danger, they shall begin to fire, regularly, by platoons. The first line continuing to advance charging, shall take care that no regiment shall break the line. The officers, in advancing, shall give the word of command distinctly, and loud, and place themselves one pace before their platoons, that the men may hear them, and that the officers, by seeing their men, may prevent them from hurting each other, by an irregular fire. In case the enemy's cavalry shall pierce the first line, then the regiment which they have pierced, shall face about, and charge them in the rear. If victory declares for his Majesty, then the platoon-firing shall cease, and the cavalry, hussars, and infantry, selected by his Majesty, will proceed in pursuit of the enemy. During the pursuit, no soldier, under pain of death, shall plunder. Previous to the action, the van guard shall not advance above two miles before the army, using every precaution to reconnoitre effectually. The army shall form the line, as may be directed, three miles from the enemy. These dispositions shall invariably be followed.” ——— It must be

should an event of such magnitude be committed to the chance of one great battle, but when it appears decided and clear, that the advantages that may be hoped to arise from gaining the battle, will infinitely counterbalance the disadvantages to be dreaded by losing the day, from a general defeat. Before orders are issued for giving battle, the nature of the ground must be examined, and known, with the most extreme minuteness, and topographical accuracy. Every general, in proportion to his known abilities, and experience, must have his particular duty, in detail, fully explained to him. The arms of every kind are to be, previously, carefully inspected, and ascertained to be in the best condition. The real state of the artillery is to be reported, and it must be numerous, and well found. There must arise no chance of a scarcity

be meant, that the battalion-columns form in contiguous line of close columns, previous to a deployment into line, probably, about 1500 yards from the enemy. Soldiers are frequently directed to *aim low*. The reason is well founded. The visual ray, and the line of the ball, cross each other, from not being parallel, close to the muzzle of the piece. The parabolic curve described by the ball, intersects, again, the visual ray, between the object and the eye, at a distance from the muzzle, in proportion to the strength of the charge, and length of the piece. If the object is within this distance, the aim must be low; and if farther removed, the aim, on the contrary, ought to be taken *higher* than the object.

of

of ammunition of every sort. There must be surgeons and carriages in sufficient number to attend to the wounded, and to convey them to an assigned situation. For want of such a humane precaution, I have seen numbers of brave men perish, when the action has lasted throughout the day, and has been succeeded by a cold and rainy night.

The heavy, and even the light baggage is to be dispensed with. The direction in which the sun shines, in which the wind blows, and in which the dust flies, must be all attended to, to prevent the detrimental effects these circumstances often produce. A commanding and judicious situation will be selected for the field pieces, which are to be posted at advantageous distances. It is to be recommended to the soldiers to cease firing, on hearing a roll of the drums; and if they speak at all, to speak in a low voice, in order that they may distinctly hear the commands of their officers. The brigades ordered to advance must be well supported, and those obliged to fall back, from having suffered severely in action, are to be well covered and protected. The troops must not be permitted to disperse in different directions in pursuit of a flying and routed enemy. The generals of division, the generals of brigade, and likewise the commanding officers of battalions, ought to be

well mounted on strong and active horses, well broke in as chargers, of sufficient height and speed, to enable them to overlook the line, to judge of the movements, and to arrive, quickly, wherever their presence may be necessary. Staff-Officers and aids-de-camp ought also to be well mounted, and skilful horsemen, in order to convey and communicate orders, with celerity, to any brigade to which they may be detached. All defiles in rear of an army are to be occupied, to put it out of the power of the enemy to seize on them. An omission of this kind, in the event of a reverse of fortune, may occasion the loss of the artillery, and even the utter destruction of the whole army.

It is essential that the general should possess a good coup-d'œil, or readiness of judging by the eye, that he may be able, at once, to judge of ground, and to calculate, at sight, the number of troops that are on it, or that may be drawn up on it. This ready habit of judging will enable the general, on the very first movement made by the enemy, to see all the advantages which he may draw from it. A skilful, consummate general will avail himself, ably, of the least height, eminence, defile, hollow road, or morass which the face of the country presents.

Various military positions may be assumed in a square space of no considerable extent, according

according to circumstances, or the probable intentions indicated by the movements of the enemy. A general, who is a master of his profession, will readily ascertain the most advantageous. The study of fortification will contribute much to perfect this talent of singular and indispensable utility.

In short, the force must be disposed of, and arranged, to be ready to act in concert, and without embarrassment, confusion, or disorder, on any requisite point. General Clofen, under whom I served during the whole of the seven years war, possessed, in the highest possible degree, the art of judging, by a quick aptitude of eye, of the advantages and defects of an enemy's positions. He thoroughly understood this useful art, deriving every possible advantage from the nature of the ground, to the prejudice of the enemy. He fixed his batteries so judiciously, that they produced, when opened, a decided effect. As soon as he reconnoitred the enemy, he immediately foresaw the nature and extent of the designs he meditated. In this, particularly, he was never deceived. This general owed his knowledge of this art to fortunate and uncommon talents, and to experience acquired in the war of Bavaria: for as to theory, he had none, and has never perused military authors. Though he was ignorant of the science of engineering,

he frequently, from his habits, corrected faults in redoubts, abbatis, and in defences planned and constructed by those reckoned the most skilful, so judiciously, that the engineers assented to the justness of his suggestions, and found their works, thus, rendered more formidable.

On the day of battle, inferiority of numbers may be compensated by an able choice of ground, by a judicious mode of drawing up the troops, and by an oblique order of battle; that is, by refusing one wing to the enemy, and by reinforcing that which is to attack the enemy.*

It was thus that Frederick the Great, at the battles of Rosbach and Lissa, took the enemy in flank, and vanquished armies four times more numerous than his own.

The enemy is thrown into great confusion, and is much embarrassed, by setting fire to villages situated in his front, and on his flanks, when the wind is blowing towards the enemy. The direc-

* The concluding expression is above, "*c'est à dire, en refusant une aile à l'ennemi, et en renforçant celle qu'il veut attaquer.*" The "*qu'il*" is, probably, an error of the text, and ought to be "*avec laquelle,*" meaning, that the refused wing is to detach a reinforcement to the other wing, which is to advance, in line, or in echellons, to attack the enemy. The expression may be supposed right, if the pronoun "*il*" applies to the general, and it may, then, be translated "*and by reinforcing that wing which he (the general) intends should advance to attack.*"

tion of the wind drives the smoke in the face of the enemy, preventing him from directing his own attacks with certainty, and from avoiding, and taking measures against those made on him.

It must be particularly avoided to draw up troops on ground where their movements are confined, and where they cannot act advantageously. The line must march up, steadily, and boldly, to an attacking enemy, and thus counter-attack unexpectedly. No procedure disconcerts more, and produces a better effect. By gaining ground, the victory is infallibly secured.*

Though

* General Monk observes on offensive war, " that a prince who puts himself upon an offensive war, ought to be master of his enemy in *shipping*, *purse*, and men, or at least, in *shipping* and *purse*, or else he must see some garboils in the state which he assails: and he ought to be called thither by a party, otherwise, it would be a rash enterprise." If this short theory is clear, Buonaparte's enterprise is made out a rash one, in which he depends *entirely* on his fortune. General Monk writes on defensive war, and says, " the best way to prevent any attempt of any foreign enemy, is to be able, and ready to resist his designs; and the best way to do that, is to have a good rich public treasure before hand, and your people not only well trained up in martial discipline, but perfectly satisfied with the government they fight for." If this theory is well founded, the enemy's speculations must prove a losing concern. Kingdoms, or states, though they have received many

Though the whole of the force may not be drawn up in order of battle, or even arrived for the purpose, on the ground, if a favourable opportunity of attacking appears, it must, on no account, be lost. Great and important advantages are often thrown away by irresolution, and temporizing, injudiciously.

If it is not found practicable to cover one of the wings, by the bank of a river, a village, close to a forest, against a morass, or near hollow roads, it will become absolutely necessary to post troops *en potence*, or forming an angle with the flank, which cannot be covered by some one of these objects, in order to outflank (*pour déborder*) the enemy, and to attack him with im-

overthrows, should never cowardly yield themselves up to be slaves to their enemies, or tyrants, but endeavour to look fortune again in the face, and to be ready to overcome, or lose more gloriously, or get honourable terms of agreement. Because, by yielding, they can hope for nothing, but the saving of the lives of the inhabitants, and it will be in the enemy's power to deprive them of those, whenever they think proper: and peace is assuredly more grievous to men in subjection, than war can be to those persons who enjoy their liberty. For it is an incontestable truth, that all men whose last hope and resource rest in their arms, nourish that hope, and grow adventurous in it. A just cause is the best defence against a strong enemy. When experience has confirmed the bad faith of an enemy, any treaty with him in an invaded country, is totally out of the question.

petuosity

petuosity in the rear, in case he may attempt to turn your flank. You will, thus, completely render his design abortive.

The cavalry commences the charge at the distance of four hundred paces from the enemy, throwing itself, precipitately, against the body directly in front. The cavalry, in plains, charges in close and compact line; and with twenty paces only of interval, if acting in an intersected country.

Victorious cavalry must be followed up by infantry, which has, previously, approached as near the enemy as possible, in order to avail themselves of the impression made by the cavalry, and to complete the defeat. Finally, this infantry is followed by light horse, whose duty it will be to seize on the guns, tumbrils, colours, &c. and to take charge of the prisoners.

Great attention is to be bestowed in marking off, and preserving an interval of three hundred paces between the first and second lines. Should the General commanding the second line perceive any opening in the first line, not forming any part of the plan of the order of battle, he will, immediately, order battalions from the second line to advance into, and occupy these unfilled-up spaces.

Every officer of the smallest experience knows, that the heavy artillery, that is, the artillery of

the Park, ought to be stationed on eminences and heights; and that the field-pieces cannonade in front of the battalions. Nothing is risked by posting the field-pieces in front, for as the battle must be either lost or gained, nothing should be neglected to ensure the latter result. If the day is lost, the guns must be lost likewise; and, if gained, the guns, after rendering very essential service, will be preserved. In the event of a defeat, the field train is sometimes saved when an enemy is too cautious, and does not follow up the victory by a vigorous pursuit.

It is understood that provisions are to be in readiness to be distributed to the troops who may require them during the fatigues of a very long and hard-fought action. The resolution and strength of the soldier is supported by timely attention to his nourishment. If you want to vanquish the English easily, attack them fasting; when they have fed heartily on roast beef, and have drank their punch, they fight with more obstinacy than at other times.*

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* “ *Lorsqu'ils se sont remplis de Rosbiff et de Punch, ils combattent avec bien plus d'opiniâtreté.*” Foreigners, in general, always form a very absurd and erroneous estimate of the real English character, and a total ignorance of our manners and customs. An Englishman loves his *king*, his *country*, and its *constitution*, and with gratitude to the Author of his Being, and benevolence and charity to all mankind, enjoys the

The principal consideration is to profit by the first impression made on the enemy, availing yourself of his alarm and consternation without giving him a moment's time to recover from the effects of his terror. After the battle, the wounded are to be attended to, including those of the enemy. The magazines near the field must be seized on, and the towns and cities in the neighbourhood are to be taken or assaulted, while under the impression of terror and alarm.

The brigades marching in ordinary time (*lentement*) in order of battle, or in line, ought to be cautious in pursuing the enemy. This can scarcely be done, without a hazard of being taken in flank, and of losing the fruits of their success. They will slowly follow in close order, the light troops whom they are intended to sustain.*

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the manifold blessings attached to the happy lot of having been born in a land of freedom. The Translator of these sheets has been much among the French, and is sorry to say, that his experience has not furnished him with very ample materials for panegyrising their general character, and of the French he must say, that no nation is more addicted to sensual excesses, and that the monkey and the tiger sleep only to make room for less ludicrous and less ferocious propensities. There are exceptions to all general rules, but when an author forgets himself, and makes illiberal remarks, he must expect to hear more truth than he was aware of.

* In expectation of a landing by the French in 1755, Major General Wolfe issued some orders to the 20th regiment,
lying

The discouragement of the troops, and the disadvantageous opinion they entertain of a
General

lying at Canterbury. Many of them are well calculated at the present time. "Whoever throws away his arms, unless they become unserviceable, must expect to be tried by a General Court-Martial. If a serjeant leaves his platoon, or does not take the command of it when the officer falls, he will be tried by Court-Martial. Neither officer, non-commissioned officer, nor soldier, is to leave his platoon, or abandon his colours, for a flight wound. While a man is able to do his duty, and can stand and hold his arms, *it is infamous to retire*. The battalion is not to halloo, or cry out, till they are ordered to charge with the *bayonet*; in that case, and when they are on the point of rushing on the enemy, the battalion may give a warlike shout, and rush in on the enemy. Whoever begins to fire without orders, will be put to death on the spot. The cowardice, or irregular behaviour of one or two men, is enough to put a whole battalion in danger. A soldier that quits his rank, or offers to fly, is to be instantly put to death by the officer who commands the platoon, or by the officer or serjeant in the rear of the platoon. A soldier does not deserve to live who will not fight for his King and Country. If a non-commissioned officer, or soldier, leaves his platoon, and joins, afterwards, unhurt, he shall be reputed a coward, and tried for his life. The drummers are to remain with their companies, and to assist the wounded. Every officer and non-commissioned officer must remain at his post steadily, during the action, to preserve order and obedience. The confusion occasioned by the loss of men, and the noise of the artillery and musquetry, will require every officer's strictest attention to his duty. When the files are reduced by casualties, they are to be completed as soon as possible by the assiduity of
the

General who has lost the day, though he may have evinced the highest professional talents, are

the officers, and non-commissioned officers in the rear. The whole battalion is not to pursue the enemy, but the grenadiers and piquet will be detached for this duty, followed by the battalion, in regular order. If platoon-firing is ordered, it will be continued regularly from centre to flanks, or from flanks to centre, till an order is given to advance, to charge with bayonets. If a body of less front than the battalion is attacked, the companies towards the wings must fire obliquely, to right and left. A steady, well-levelled, and cool fire, is preferable to a quick, and irregular fire. The soldiers take their orders from their officer, who is to give them with coolness and resolution. If a battalion in first line is thrown into disorder, and retreats, the one in its rear, in the second line, will form openings, through which the first will retire; and the battalion in second line, will move up to occupy the place of the other. If breaches are to be made in the enemy's line for the cavalry to fall in upon them, the grand divisions of the regiment are to form a firing column of three equal parts in depth; they are to march forward, and pierce the enemy in four places, that the cavalry may enter and destroy them. The first of the three platoons will fire, and immediately present their bayonets. These attacking columns are to preserve their interval in advancing to the attack. All attacks at night are to be made with bayonets, unless when the troops are posted with no other design than to alarm, harass, or fatigue the enemy, by firing at their out-posts, or into their camp. If a battalion attacks the enemy's camp, or quarters, in the night, all possible means, no doubt, will be used to surprise them; but if they are found in arms, they are to be vigorously attacked with the bayonet. It is needless to think of firing in the night, because of the confusion

are melancholy considerations, apt to be attended with very pernicious consequences. To diminish the

fusion it creates, and the uncertainty of hitting any object in the night. A column that receives the enemy's fire, and falls immediately in among them, must necessarily defeat them, and create a very great disorder in their army. The death of a platoon-officer must not produce confusion or disorder in it; for, while an officer or non-commissioned officer remains, no man is to abandon his colours, or betray his country. The place of a field-officer who falls, will be filled up by a captain. If a battalion is invested by a great superiority in a post they are not required to defend to the last, there is only one remedy, which is, in close and compact order, at night, to pierce the enemy's line resolutely, and to retire in the order best calculated with respect to the force, the nature of the country, and the enemy. The battalions are always to be prepared to advance to the charge of the bayonet. Attempts must be always made to turn the flanks of the enemy, in order to take them in rear, provided their flanks are not covered by strong ground, or detachments. The flank-companies are to be accustomed to these useful movements. If a body, which has been firing on the enemy from behind a hedge, is obliged to retire, the men must cover each other as much as possible, in order to be in the least degree exposed to the fire of the enemy, which has driven them from their post. All little parties that are intended to fire on the enemy's columns of march, and on their advanced and rear guard, are to post themselves so as to be able to annoy the enemy without danger, and to cover themselves behind hedges, trees, walls, ditches, or any other protection. When forced to retire, these parties are again to take post similarly, and to keep up a perpetual fire. When a considerable detachment is to be posted to annoy the enemy

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the bad impression which the loss of the victory may have given of his talents and good fortune, he must not retreat, rapidly, to the distance of forty leagues, as did the Soubises and Contades, after the battles of Rossbach and Munden. He must shew that he is not disheartened: he must reform his army: he must halt at the first advan-

on his march, measures are to be taken to cover its retreat securely, if obliged to retire. If the seat of war should be in this strong inclosed country, it will be managed chiefly by fire, and every inch of ground, that is proper for defence, will be obstinately disputed with the enemy; in which case, the soldiers will see the advantages of levelling well, and of the various manœuvres which they may not now comprehend. They will annoy the enemy with facility and much effect, by moving actively from cover to cover, according to circumstances. They are to make feints of retiring sometimes, in order to draw the enemy into dangerous situations, where they will be taken in flank, by little ambuscades. If intrenchments are to be attacked, small columns of attack will be formed, and soldiers scattered between them will clear the parapets, which the columns are to storm resolutely. In defending intrenchments, the attacking party is to be fired on when within two hundred yards; and, when they attempt to mount the parapet, they are met with a *bloody resistance* with the bayonet."

Though some few of the above orders may not be strictly conformable to the present system of tactics, these general rules and directions may be attended to, and practised with great effect by light troops and flankers, whose annoying movements and unceasing action will consume the enemy, and render him incapable of any vigorous resistance.

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tageous position: and he must feign and display an appearance of being determined to take his revenge, as Frederick the Great did after he was surpris'd at Hohenkirgen. He had lost all his artillery; his troopers were mounted without saddles; he had few or no fire-arms; and, nevertheless, he offered battle to the Austrians, who did not dare to engage him.

Battles are indispensable to terminate contests that would be, otherwise, endless. When a General is reduced to the necessity of fighting a battle, it may be assumed as a founded fact, that his misconduct has given rise to this otherwise unavoidable necessity. It is a decided proof of consummate talents in a General, to manœuvre so skilfully, as to force his opponent to commit his fortune to the issue of a battle.

When two armies are equally animated with a desire of engaging, the contest is soon decided.

An enemy, who hangs on my rear, forces me to fight. An enemy, also, who meditates a junction with some other force at no great distance, will render it necessary to bring him to action before he effects his design.

Glaring want of skill and generalship made evident by the movements of an enemy, are decided inducements for bringing him to a battle before he becomes sensible of the faults he has committed, and has had time to repair them, by
again

again studying positions and circumstances. A choice of weak positions, posting the wings on ground which does not secure them against being turned, leaving defiles in the rear unoccupied, marching forward without all the necessary precautions and attentions to the preservation of wheeling distances, and distances of other descriptions; all these are among the greatest errors which a General may fall into. In these cases, the fire of the artillery and of the musquetry may prove more dangerous to yourself than to the enemy; and, at all events, the fire will be thrown away and useless, for want of corresponding dispositions to give it effect.

A message indistinctly delivered by an Aid-de-camp, or a gross mistake or misconception, may occasion the loss of a battle. The death of a General may, also, produce a defeat, by the immediate discouragement and dejection such a circumstance will occasion. On this account, he ought not to expose himself but in situations where he must animate his army by his example, and stimulate it to uncommon exertion. A treacherous conduct in a General, or on the part of his officers, is the greatest misfortune which can happen, but fortunately such instances are rare.

Previous to a battle, the General will ride along the lines, addressing the soldiers, and
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animating them to deeds of glory. He will inspire them to fight with determined resolution, by representing their triumph as certain, and peace, repose, indulgence, and rewards, as the undoubted fruits of the victory.


The steadiest and most experienced men must be stationed in a fourth, or supernumerary rank, to encourage and keep in order the ranks and files, and to oppose those inclined to give way. In advancing in line, the fourth rank will observe that the ranks lock well up, using every exertion to cause the line to advance firm and steady, that the charge of the bayonet may be given powerfully, and effectually among the ranks of the enemy. The precision of the shock, and the momentum of the charge, will depend much on the previous attention of the supernumerary rank.

If, previous to the attack, some of the soldiers are observed to grow pale and tremble, it is better, in imitation of the Romans, to send them to the stations of the surgeons, under a pretence of sickness, than to allow them to remain in the ranks. Some faint-hearted men, successively, betraying symptoms of fear, during an advance to a charge, or under a galling fire, communicate their terror to others, and frequently occasion the defeat of a whole army. The brigades posted supporting each other, push on resolutely in
very

very close and compact order, in defiance of the fire of the enemy. This determined mass, like a devouring flame, burning with the patriotic love of their country, collecting all their force for a decisive effort, and animated with fury, fall like a thunder-bolt on the enemy, and snatch from him a victory which he has calculated on obtaining, and firmly believes already to be completely decided in his favour.


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
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Wimpffen, François Louis Hérold <<de>>,

The experienced officer, or instructions by the General of Division,
Francis Wimpffen, to his sons, and to all young men intended for the
military profession being a series of rules laid down by General Wimpffen,
to enable officers of every rank, to carry on war, in all its branches and
descriptions, from the least important enterprises and expeditions, to the

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